June 16, 2022

The Domestic Sources of Greece’s China Policy

Tasos Panoutsopoulos
Download pdf

The 5th of June 2022 marked the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Greece and China. On this occasion, Greek President Katerina Sakellaropoulou and Chinese President Xi Jinping exchanged warm wishes. [1] Two weeks earlier, on May 13, Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias had a phone conversation with his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi, who described Greece-China relations as a “true reflection of mutual understanding and affinity between ancient civilizations, and a vivid epitome of the trend of the times for peace, development and win-win cooperation, setting a good example for the development of relations between China and European countries.” [2] Dendias said that Greece firmly adheres to the one-China principle and that Wang Yi expressed his understanding of European and Greek concerns over the war in Ukraine. Finally, a symposium celebrating 50 years of Greece-China diplomatic relations was held at the Aikaterini Laskaridis Foundation in Piraeus on May 27th. Chinese Ambassador to Greece Xiao Junzheng noted that the two countries “must pursue mutual beneficial and win-win cooperation, which calls on us to align the construction of the 'Belt and Road' initiative with the 'Greece 2.0' plan, and expand bilateral cooperation in areas such as shipping, energy, infrastructure, green and digital economy.” [3]

Against this background, this report explores the roots of Greece’s China policy in order to better understand the dynamics of Sino-Greek relations. It argues that despite the competition between China and the West, Greece, an EU and NATO member, has developed a strong relationship with Beijing that remains remarkably stable.


Greece established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China on June 5, 1972, when the pro-American and heavily anti-communist Greek military junta attempted to adjust its policy to the needs of détente and break its increasing isolation from its Western allies. [4] After the escalation of the Sino-Soviet border conflict in 1969, China also sought to improve its relations with the West, in particular with the United States. Nixon’s visit to Beijing in February 1972 accelerated Greece’s rapprochement with China. From the very beginning, it was already possible to see the potentially significant role of maritime shipping as the driver of economic cooperation between the two countries. Greek ship owners and the Chinese were especially interested in the role that the huge Greek commercial fleet could play in the expansion of China’s role in global trade and there was significant cooperation already in 1971. [5] Despite relations between Athens and Beijing being relatively static for decades, the first concrete steps toward economic cooperation between Athens and Beijing were made only in 2006. A clear acceleration occurred in April 2016, when COSCO Shipping acquired a 51 percent stake in Greece’s biggest port, the Port of Piraeus, transforming it into China’s gateway to Europe. [6] Since then, closer cooperation between the two countries has also expanded in the diplomatic field.

Against this background, this report analyzes the main domestic and external factors that shaped Greek behavior vis-à-vis China under the last two governments led by SYRIZA and New Democracy (ND), which came to power in January 2015 and July 2019, respectively. It argues that although Greece’s relationship with China was initially motivated by Athens’ need for foreign investment, that changed in 2015, when the Greek anti-EU sentiment generated by the austerity measures imposed on Athens in 2010 reached its peak. Athens is likely to remain a loyal partner of Beijing, and bilateral relations are expected to remain stable in the future, despite rising tensions between China and the West, as well as the negative popular perception of Chinese investments that are seen as contributing to the privatization of public assets.

The report is divided into four parts. The first part discusses the Greece-China relations since 2006. The second part sheds light on the domestic perceptions of Greece’s China policy. The third part will examine how these factors affect Athens’ stance toward China in the EU and NATO and will consider the possible future evolution of Greece’s policy in the context of rising competition between China and the West. The final part reviews the findings and discusses the possible evolution of Greece’s China policy.

The Foundations of Today’s Greece-China Relations

In January 2006, the Greek Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis (ND) laid the foundations for close economic cooperation between Greece and China as part of his efforts to promote privatizations in the Greek public sector. That month, he traveled to Beijing and met with Chinese President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, with whom he signed an agreement on “strategic cooperation” between the two countries. [7] In particular, Karamanlis and Wen agreed to utilize their countries’ ports and promote tourism and exports. On November 25, 2008, in a ceremony attended by Kostas Karamanlis and Hu Jintao, Wei Jiafu, President and CEO of COSCO, and Nikos Anastassopoulos, CEO of Piraeus Port Authority, signed a concession agreement to develop and operate Piers 2 and 3 of the Port of Piraeus. [8] However, the Sino-Greek relationship would reach its apogee only a few years later, in a totally different environment and because of different reasons.

The financial crisis of 2008 was a watershed moment for Greece, a member of NATO since 1952 and an EU member since 1981. Athens faced serious challenges not only in relation to its economy but also to its position in the international system. The implementation of the EU austerity measures in 2010 by George Papandreou’s socialist PASOK government gave rise to strong anti-EU populist movements, thereby crucially challenging Greece’s traditional pro-Western orientation that has endured since the end of World War II. Even traditionally pro-EU forces, such as New Democracy, became critical of the EU austerity measures. Since his election in 2012, Prime Minister Antonis Samaras (ND), who as a leader of the opposition had opposed Greece’s agreement with its creditors, pursued close cooperation with China. At the invitation of the Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, Samaras paid a four-day visit to China in mid-May 2013, accompanied by around 60 businessmen, aiming to attract investments and promote Greek exports. According to the Chinese ambassador in Athens, Du Qiwen, at that time the Chinese were particularly interested in the privatization of Greece’s biggest airport “Eleftherios Venizelos.” [10] In October 16, 2014, Samaras met with Chinese Premier Li Keqiang in Milan, Italy, and expressed once again Greece’s interest in the participation of Chinese businesses in Greece’s privatization process, especially regarding the Port of Piraeus and, more broadly, the fields of logistics, infrastructure and finance.

A new anti-austerity, populist coalition government composed of Alexis Tsipras’ left-wing SYRIZA and Panos Kammenos’s right-wing Aneksartiti Ellines was elected in January 2015. They gave new impetus to Greek-Chinese cooperation, pushing it beyond China’s contribution to Greek privatization efforts. The origin of this development can be found in the new government’s plans to renegotiate the austerity measures with its lenders, which included seeking economic assistance from China, Russia, and even Iran. Days after the new Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras met with Chancellor Angela Merkel in Berlin for the first time in March 23, 2015, Deputy Prime Minister Giannis Dragasakis and Foreign Minister Nikos Kotzias traveled to Beijing to discuss further Chinese investments in Greece, and met with their counterparts Ma Kai and Wang Yi. Dragasakis and Kotzias discussed the possibility of linking Chinese investments in the Port of Piraeus and elsewhere with the sale of EUR 7 billion of Greek debt to China in March 2015. [11]

Hence, the China-Greece relationship reached new heights after the SYRIZA-led government signed the agreement for a new investment by COSCO in the Port of Piraeus in April 2016. As Chinese Ambassador Zou Xiaoli put it, the port would be the “dragon head” and the embodiment of the “five pillars of the Belt and Road Initiative.” [12] As such, it would have a significant impact on global trade flows and the EU as a whole. During his term of office, Tsipras visited China twice. In early July 2016, he paid a five-day visit to Beijing, meeting with Chinese Premier Li Keqiang. Like before, the Greek side was particularly interested in discussing privatizations, the export of Greek products, and Chinese investments in the Greek technological sector, railway system, dockyards, as well as real estate. Discussions also included the possibility of having Chinese university students studying in Greece. [13] Athens had high hopes for this trip. Alexis Tsipras was accompanied by Foreign Minister Nikos Kotzias and other ministers, as well as the Chairman of the Board of Hellenic Republic Asset Development Fund, Stergios Pitsiorlas, and a number of Greek entrepreneurs. [14] These contacts were essential for Beijing as well, which attributed not only economical but also strategic importance to its cooperation with Athens. Indeed, the Chinese ambassador in Greece, Zou Xiaoli, stressed Greece’s role as an “anchor of stability and development in the Eastern Mediterranean.” [15] In mid-May 2017, Tsipras participated in the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in Beijing. [16] In April 2019, Greece joined the 16+1 initiative in Dubrovnik, a mechanism set up in 2012 to boost the cooperation between China and the countries in Central and Eastern Europe.

The election of a new ND-led government under Kyriakos Mitsotakis, a liberal, pro-Western politician, did not reduce China’s presence in Greece. Quite the contrary. Mitsotakis visited Shanghai in November 2019, where he met with Chinese President Xi Jinping, “reaffirming the bonds of friendship and cooperation connecting the two countries.” [17] While the two leaders identified a number of areas for stronger economic cooperation, Mitsotakis also stressed the cultural aspect of this relationship. “You too have made a lot of references in your speeches on the closeness of our two civilizations, a closeness that goes back a very long time. However, I believe it marks the special significance of this relationship, from a cultural standpoint,” he told Xi. [18] A few days later, when President Xi visited Athens, Greek President Prokopis Pavlopoulos expressed his admiration for China’s development that “leads to the increase of the living standards of its citizens” and “highlights China as a global economic factor.” [19] “Greeks are ready to work together with China in this new path of development,” added President Pavlopoulos. “Real civilizations do not clash, but by origin they are destined to serve man and peace, building bridges of communication and bringing down walls of discrimination,” he concluded, referring to the ancient civilizations of Greece and China. [20]

During the past two decades trade between the two countries has grown significantly. Increasing every year from 2001 to 2013, exports to China reached their peak in 2018 (Figure 1). Accordingly, imports from China also started increasing in 2001, hit a high level in 2008, remained relatively stable between 2012 and 2017 and hit a new record in 2021 (Figure 2). Furthermore, in 2013 there was a massive influx of Chinese foreign direct investment to Greece, which remained stable until 2015 and grew further in 2017 and 2018 (Figure 3). Nevertheless, it decreased slightly during 2019 and even further in 2020 (Figure 3).

Figure 1 - Prepared by the author. Data: International Trade Center (https://www.trademap.org/)
Figure 2 - Prepared by the author. Data: International Trade Center (https://www.trademap.org/)
Figure 3 - Prepared by the author. DATA: Source: PRC Ministry of Commerce, PRC National Bureau of Statistics, and PRC State Administration of Foreign Exchange

Domestic Perceptions of China and Greek Politics

Greece’s perception of China is ambiguous as it seems that there are “two Chinas.” One is the country with a millennia-old civilization; the other is the powerful investor coming from Asia. Greeks take a different stance toward each of these “Chinas.”

China, understood as a country with a very long history and home of an ancient civilization, is extremely popular in Greece. Indeed, the number of Chinese tourists before the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic was growing every year. In 2018, the country attracted between 150,000 and 200,000 Chinese tourists, 20% more than the year before. In 2019, Prime Minister Mitsotakis set a new goal of 500,000 visitors. [21] Furthermore, since 2016 around 50% of Greeks have a favorable stance toward China (2016: 50%, 2017: 43%, 2018: 51%), according to the Pew Research Center. [22] These numbers are the highest in the EU and are comparable only to some countries in the Middle East and North Africa. No more than 37% of the population approves of China (2016: 32%, 2017: 31%, 2018: 29%, 2019: 37%) in neighboring Italy.

Yet, the numbers are far lower when it comes to the Greeks’ confidence in the Chinese President (17% in 2017, 11% in 2018, 17% in 2019). [23] This is most likely linked to the “other China,” the economic and geopolitical giant seen through the lens of Greek politics. Chinese investments in Greece have been equated with the privatization of the public sector and, as such, they are highly unpopular. In particular, domestic perceptions of China’s presence in Greece have almost exclusively been defined by COSCO’s investment in the Port of Piraeus.

A majority of Greek political parties, as well as trade unions, initially opposed the agreement with COSCO, not because it was a Chinese investment per se, but because it was part of the process of privatizing  national assets. In November 2008, the opposition (PASOK, SYRIZA, LAOS [Popular Orthodox Rally], KKE [the Greek Communist Party]) protested the agreement. [24] In addition, by November 2008, workers at the Piraeus port had been on strike for thirteen consecutive months. [25]

Although SYRIZA signed the country’s biggest agreement with COSCO in April 2016, its members had previously tried to block the initial investment. Before becoming a leading component of the government, SYRIZA was a marginal left-wing party, opposed to privatizations and with close ties to trade unions. In October 2009, SYRIZA MPs Thodoris Dritsas and Panagiotis Lafazanis even called on George Papandreou’s government to cancel the “colonial agreement that handed the Piraeus port over to COSCO.” [26] Dritsas, who became an Alternate Minister for Shipping when SYRIZA came to power in January 2015, announced the cancellation of the privatization of the Piraeus Port Authority. [27] SYRIZA’s Minister of Finance Yanis Varoufakis later claimed that he personally intervened at a meeting with the Chinese ambassador in order to persuade Alexis Tsipras to reach an agreement with COSCO. [28] A year later, the picture would be completely different. The agreement with COSCO was ratified by the Greek Parliament on June 1, 2016. Only KKE and the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn party voted against. [29]

Despite the wide approval of the agreement by the parliament, Greek society and trade unions were not favorable toward COSCO. Not only because of the previously-mentioned opposition to privatization, but also due to the company’s poor labor standards. On February 16-17, 2016, the Dockworkers’ Union of the Port of Piraeus went on a 48-hour strike. [30] On 8 April, they went on a new 24-hour strike, protesting what they called a “political crime” that violated the workers’ rights. [31] They also blamed the government for breaking its election promises about public ports and for exploiting the workers’ struggle in order to come to power, teaming up with the “neoliberals [in support] of the privatizations.” [32] In early October 2021, Greece transferred a further 16% stake of the port to COSCO, after the Greek Parliament approved a new deal in late September, even though COSCO had not concluded the mandatory investments of the initial deal (something that was blamed on Greek bureaucracy). [33] Interestingly, this time the deal was supported only by the ND-led government. KKE, SYRIZA, KINAL, Elliniki Lysi and Yanis Varoufakis’ MERA25 all voted against. KKE argued that the port is not serving the Greek people but financial interest groups and the EU. In addition, SYRIZA and MERA25 blamed COSCO for not concluding the mandatory investments to which it had committed itself to. [34]

COSCO’s practices and the company itself came under fire once again when a fatal workplace accident occurred on October 25, 2021, when a 45-year-old port employee was hit by a gantry crane and lost his life. In response, workers went on two consecutive 24-hour strikes, asking for the improvement of working conditions and more security measures by COSCO. A KKE spokesperson commented: “Before the worker’s blood dried up, the company made it clear that it does not care about the protection of the workers’ lives, also thanks to the reactionary ‘pro-investment’ legal framework approved by the governments led by bourgeois parties, both under the liberal right-wing ND government and the previous social-democratic ‘left-wing’ one led by SYRIZA. These laws trample on the workers’ rights.” [35]

Beyond COSCO, Greek public opinion has also been skeptical about Chinese investments in other sectors. After the Greek government initiated the “golden visa” program in 2014, a growing number of investors from China (as well as Russia and Lebanon) started to buy property in Greece. The Greek press described massive Chinese investments as an “avalanche” or as a Chinese “conquest” of Greece. [36] Four years after the program was launched, 2.091 out of 4962 visas were awarded to Chinese buyers and their family members. [37] Despite the fact that real estate prices remained high because of the Chinese investors, many Greeks considered this massive wave of investments as a threat to their property and an intrusion into their everyday lives. Yet, the number of Chinese investors has grown even more since then. By November 2021, 6367 of golden visas (or 67% of the total) were awarded to them. [38]

Even though currently there is no openly pro-China political party in Greece, a number of politicians and academics have argued that China should not be demonized. In March 2019, Yanis Varoufakis, now leader of left-wing MERA25 party, criticized the popular critical narrative about China’s economic presence in Europe, arguing that it was the Union’s own fiscal policies that depressed the European economy, thereby creating opportunities for Chinese investors. “We are idiots. Don’t blame the Chinese for this…We created a vacuum and the Chinese are filling it,” he stated. [39] And he went even further. In one of his lectures at the Cambridge Forum, he argued that China is “much more humanistic than the United States” and, despite its attempts to expand its influence, Beijing is “absolutely non-interventionist in a way that Europeans, the West, have never managed to fathom.” [40] Kostas Douzinas, another member of SYRIZA and a professor of Law and Political Philosophy at Birkbeck College in London who served as Chair of the Permanent Committee on National Defense and Foreign Affairs from 2015 to 2019, wrote in a recent article on the American withdrawal from Afghanistan that “China is neither powerless, nor can it be blamed for terrorism. Constructing China as the new enemy can lead to the end of the West as we know it. Let’s hope it will not be the end of the world as well.” [41]

As shown above, Greek governments have framed their China policies in different ways that better serve their ideology and their political programs, but the essence is the same. Except for the KKE, which championed the popular dissatisfaction over work issues in the Port of Piraeus, and the pro-Russian Elliniki Lysi, China is now considered a valuable partner for Greece across the political spectrum. After all, as Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias put it, China “came and invested in Greece when others stayed away.” [42] No political force that comes to power can forget this.

Greece’s Pragmatic Balancing between China and its Western Allies

Despite the rising tensions between China and the West, Greece is determined to keep its China policy intact. Since his election in July 2019, Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis pursued a more “open” foreign policy, which emphasized the country’s geographic location. Being at the crossroads between the West and the East, and close to the Global South, Athens must follow a well-balanced foreign policy that takes into account the position and interests of all powers, both regional and global ones. Accordingly, during Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to Athens in late October 2021, Mitsotakis stated that there is no fundamental conflict of interest between China and the EU. [43]

Speaking at the 17+1 Summit in February 2021, at a time when many Western countries were taking distance from Beijing, Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis said that COSCO’s investment in the Port of Piraeus is an example of a mutually beneficial agreement. He also added that the 17+1 mechanism can “contribute to the making of courageous decisions through cooperation, solidarity, understanding and transparency.” [44] Two months later, in May, Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis was pulling his country out of that same mechanism, calling for a coordinated EU27 approach toward China. “Unity of [the] 27 is key to success in EU’s relations with external partners. Relations with China should be no exception” he stated. [45] Yet, Greece is determined to stay and pursue a national policy, rather than a European or NATO one. In July 2021, on the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the Sino-Greek Comprehensive Strategic Partnership agreement (signed in 2006), the Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis and President Xi had a conversation over the phone. The two leaders discussed China’s role as a permanent member in the UN Security Council in both consolidating stability in the Eastern Mediterranean, and in supporting the settlement of the Cyprus question on the basis of the resolutions previously approved by the Security Council. [46] The conversation came only weeks after the NATO Summit of June, where the global security challenges posed by China were stressed once again, as it has been the case since 2019. Finally, in June 2021 the Greek permanent representative in NATO stated that, by cooperating with Beijing, Athens is getting “the benefits of a healthy and very legitimate commercial relationship,” [47] a statement coming three months after EU sanctions were imposed on China due to alleged human rights violations in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, which made the EU-China relations deteriorate further.

Asked by the Washington Post if he worried that China’s presence in Greece might turn into a political and military one, Mitsotakis answered “Absolutely not. Greece is a member of NATO and of the European Union. We want to have good relations with China, but they are also strategic competitors.” [48] Since the very beginning, with the exception of SYRIZA’s early days in power, Greece has managed to balance well between its China and its European and NATO policies. When Kostas Karamanlis signed the first agreement with Beijing in 2006, he was simply doing what other of his European counterparts had already done. For Athens, China was an economic partner in addition to the EU, and this relationship had no geopolitical or other implications for its relations with Western partners. Again, when Prime Minister Samaras met with Chinese Premier Li Keqiang in October 2014, he stressed that the participation of Chinese enterprises in Greece’s privatization process would “advance Europe-Asia connectivity and promote the Greece-China relations and EU-China relations for new development.” [49] Although under SYRIZA, at least initially, China was an alternative to the EU, this changed once the government normalized its relations with its European partners in August 2015.

COSCO’s investment in the Port of Piraeus brought the two countries closer on other issues as well. In June 2017, shortly after Tsipras’ trip to Beijing, Greece vetoed a joint EU statement condemning China’s human rights violations, spreading concerns among EU officials. [50] In May 2019, the Chinese President Xi Jinping expressed his “understanding” on the Cyprus problem, one of Greece’s so called “national issues” (εθνικά θέματα), and a crucial factor in the country’s foreign policy. Again, in October 2021, according to CGTN, Wang Yi and Nikos Dendias agreed “to continue to support each other's core interests and major concerns.” [51] It is highly unlikely, though, that these “core interests,” will include the Greek-Turkish dispute in the Aegean Sea, or the Cyprus question as China has been extremely cautious regarding these issues.

Certainly, Greece’s China policy is not anti-Western. Instead, it is seen as a non-exclusive partnership, like those that Greece has in the Middle East with Egypt and Israel. At the same time, Athens’ relations with Washington have reached new heights, especially after the renewed US-Greece defense deal of October 2021. Despite its closer cooperation with China, Greece remains loyal to NATO and the United States in the Eastern Mediterranean. Athens seems more willing to cooperate with both superpowers than to side with one of them, while, at the same time, distancing itself from the narratives of a “new Cold War.” What remains to be proven are the limits of this strategy.

Conclusion and Prospects for the Future

This report discussed the dynamics and foundations of today’s relations between Athens and Beijing, the domestic perceptions of China by Greece’s main political parties and figures, and Greek attempts to balance between Beijing and its Western allies and partners. It showed that Greece-China relations gained new impetus as an alternative to the EU during the economic crisis of 2010 and especially after the election of the coalition populist government of SYRIZA-ANEL in January 2015. However, during this period Greeks were not favorable toward Beijing’s rising role in the Greek economy, as this role was based on the privatization of public assets. The election of a pro-Western government in Athens in July 2019 did little to change Greece’s policy toward China. Prime Minister Mitsotakis not only supported further privatizing the Port of Piraeus but also sought to expand cooperation between the two countries in other sectors.

Against this background, we should expect that the bilateral relations between Greece and China will remain warm in the foreseeable future. At the same time, this partnership is not expected to turn against the EU or NATO but will seek to balance between them. Athens will probably avoid taking a hardline stance with the West in the latter’s dispute with China. Rather, it will attempt to stay as distant as possible, maximizing the benefits from its economic cooperation with Beijing, while, at the same time, securing US and NATO support over its strategic interests in the Mediterranean and the Balkans.

Finally, current developments in Ukraine can help us better understand Greek foreign policy not only toward China but also toward non-Western powers in general. Despite close historical, cultural and religious ties between the two countries and heavily pro-Russian public opinion, Greece was one of the first in the West to take a firm stance against Russia, condemning the invasion in Ukraine and arming the Ukrainians from the very beginning. [52] As Prime Minister Mitsotakis put it in March 2022 “there can be no equal distances…You are either with peace and international law or against them.” [53] The war in Ukraine proves that Greece is an integral part of the West and a proponent of the so-called “rules-based international order”. Its cooperation with both China and Russia is indeed very close when compared to other Western states but Athens is not expected to move away from the US and the EU in times of crisis.


[1] "Athens, Beijing mark 50 years," Kathimerini.gr, June 7, 2022, link.

[2] "Wang Yi Speaks with Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias on the Phone," PRC MFA, May 13, 2022, link.

[3] "50 years of Greece-China diplomatic relations celebrated at Laskaridis Foundation," amna.gr, May 27, 2022, link.

[4] Dionysios Chourchoulis, Manolis Koumas and Anastasios Panoutsopoulos, “Beyond the bi-polar world, Greece’s relations with China, Israel and Africa, 1967-1973” in Antonis Klapsis, Constantine Arvanitopoulos, Evanthis Hatzivassiliou and Effie G.H. Pedaliu (eds.), The Greek Junta and the International System, Routledge, London 2020, pp.71-83.

[5] Dionysios Chourchoulis, “Greece and the People’s Republic of China in the Cold War, 1972–1989”, in Janick Marina Schaufelbuehl, Marco Wyss, and Valeria Zanier (eds.), Europe and China in the Cold War, Brill, Leiden and Boston 2019, pp.62-68.

[6] It became 67 percent in 2021. See: Shin Watanabe, "China's COSCO raises stake in top Greek port Piraeus to 67%," Nikkei, October 26, 2021, link.

[7] "Έλληνες πρωθυπουργοί που βρέθηκαν στο δρόμο του μεταξιού [Greek Prime Ministers on the Silk Road]," newsbeast.gr, November 8, 2019, link.

[8] "Cosco Pacific Signs a Concession Agreement to Develop and Operate Piers 2 and 3 of the Port of Piraeus in Greece," ship.gr, November 26, 2008, link.

[9] "Greek PM Antonis Samaras visits China in effort to boost ailing economy," South China Morning Post, ,May 16, 2013, link.

[10] "Li Keqiang Meets with Prime Minister Antonis Samaras of Greece," PRC MFA, October 16, 2014, link.

[11] Dora Antoniou, "Η μυστική σύσκεψη τον Μάιο για το plan Β [The secret meeting in May for Plan B]," Kathimerini.gr, October 11, 2015, link.

[12] "Speech by Ambassador Zou Xiaoli at the Seminar 'The New Silk Road of China: One Belt, One Road (OBOR) and Greece'," PRC MFA, March 30, 2016, link.

[13] "Ο Αλ. Τσίπρας παίζει το χαρτί των κινεζικών επενδύσεων [Al. Tsipras plays the card of investments]," naftemporiki.gr, July 1, 2016, link.

[14] "Στην Κίνα ο Τσίπρας με το μισό υπουργικό [Alexis Tsipras in China with half the cabinet]," eleftherostypos.gr, June 2, 2016, link.

[15] "Στάζει μέλι” για την Ελλάδα ο Κινέζος πρέσβης – Έκπληκτος από τους χειρισμούς της Cosco [The Chinese ambassador’s dripping honey for Greece- Surprised by Cosco’s handling]," newsit.gr, June 1, 2016, link.

[16] "(B&R Forum) Quotable quotes of world leaders at Belt and Road forum," Xinhua, May 14, 2017, link.

[17] "Meeting of Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis with the President of China Xi Jinping in Shanghai," primeminister.gr, November 4, 2019, link.

[18] Ibid.

[19] "Προεδρικό Μέγαρο: Όσα έγιναν στο δείπνο προς τιμήν του Σι Τζινπίνγκ [Presidential Mansion: What happened during dinner in honor of Xi Jinping]," tovima.gr, November 2019, link.

[20] Ibid.

[21] "Chinese visitors set to increase amid closer ties," Kathimerini.gr, November 13, 2019, link.

[22] "Global Indicators Database - Opinion of China: Do you have a favorable or unfavorable view of China?," Pew Research Center, link.

[23] "Global Indicators Database - Confidence in the Chinese President: How much confidence do you have in the Chinese President?." Pew Research Center, link.

[24] "Υπεγράφη στο Μέγαρο Μαξίμου η συμφωνία του ΟΛΠ με την Cosco [The agreement between OLP and Cosco was signed in Maximos Mansion]," in.gr, November 25, 2008, link.

[25] "Οι Κινέζοι έρχονται, οι απεργίες συνεχίζονται στον ΟΛΠ [The Chinese are coming, strikes continue at OLP]," tanea.gr, November 26, 2008, link.

[26] Eleni Stergiou, "Υπόθεση ΟΛΠ: Πώς από το «όχι» φτάσαμε στην πώληση με υπογραφή Τσίπρα [OLP case: How from “no” we got to the sale with Tsipras’ signature]," protothema.gr, April 4, 2016, link.

[27] Vangelis Mandravelis, "Dritsas announces cancellation of OLP sale," kathimerini.gr, January 1, 2015, link.

[28] "Βαρουφάκης: «Εγώ έπεισα τον Τσίπρα να προχωρήσει με την COSCO» [Varoufakis: I persuaded Tsipras to go on with COSCO]," protagon.gr, October 11, 2017, link.

[29] "Τελικά… ψηφίστηκε η συμφωνία για την Cosco μετά από ένα… ολοήμερο αλαλούμ [The agreement for Cosco was finally voted after an… all day confusion]," newsit.gr, June 1, 2016, link.

[30] "Απεργία κατά της πώλησης του ΟΛΠ στις 16 - 17 Φεβρουαρίου [Strike against the sale of OLP in February 16-17]," naftemporiki.gr, February 8, 2016, link.

[31] "Ενταση στην πορεία λιμενεργατών κατά της ιδιωτικοποίησης του ΟΛΠ [Tension during the dock workers' protest against the privatization of OLP]," tovima.gr, April 4, 2016,  link.

[32] Ibid.

[33] "Parliament paves way for Cosco to raise its OLP stake," ekathimerini.com, October 1, 2021, link.

[34] "Με τις ψήφους της ΝΔ, στην Ολομέλεια η τροποποίηση της σύμβασης Δημοσίου – ΟΛΠ [With the votes of ND, in the Plenary Session, the amendment of the contract between State– OLP]," naftemporiki.gr, September 28, 2021, link.

[35] "One more crime committed by the employers in the COSCO piers in Piraeus Port," inter.kke.gr, October 27, 2021, link.

[36] "'Κατάληψη' στην Αθήνα: Κινέζοι αγοράζουν μαζικά διαμερίσματα [“Occupation” in Athens: The Chinese are buying apartments en masse], topontiki.gr, March, 1, 2018, link.

[37] Anastasia Galani, "Οι Κινέζοι αγοράζουν το κέντρο της Αθήνας και το νοικιάζουν στο Airbnb - Μπίζνες με ακίνητα και χρυσές βίζες [The Chinese buy the center of Athens and rent it on Airbnb - Real Estate and Golden Visas Business]," lifo.gr, January 24, 2018, link.

[38] Nikos Rousanoglou, "Σε τροχιά ανόδου φέτος το πρόγραμμα 'χρυσή βίζα' [The “golden visa” program is on the rise this year]," kathimerini.gr, December 15, 2021, link.

[39] Jorge Valero, "Stop demonising China, Varoufakis tells Europe," March 27, 2019, euractiv.com, link.

[40] "Yanis Varoufakis on Chinese 'Imperialism'," YouTube, link.

[41] Kostas Douzinas, “Finis Pax Americana,” EFSYN, September 20, 2021, link.

[42] "Greece Signs BRI Deals, States 'China Invested When Everyone Else Stayed Away',” silkroadbriefing.com, November 19, 2019, link.

[43] "China, Greece pledge to jointly build high-quality Belt and Road Initiative," CGTN, October 27, 2021, link.

[44] "Μητσοτάκης: Η επένδυση της Cosco παράδειγμα αμοιβαίας επωφελούς συνεργασίας [Mitsotakis: Cosco’s investment is an example of mutually beneficial cooperation]," iefimerida.gr, February 9, 2021, link.

[45] Stuart Lau, "Lithuania pulls out of China’s '17+1' bloc in Eastern Europe," Politico, May 21, 2021, link.

[46] "Μητσοτάκης: Τηλεφωνική συνομιλία με τον πρόεδρο της Κίνας – Τι είπαν για Τουρισμό και Αν. Μεσόγειο [Mitsotakis: Telephone conversation with the President of China - What they said about Tourism and the Eastern Mediterranean]," tanea.gr, July 7, 2021, link.

[47] "Greece benefits from its relationship with China," ekathimerini.com, June 18, 2021, link.

[48] Lally Weymouth, "Greece was in deep trouble. How did it right the ship?," Washington Post, November 24, 2021, link.

[49] "Li Keqiang Meets with Prime Minister Antonis Samaras of Greece," PRC MFA, October 16, 2016, link.

[50] Robin Emmott and Angeliki Koutantou, "Greece blocks EU statement on China human rights at U.N.," Reuters, June 18, 2017, link.

[51] "China, Greece pledge to jointly build high-quality Belt and Road Initiative," CGTN, October 28, 2021, link.

[52] "Greek PM condemns Russian attack, says Greece energy supply secure," Reuters, February 24, 2022, link.

[53] Nektaria Stamouli, "Greece tossed aside years of caution in Ukraine — and upset Greeks," Politico, March 23, 2022, link.

With the support of
Published with the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation pursuant to art. 23-bis of Presidential Decree 18/1967. The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation.
Published with the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation pursuant to art. 23-bis of Presidential Decree 18/1967. The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation.
Privacy Policy
Cookie Policy