An Unreliable Friend: Arab Perspectives on China After the Twelve-Day War

This edition of the ChinaMed Observer builds upon our ongoing research analyzing local, regional and Chinese perspectives on China’s role in the Middle East in the aftermath of the “Twelve-Day War” between Israel and Iran. Whereas our most recent analysis examined Israeli media – and a similar study on Iran is forthcoming – this piece instead turns to the Arab world. Perspectives from the Arabic-language press should not be overlooked, given that the war briefly spilled over into the Gulf on June 23, when Iran, in retaliation for U.S. strikes on its nuclear facilities, launched missiles at an American military base in Qatar (with still unclear results)

Although Iranian-backed groups have previously targeted sites in the Gulf, this unprecedented direct strike by Tehran itself showcased Gulf states’ vulnerability to regional escalation and their reliance on the U.S.-led security architecture. In response, Qatar’s leadership swiftly condemned the Iranian attack, affirmed its right to respond militarily, and received immediate backing from fellow Gulf states. However, the conflict was rapidly contained: tensions cooled after Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian called to express regret and the U.S. backed a ceasefire between Israel and Iran.

This rapid reconciliation testifies the resilience of the renewed ties between the Islamic Republic and the Gulf. Nevertheless, as Mina Al-Oraibi observed in Foreign Policy, “Tehran should not take this for granted,” stressing that Iran must now actively work to rebuild confidence and highlighting the steps already taken by the Iranian leadership. Strikingly absent from this reconciliation process, however, has been China, despite its much-publicized role as mediator and guarantor of the earlier Saudi-Iranian rapprochement.

As this Observer examines, China was largely absent or overlooked in Arab media discussions on the region’s evolving security landscape. This omission should not be mistaken for hostility: when China was mentioned during and immediately after the conflict, Arab commentators often praised its “positive neutrality.” Yet in the aftermath of the war, renewed attention was given to Beijing’s decision not to provide direct support to Iran. Here, Arab commentators expressed understanding of China’s strategic and pragmatic motivations, while also concluding that the war exposed the limits of Beijing’s regional influence.

Debate continues over the future of Sino-Iranian relations with Gulf-aligned media outlets displaying a degree of satisfaction that Tehran now finds itself dependent on a self-interested and unreliable partner. However, at the same time, a few Arab journalists, particularly in independent pan-Arab outlets, raised concerns about the risks of relying on China, concerns that extend well beyond Iran’s predicament.

Positive Views on China’s “Positive Neutrality”

Arab media, deeply concerned about the risk of a regional spillover, devoted extensive coverage to the Israel-Iran war, closely tracking statements from Israeli, Iranian, and U.S. officials as well as unfolding military operations. China’s expressions of concern and calls for restraint received attention as well, though to a lesser degree. Notably, during the conflict, Chinese accusations that the U.S. under President Donald Trump was “pouring fuel on the fire” were reported on, including in Arabic-language outlets whose editorial lines are strongly tied to the national interests of U.S.-aligned Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia.^[1]

While Beijing’s calls for de-escalation, respect for sovereignty, and the rejection of the use of force were generally portrayed in a neutral – if not mildly positive – light, Arabic-language analyses often voiced skepticism about China’s willingness or capacity to shape outcomes in the region. For example, in the days preceding the U.S. strikes on Iran, the London-based daily Asharq Al-Awsat, which has ties to the Saudi Royal Family, published an article summarizing research from The Washington Institute for Middle East Policy, a pro-Israel American think tank. The piece dismissed the prospect of any significant Chinese role in the conflict, arguing that although “China relies on Iran for oil and to counter U.S. influence [and] would lose a lot from any large-scale war between Iran and Israel involving the U.S., it can do little about it.” Drawing on both American and Chinese analysts, the article stressed that Beijing was unlikely to intervene militarily to defend Iran. Instead, while China prefers regional stability, it could even stand to benefit from prolonged U.S.’ entanglement in the Middle East, an outcome that might divert Washington’s attention and resources away from East Asia while offering Beijing lessons relevant to a potential crisis over Taiwan.^[2]

The article also highlighted Beijing’s “remarkably measured” stance, noting that Chinese statements avoided both explicitly condemning Israel and any direct call for the U.S. not to attack Iran. However, it dismissed the notion that this restraint signaled an effort by China to position itself as a mediator, arguing instead that “Israel is likely to question China’s neutrality as a mediator due to its bias toward Iran and outreach to Hamas,” and emphasizing that “it is unclear whether China has made any specific efforts to find a diplomatic solution.”^[3]

After the Iran-Israel ceasefire, the limited Arab commentary on China did not reproach Beijing for its lack of action or its apparent diplomatic ambiguity. On the contrary, some Arab analysts expressed positive views of China’s rhetoric and relative impartiality. For example, in an article for Al Majalla, another Saudi-owned London-based outlet, Lebanese journalist Charbel Barakat characterized China’s refusal to unequivocally condemn Israel and its restraint as “calculated positive neutrality.” For Barakat, this posture reflected not an inability to act but rather a deliberate approach “imbued with caution and selectivity.” While acknowledging debates among Chinese scholars about the role of China’s long-held foreign policy principles, Barakat argued that strategic considerations, in particular regarding Taiwan, were the decisive factor in explaining why China refrained from providing military support to Iran.^[4]

Citing Taiwanese, Chinese, and Arab experts, Barakat concluded that “China’s approach of positive neutrality appeared to be a wise decision,” since:

“The war did not open a broad strategic window for Beijing, neither with respect to Taiwan, nor in the context of geopolitical competition with the U.S., nor even in terms of expanding its influence in the Middle East, where China had not positioned itself as a strong mediator to begin with. Nonetheless, Beijing emerged from the crisis with cumulative experience in managing delicate balances, minimizing risks, and reinforcing its image as a responsible power at a time fraught with high costs and uncertain outcomes.”^[5]

An even more celebratory interpretation of China’s “active neutrality” appeared in an opinion piece by Waref Kumayha, president of the Lebanese-Chinese Dialogue Road Association, published by Asharq Al-Awsat. Kumayha also argued that China has emerged from the conflict in a stronger position, cultivating a reputation of a responsible power – including in the Middle East – that does not aspire to replace Washington as hegemon but instead seeks to “share global power” and advance multipolarity. ^[6]

According to Kumayha:

“[China] is neither entirely neutral nor confrontational. […] It speaks of respect for sovereignty, but does not neglect interests. Through all this, Beijing continues to cultivate the image of a responsible power that does not seek heroic roles in the media, but tangible results on the ground. […] China has demonstrated that its silence is not an absence, but rather a modus operandi.”^[7]

A more nuanced and analytical perspective on Beijing’s “cautious stance” was provided by the China Research Unit at the Emirates Policy Center (EPC), an Abu Dhabi-based think tank. In their in-depth analysis, EPC researchers noted that China’s “balanced” approach to the conflict was not immediate: Beijing initially issued a sharp condemnation of Israel for violating Iranian sovereignty. According to the study, it was only after Chinese President Xi Jinping, on 17 July, urged “all parties” to de-escalate that China adopted a more moderate tone toward Israel. The analysts further suggested that, beyond safeguarding its long-term relationship with Israel, Beijing may have also been hedging against the possibility of an Iranian defeat, noting that both Chinese experts and the wider Chinese public have shown decreasing confidence in Tehran.^[8]

The analysis identified four strategic considerations underpinning China’s restrained posture, particularly its reluctance to provide decisive support to Iran. First, direct military support to Iran would imperil Beijing’s long-term interests, especially its reputation as a neutral and responsible actor. Second, long-standing concerns over Iran’s aggressive regional strategy, coupled with new apprehensions regarding Israel since October 7. Third, China’s limited leverage over both Iran and Israel.  Fourth, China was wary of opening a new front with the U.S. while simultaneously seeking progress in trade negotiations and maintaining focus on Taiwan.^[9]

The Future of China-Iran Relations and their Regional Implications

Although many Arab commentators express understanding – if not outright approval – of China’s rhetoric and “neutrality,” Beijing is not regarded as a credible alternative to the U.S. when it comes to regional security or conflict mediation. This does not necessarily imply enthusiasm for Washington’s own conduct. Saudi analysts, for example, have criticized the United States’ “belated” military response to the Houthi movement in Yemen, contrasting the American offensive with the Gulf’s current priorities of “development and peace.”^[10] Yet even critics tend to see no immediate substitute for U.S. security leadership in the region.

The Israel-Iran war reinforced this perception. As an example, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat published an Arabic translation of an AFP piece quoting experts from both inside and outside the region (among them ChinaMed’s Head of Research, Andrea Ghiselli). All agreed that the conflict laid bare the limits of Chinese influence in the Middle East. Ahmed Aboudouh, associate fellow with Chatham House and Head of the China Research Unit at the EPC, was direct regarding Beijing’s supposed leverage over Tehran, he observed that “China’s position in the Middle East has been very weakened since the beginning of the conflict,” adding that “everyone in the region understands that China has little, if any, influence to play a real role in de-escalation.”^[11]

Arab analysts generally interpreted the erosion of China’s potential security role not as a loss for their own states, but rather as a setback for Iran.^[12] From their perspective, Tehran emerged as the principal loser: the war exposed the hollowness of its partnerships with China and Russia, while at the same time demonstrating the durability of the U.S.-Israel alliance, even under the mercurial leadership of President Donald Trump (with several Gulf commentators expressing barely concealed satisfaction at Iran’s predicament).

Saudi commentator Adel Alharbi, writing for The Independent Arabia (noted for having ties with the Saudi Royal Family), remarked that Tehran, “despite its revolutionary rants and inflated slogans, now appears more exposed than ever, surrounded by fluid alliances.”^[13]

He argued that:

“Tehran, for its part, appears increasingly isolated, particularly after U.S. strikes. Even Russia, despite having received generous Iranian support in the war in Ukraine, refrained from taking a explicit stance, instead opting for tepid statements […] China has remained almost entirely silent, especially as it had little incentive to expend political capital on a file lacking both clear prospects and broad international consensus. Beijing realizes that Iranian escalation harms its interests more than it harms Washington’s, as 45% of China's oil imports transit through the Strait of Hormuz, making Beijing arguably more invested in appeasement than Teheran itself.”^[14]

Despite the conspicuous lack of support from Tehran’s allies in the so-called “trilateral axis” with Moscow, and Beijing, Arab observers widely agreed that Iran has little choice but to continue courting China, especially to modernize its air and defense capabilities. Reports have surfaced that Tehran hopes to acquire Chinese J-10C fighter jets, which proved effective in the Pakistan-India dogfights earlier this year.

Yet the London-based, secular, pan-Arab daily Al-Arab, while acknowledging these ambitions, cautioned that “this option does not appear as guaranteed as the Iranian leadership hopes”:

“It became clear that Iran's options were now limited. Russia, a traditional partner in military cooperation, backed away from concluding announced deals, most notably the Sukhoi-35 fighter jet deal […] Against this delicate backdrop, Iran has tried to push for deeper defense and armaments cooperation with China, but faces a far more complex reality. While Beijing has signaled a general willingness to cooperate, it avoids entering into direct military commitments that could draw it into an undesirable confrontation with the U.S. or jeopardize its economic interests.”^[15]

The EPC’s China Research Unit likewise contended that “Iran’s military weakness and ineffectiveness during the war may result in a shift in Chinese strategic thinking,” noting that “Iran may have lost its functional advantage in China’s strategic calculations as a counterweight to Western influence capable of keeping American focus and attention on the Middle East for decades.”^[16]

Nevertheless, according to their view, China may continue to export arms to Iran, assist with industrial reconstruction, and provide diplomatic backing – while opposing any Iranian pursuit of nuclear weapons – driven by a more profound concern:

“A deeper concern for the Chinese Communist Party is the prospect that regime change in Iran could become a declared objective of U.S. policy. […] A forced effort to unseat Iran’s leadership could trigger internal chaos or civil conflict, with unpredictable regional consequences [fuelling] narratives that justify direct challenges to China’s own political system and embolden efforts to undermine the Communist Party’s hold on power. In other words, the security requirements of the regime in Beijing will continue to drive China’s opposition to any externally driven attempt, particularly by Israel and the United States, to overthrow Iran’s ruling establishment.”^[17]

Among analysts and media linked to Gulf governments, the dominant tone toward China remains neutral and pragmatic, likely reflecting their own countries’ strong economic ties with China and their ambivalence toward a conflict that pitted their erstwhile principal rival, Iran, against Israel, a state increasingly seen as the main source of regional instability and a serial violator of national sovereignty.

Although there is limited coverage, independent pan-Arab outlets appear to have adopted a more critical stance. The London-based digital daily Rai al-Youm, known for its oppositional and often pro-“resistance” perspectives, published an article by analyst Mahdi Mubarak Abdullah asserting that China’s actions amounted to a “complete betrayal of Iran.” Possibly suggesting that the implications of Chinese behavior may extend beyond Iran, he wrote that the crisis revealed that Beijing's diplomacy is designed only to protect its own economic and strategic interests.^[18]

For Abdullah, the lesson is clear:

“China is not a reliable friend in times of crisis and will often turn its back when its partners most need support. Those who look to Beijing as a steadfast ally and a cornerstone of their security and stability must recognize that such expectations are badly misplaced. China’s diplomacy, whether soft or hard, is essentially instrumental and transactional.”^[19]

Conclusions

China was not a central focus of Arabic-language media coverage during the Israel-Iran conflict. The few commentators who did consider the potential role of the People’s Republic initially welcomed Beijing’s calls for de-escalation and its “positive neutrality,” a reaction likely shaped by anxiety over a possible spillover and negative attitudes toward the two belligerents.

In the conflict’s aftermath, however, a more critical assessment has emerged. The war culminated in U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, an escalation that led to fighting spilling over into the Gulf. These events demonstrated the fragility of the regional order and revived fears that any future escalations could endanger the Gulf states’ aspirations for peace, development and regional cooperation. Against this backdrop, China’s self-focused and risk-averse approach has come under closer scrutiny.

Arab analysts generally expressed an understanding of the strategic reasoning behind Beijing’s avoidance of direct military support for Iran, attributing its caution to the desire to preserve economic and diplomatic ties with Israel and the U.S. Several commentators also suggested that China’s stance in the Middle East is closely linked to its immediate strategic priorities, particularly Taiwan, suggesting that the region remains secondary to Beijing’s core concerns (a perception that, as we at ChinaMed have observed, is increasingly present in analyses across the rest of the wider region, from Kosovo to Cyprus).

Even so, the war has seemingly undermined China’s credibility as a potential security provider, with some Arab experts arguing that Beijing lacks the capacity and the willingness to mediate conflicts or reshape the Middle East’s strategic balance, especially when compared with Washington’s more interventionist approach.

Debates have also focused on the future of Sino-Iranian relations. Some Gulf commentators argue, often with a measure of satisfaction, that Tehran misjudged Beijing’s reliability, leaving Iran increasingly isolated and dependent on a transactional and unpredictable partner. It remains to be seen whether the recent Israeli strike on Qatari territory, which revealed the limits of U.S. concern for Gulf sovereignty and security, might lead Arab commentators to reconsider China’s potential role in regional security.

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Francesco SCALA is a Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. He holds a Master’s Degree in Language and Cultures of Asia and Africa from University of Naples “L’Orientale.” His research focuses on the media coverage of China in the Gulf countries, including Iraq.

Leonardo BRUNI is the Project Manager of the ChinaMed Project. He is also a Doctoral Researcher in History at the European University Institute, a Junior Research Fellow at the Torino World Affairs Institute (T.wai), and a graduate of the Sciences Po-Peking University Dual Master’s Degree in International Relations. His research interests include China-EU relations, the history of Sino-European relations, and Chinese foreign policy in the wider Mediterranean region.