The Real Victor: The Arab Media Debate on China and the Iran War

On March 11, 2026, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2817. Proposed by Bahrain and backed by fellow Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries as well as Jordan, the resolution condemns “in the strongest terms” Iran’s “egregious attacks” against Gulf states, deeming them a clear breach of international law and demanding their immediate cessation. Far from a purely symbolic rebuke of Tehran’s claim that its actions were an inevitable retaliatory response to U.S. and Israeli aggression, the resolution establishes legal obligations that could, in principle, open a pathway toward enforcement.

With 135 co-sponsors, Resolution 2817 secured unprecedented international support, marking an apparent diplomatic victory for the GCC. Yet, there was no unanimity within the Security Council itself: thirteen members voted in favor, while China and Russia abstained. Moscow had tabled its own alternative, more generic draft that avoided naming specific actors, but it failed to gain traction despite Beijing’s support. China’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Ambassador Fu Cong explained the abstention by stating that while Beijing “does not go along with Iran’s attacks against the Gulf Arab states,” the resolution failed to “fully reflect the root cause and the overall picture of the conflict in a balanced manner.” This stance, alongside China’s opposition to the use of force, was behind its subsequent coordination with France and Russia to dilute, delay and veto a follow-up Bahraini draft resolution to reopen the Strait of Hormuz by force.

China’s rhetoric and diplomacy have not gone unnoticed in the Arabic media and expert debate. As examined in recent editions of the ChinaMed Observer, Beijing’s abstention reflects its balancing act: preserving its “strategic partnership” with Iran – to oppose the U.S. – while signaling concern over violations of GCC sovereignty, in light of the region’s importance to China’s energy security and economic interests.

This ChinaMed Observer examines how experts in the GCC and pan-Arab media interpreted China’s response to the war. The relatively limited coverage reveals less a unified assessment than a pattern of projection: seeing in Beijing what aligns with their own strategic narratives. The Gulf press often portrayed China as distant yet ultimately benign, lacking affinity with Iran and sharing the GCC’s security and economic concerns. In contrast, alternative pan-Arab outlets framed the conflict as part of a wider global struggle, casting China as aligned with, and allegedly providing military support to Iran and the “resistance.” Between these extremes, a smaller group of experts offered more calibrated assessments of China’s engagement. Yet, what ultimately unites these otherwise divergent readings is a shared conclusion: China is the long-term winner of this unwanted war.

Is China Still Ambivalent on Iran?

Despite the gravity of the crisis enveloping the Gulf, China’s ambivalent posture has not featured much in the Arab expert debate. This is not to say that Chinese statements or initiatives have gone unnoticed; rather, they have been consistently eclipsed by far more urgent and contentious issues. For instance, Gulf commentators have been engaging in a heated debate on whether GCC states should intervene militarily against Iran, whether U.S. and Israeli actions reflect an unforgivable disregard for Gulf security, whether continued reliance on the American security architecture remains viable, and whether Iran can still be regarded as a credible partner. That such an unusually candid debate is also unfolding within the Gulf’s tightly managed media environment only further reflects the depth of regional unease; revealing diverging positions even within the GCC (for an ongoing overview of this debate check out the Substack The Gulf Nashra).

Within this high-intensity context, China’s diplomatic messaging and mediation proposals, though reported, initially drew scant attention from Arab experts. This indifference has persisted over the past month of war, despite Beijing’s outreach through Special Envoy Zhai Jun and peace proposal with Pakistan. This response was likely less an oversight than a judgment: China’s role is probably seen as lacking credibility.

This is nothing new. As previously observed, Arab expert discourse during the “Twelve-Day War” showed little sustained interest in Chinese mediation efforts. Instead, attention centered on China’s relationship with Iran, probing Chinese rhetoric, and more tellingly, inaction. Beyond condemning U.S. and Israeli strikes, China allegedly provided no material support to Tehran, a restraint that clashed with the supposed depth of Sino-Iranian ties. Beijing is not only the main purchaser of sanctioned Iranian oil, but also supported Tehran – with which it signed a 25-year agreement in 2020 – in joining the BRICS+ and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. In the aftermath, this gap was closely scrutinized by Gulf-based analysts, several of whom viewed Iran’s predicament with thinly veiled satisfaction.

A similar dynamic re-emerged in the early phase of the current war. Coverage by outlets such as Al Jazeera, Asharq Al-Awsat, and the Jordanian daily Al-Ghad mostly sought to explain Beijing’s reluctance to provide direct support to Iran, and apparent effort to maintain diplomatic distance. Much of this reporting, however, relied heavily on Western sources (including the Associated Press, The Wall Street Journal, and The Telegraph) which have framed China as unreliable and having “little to offer Iran beyond statements.” Against the backdrop of early U.S. and Israeli operational successes, including the assassination of Ayatollah Ali Khamanei, this narrative framed China as ineffectual in shaping outcomes or protecting its partners, raising questions about the credibility of its global ambitions.¹

As such, many Arab commentators have reported on, and in some cases even accepted, the Western‑framed idea that the war against Iran may be intended, at least in part, to indirectly undermine Beijing’s energy supply, regional influence, and challenge to the Western‑led order. This narrative has circulated widely as Western observers likely search for strategic explanations for a war that is damaging both the global economy and U.S. reputation.²

Where China drew sustained attention from Arab media was, unsurprisingly, in speculation over potential military support to Iran. For example, the UAE-based news outlet 24.ae, citing Israel’s Channel 12, reported that despite two years of negotiations with Russia and China, Iran ultimately did not receive advanced anti-ship cruise missiles. The implication is clear: both Moscow and Beijing appear content to remain at arm’s length, unwilling to risk direct confrontation with Washington for the sake of Tehran.³

Yet, Ahmed Aboudouh, head of the China Studies Unit at the Abu Dhabi-based Emirates Policy Center, offered a more nuanced assessment shortly before the outbreak of war. Writing for Chatham House in his capacity as an Associate Fellow with its Middle East and North Africa Programme, Aboudouh cautioned against the prevailing Western interpretation that China’s restraint signals unreliability, indifference toward Tehran, or a lack of strategic ambition in the Middle East.⁴

For Aboudouh, “This assessment… is hasty. It misses the long-term lessons that the 12-day war revealed about China’s position on the nuclear negotiations. It also overlooks Beijing’s main objectives for its future relations with Tehran.” According to him, China’s approach is closely tied to its opposition to a nuclear-armed Iran, which may trigger a regional war. Such a war would endanger critical shipping lanes, disrupt China’s energy imports, and expose Gulf states “where China’s commercial interests far outweigh its ties with Tehran.” It could even accelerate nuclear proliferation among Japan, South Korea, and Australia, complicating China’s more immediate strategic environment.

“Given this, it may even be fair to assume that Beijing would tolerate limited US-Israeli strikes on Iran as a negotiating tactic if they could secure a diplomatic breakthrough that resolved the Iranian nuclear issue without triggering an all-out regional war.”

A weakened Iran, whether from U.S. or Israeli military strikes or domestic unrest, may even serve Chinese interests. While Beijing remains opposed to regime collapse which may potentially yield a Western-aligned government, a more fragile Iran is likely to become increasingly dependent on China economically, technologically, and diplomatically.

Chinese Support to Iran: Marginal, Decisive or Unacknowledgeable?

As the war escalated, a growing analytical strand across the Arab world began to frame the conflict as benefiting China, in particular by distracting the U.S. from East Asia and Taiwan.⁵ This shift appears partly driven by a continued reliance on Western reporting, which adopted this narrative.⁶ In particular, The Economist’s widely circulating cover, “Never Interrupt Your Enemy When He’s Making a Mistake,” attracted notable interest, reinforcing the portrayal of the war as a costly U.S. miscalculation that could ultimately strengthen Beijing’s global position.⁷ As analyzed in the previous ChinaMed Observer, this perspective also became popular among Chinese analysts and official commentary, which are increasingly cited in the Arabic press.⁸

At the same time, a divergence emerged between media within and outside the Gulf with regard to China’s military role in the crisis. An earlier consensus, shared across Western, Gulf, and even Chinese reporting, had held that Beijing was largely leaving Iran to confront U.S. aggression alone. This assumption has since come under scrutiny as Iran proved far more resilient than initially anticipated. Consequently, several Western analysts began to seriously consider how China, alongside Russia, may be providing more direct forms of assistance, including satellite-based and radar targeting support. In recent reports by ABC News and The Washington Post, MizarVision – a Chinese geointelligence AI-firm, has been repeatedly highlighted as a possible channel through which Tehran may be obtaining intelligence that enabled it to accurately target U.S. assets. This interpretation, however, has been contested.⁹

Despite earlier reliance on Western reporting, these claims only marginally trickled down into Gulf media. In this regard, Ezz El Din Abdel Mawla, the director of research at the Al Jazeera Center for Studies, suggested that even if China had provided intelligence to Iran, its support has so far not played a decisive role:

“I think there is exaggeration about them, as the relations between Tehran and Beijing in this field are very recent and cannot be compared, for example, to the Chinese-Pakistani relations… It appears that Iran is using some Chinese technologies to develop its ballistic missiles and jamming and tracking systems, but it will take some time for Chinese weapons to become a key component of Iran’s defensive and offensive arsenal.”¹⁰

Beyond Qatari sources acknowledging Chinese involvement but downplaying it, the rest of the Gulf press remains notably silent on the issue. Even when reporting on MizarVision and its capacity to monitor U.S. military forces, Saudi royal family-owned Al Arabiya stops short of considering whether such intelligence could be shared with Tehran.¹¹ This silence may partly reflect China’s marginality in the war’s operational dimension. However, it may also point to deliberate editorial caution: attributing indirect responsibility to China would risk implicating it in Iranian strikes against Gulf states, thereby complicating relations with a partner still viewed as diplomatically and economically indispensable.

Outside the Gulf, however, a markedly different narrative emerges, particularly in “resistance-aligned” media outlets such as Al Mayadeen, known for its pro-Hezbollah and pro-Iran editorial line. Writing in this vein, Egyptian researcher Ibrahim Younis frames the Iran war as a global struggle:

“the declared objective of destroying the nuclear program and missile capabilities was merely the necessary facade for a broader and more far-reaching project aimed at dismantling the central link connecting Chinese and Russian strategic projects in the heart of Eurasia with the vital sea and land routes in West Asia… this war, in its deep essence, is directed against Beijing and Moscow as much as it is directed against Tehran and the entire axis of resistance.”¹²

Younis further reports claims of extensive Chinese military support to Iran, ranging from anti-stealth aircraft radar and layered air defense platforms to access to the BeiDou navigation system and expanded electronic warfare cooperation. In his account, this Chinese support explains both the difficulties faced by U.S. and Israeli forces in securing air superiority and Iran’s ability to strike important targets with notable precision, including across the Gulf.

These views may reflect the biases – or, more accurately, aspirations – of resistance-aligned analysts.¹³ However, such claims extend even to more institutional voices which have also acknowledged the possibility of limited Chinese involvement. For instance, Egyptian Major General Samir Farag, in an interview with Masrawy (while cautioning against inflating this “fierce but limited regional war” into a “third world war”) suggests that China is likely providing intelligence support “from afar” to sustain Iran’s resilience without provoking direct confrontation with the U.S.¹⁴

Taken together, these perspectives stand in marked contrast to much of the Gulf press, which continues to portray China as aligned with GCC interests,¹⁵ by either dismissing implicitly the possibility of meaningful Chinese support to Iran, or framing any such cooperation as a byproduct of Beijing’s transactional diplomacy, as recently argued by Jonathan Fulton. As such, even when awareness of potential China-Iran collaboration exists in the Gulf, it is often interpreted through this pragmatic lens which refrains from attributing responsibility to Beijing – an assessment that is being taken seriously everywhere else.

Chinese Mediation

When asked whether China helped achieve the recent, very fragile two-week ceasefire, U.S. President Donald Trump said “I hear yes.” Nonetheless, given the conflicting information around this ceasefire agreement, it is worth noting that Chinese mediation efforts, including the five-point plan advanced with Pakistan, have attracted limited attention in Arabic media (even resistance-aligned outlets appear to show greater interest in China’s alleged military role than in its diplomatic initiatives). Moreover, when the proposal is addressed, the focus tends to cast Pakistan rather than China as the primary actor. While there are a few exceptions,¹⁶ when Chinese mediation efforts were analyzed, they were generally interpreted through a narrow lens: China is seen as economically motivated yet strategically risk-averse and, as such, not fully committed to enforcing a peace agreement.¹⁷

This is the line of Basil Al-Hajj Jassim, writing for the Lebanese newspaper Al-Nahar, who characterized China as a “silent mediator, encouraging de-escalation and exerting discreet pressure on all sides,” but unwilling to bear the costs of direct confrontation with the West – which would expose its firms and economy to sanctions. Although China wishes to contrast U.S. hegemony and secure Iranian oil imports, “its position is governed by a delicate balance: sufficient support to prevent collapse and continuous pressure to avoid escalation.”¹⁸

A more critical perspective is offered by Joyce Karam, editor-in-chief of Al-Monitor, who dismissed China’s proposal as a “calculated headline grabber” which “scores points with Global South audiences” amid U.S. missteps. She argued that China lacks both the leverage and the trust required to act as an effective mediator, particularly for actors such as Israel.¹⁹

A similarly critical perspective emerges in an in-depth report by the Emirates Policy Center’s China Studies Unit, led by Ahmed Aboudouh. Analyzing the joint Sino-Pakistani proposal, the report concurred that Beijing lacks both the leverage and the security footprint to enforce compliance in any future agreement. Nevertheless, it argued that China’s engagement signals a form of quiet alignment with core U.S. objectives, namely de-escalation and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz as a global shipping artery rather than an Iranian-controlled chokepoint. In this interpretation, Beijing’s posture reflects a broader risk-management strategy aimed at preserving long-term strategic stability in its relationship with Washington.²⁰

The report also outlines several potential trajectories. Should the war drag on, China may pursue more pragmatic arrangements with Iran, securing access to energy exports and shipping routes in exchange for deeper economic cooperation, including providing dual-use technology and supporting Iran’s defense-industrial recovery. Yet, the report warns that such close ties with Iran risk straining China’s relations with Gulf states following the end of the war, particularly in light of Iranian strikes against GCC states.

Offering a different, nuanced analysis of Chinese mediation is Palestinian researcher Razan Shawamreh. Writing in The New Arab, a London-based, Qatari-funded media outlet, she posited that “from Beijing’s perspective, peacebuilding does not imply direct Chinese involvement in achieving peace, especially in the Gulf region.”²¹

“This is not a criticism of its policy, but rather an attempt to place the policy in its proper context, to answer the question: Where does China stand on regional wars, such as the war of annihilation in Gaza and the current war, including the attack on the Gulf? For China, regional peace can primarily be achieved by the countries of the region themselves, not by China or any other external party. China’s role is limited to secondary support and facilitation, as was the case in the Saudi-Iranian conflict.”

Analyzing Chinese official discourse, Shawamreh argues that China’s emphasis on “sovereign independence” and opposition to “foreign interference” amounts to an implicit call for reducing, if not ultimately eliminating, U.S. influence, particularly its military presence in the Gulf. For her: “China is attempting to emphasize that the current regional instability is a direct result of the Gulf states’ reliance on the United States for security.”

At the same time, Beijing makes equally clear what it is not prepared to do. It has no intention of offering an alternative “security umbrella,” or assuming the role of regional guarantor (as revealed by it taking two days to issue a public statement on the importance of protecting the Gulf states’ “sovereignty and national security”). This position reflects a consistent strategic posture: China does not see itself as a global security provider or “policeman.” Instead, it places responsibility for stability squarely on regional actors themselves:

“China’s calls for what it terms ‘sovereign independence’ and the need to limit ‘foreign interference’ are significant. This call not only encourages regional states to become self-reliant but also reflects a broader Chinese vision for reshaping regional balances away from American military hegemony, a logic Beijing has previously employed in Central Asia.”

From this premise, Shawamreh outlines two possible post-war trajectories. In the first, China may gradually expand its security engagement in the Gulf, but only if regional states themselves move away from reliance on the U.S. Such a shift, however, would not emerge through direct Sino-American confrontation; rather, Beijing appears to be waiting for structural conditions, its economic pull and evolving regional insecurities, to erode U.S. primacy over time. In the second scenario, Beijing’s cautious approach could instead reinforce Gulf dependence on Washington, particularly if regional actors perceive Beijing as unwilling to assume meaningful security responsibilities. The viability of this path, however, hinges largely on U.S. priorities: should Washington’s energy calculus shift, for instance, through reduced dependence on Gulf oil, its incentives to sustain costly security guarantees may weaken, potentially leaving a vacuum that no external power is willing to fill.

What emerges from this analysis is that China’s diplomatic restraint should not be read as indifference or unreliability. Rather, it reflects a deliberate long-term strategy aimed at reshaping regional balances away from U.S. military hegemony without jeopardizing Beijing’s broader relationship with Washington. As Shawamreh concludes, “the real problem lies not in the Chinese position itself… but rather in the flawed interpretations that attempt to ‘Westernize’ China” by projecting expectations associated with the U.S., despite Beijing making clear it will not provide unconditional security guarantees. Accordingly, sustainable Gulf security will not result from substituting one external patron for another, but from the development of indigenous capabilities. Only when security becomes a project articulated and implemented within the Gulf itself will external powers, “especially Beijing,” be compelled to engage on new terms.

The Strait of Hormuz, the Energy Crisis and the “Petroyuan”

Interviewing Chinese scholars for The New Arab, Ali Abo Mrehil, a China-based Palestinian journalist, relays the view that the postponement of President Trump’s planned visit to Beijing in May may serve as a deadline to conclude military operations, “since it is illogical to direct these operations while in Beijing.”²² As reported by Al Jazeera, Trump had also threatened to cancel the visit unless China contributed naval assets to secure the Strait of Hormuz, with the U.S. President stressing Beijing’s heavy dependence on Gulf oil.²³

A similar line of reasoning is advanced by Ahmed Aboudouh in an interview with Libération, where he notes that nearly half of China’s oil imports come from the Gulf. In this context, escalation does not only threaten Hormuz, critical for global oil prices, but also the Bab el-Mandeb, a vital artery for Chinese exports to Europe. While Houthi forces in Yemen have thus far avoided targeting Chinese shipping in the Red Sea, a regional spillover could disrupt this arrangement.²⁴

This narrative of vulnerability is not universally shared. Drawing partly on Western reporting that frames the war as a costly U.S. error, segments of the Arabic press portray China as comparatively insulated – or even advantaged. Al Jazeera notes that China has taken several steps to protect itself from sudden disruptions to energy imports, including building a national strategic oil reserve and promoting alternative technologies to reduce oil dependence.²⁵ Similarly, the Saudi Asharq Al-Awsat went as far as to predict that Chinese oil refineries are unlikely to face any difficulty caused by the current trade disruptions as a result of recent record shipments of Iranian and Russian crude and intensive government stockpiling.²⁶

Notably, the Trump administration’s decision to grant a 30-day sanctions waiver on Iranian oil was justified by U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent due to similar concerns: as a measure to prevent China from becoming the primary beneficiary of discounted Iranian exports and preferential access through Hormuz.²⁷

Iran requiring payments in Chinese yuan for secure transit through Hormuz was framed by Sharif Bibi as an arrangement that could test the resilience of the “petrodollar” and herald the arrival of the “petroyuan.” While the U.S. dollar retains dominance due to the yuan’s limited convertibility, capital controls, and comparatively shallow financial markets, yuan-denominated transactions (accounting for only an estimated 2-4% of global oil trade) have gained traction as an alternative benchmark for pricing oil particularly among sanctioned producers such as Iran and Russia. As such, the more plausible trajectory is not displacement but diversification: a multi-currency energy system in which the dollar remains central, while the yuan expands within politically constrained segments of the market. This would nevertheless erode dollar primacy, weaken the effectiveness of U.S. sanctions while enhancing China’s leverage in Middle Eastern energy markets.²⁸

However, not all see a promising future in the Sino-Iranian energy trade, first and foremost, the Saudi media. Given how China’s “teapot refineries” represent the main market for Iranian oil, sold at a significant discount due to U.S. sanctions, Asharq Al-Awsat argues that:

“Iranian oil…has lost some of its price advantage... Market speculation also suggests that Iranian supplies could be removed from the U.S. sanctions list if the military campaign results in the U.S. gaining control of Iranian oil exports. If sanctions on Iranian oil are lifted, independent Chinese refineries are expected to return to their previous purchasing patterns. Russian oil will be their first choice, along with shipments from Brazil and Canada, and offshore Chinese production, according to traders.”²⁹

Aboudouh holds a different position on the latter point:

“I do not think the Chinese can rely on Russia in the long term to compensate for the shortage caused by the war in the Middle East… Moscow does not have the capacity to increase its production to supply both China and India simultaneously”³⁰

Conclusion

Although China has not been a central actor in this war, discussions about its role in the Arabic press often reveal more about observers’ expectations of what an alternative great power should do rather than about Chinese policies themselves. From those emphasizing Western narratives, Beijing appears ineffectual and marginal; from a Gulf-focused lens, it is broadly aligned with peace and regional stability; and from “resistance”-oriented narratives, it is supporting Iran militarily as part of a global struggle against U.S. hegemony.

Even within the Gulf, interpretations seem to diverge. Qatari sources cautiously acknowledge some degree of Chinese support for Iran. Emirati perspectives often seem to frame China and the U.S. as tactically aligned against Iranian escalation. Saudi discourse, by contrast, seems more reserved. Beyond the GCC, Levantine and Egyptian analysts largely discuss China solely in relation to the Gulf, seldom considering Beijing as a meaningful actor in adjacent theatres such as Lebanon or Palestine, likely reflecting political sensitivities.

Despite these differences, a broad consensus is emerging among Arab experts, in lockstep with analysts from the rest of the world. Regardless of the strategic opportunities the conflict might offer, China is unlikely to engage militarily. However, in doing so, Beijing may come out as the ultimate beneficiary of this unwanted war.

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Francesca Daniele is a Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. She holds a Master’s Degree in Relations and Institutions of Asia and Africa from University of Naples “L’Orientale,” specializing in the Middle East and North Africa. She previously interned at the Italian Embassy in Riyadh. Her research focuses on the media coverage of China in the Middle East.