Türkiye’s Political Turmoil: Shifting Chinese Narratives between 2023 and 2025

On March 18, 2025, Istanbul University announced the annulment of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu’s degree, citing “clear errors.” This decision disqualifies İmamoğlu, a leading figure in the opposition Republican People's Party (CHP), from contesting the 2028 Turkish presidential elections, in which he had been widely regarded as the main challenger to incumbent President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

The following day, Turkish police arrested İmamoğlu on charges of corruption, financial misconduct, and alleged support for the (just recently “dissolved”) Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is designated a terrorist organization by Türkiye and its allies. Over one hundred other opposition figures were also detained. In addition to triggering significant volatility in Türkiye's financial markets, these arrests sparked the largest wave of protests in more than a decade. Demonstrations quickly spread from Istanbul to other major cities, ultimately encompassing more than 50 of Türkiye’s 81 provinces, as hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets, squares, and university campuses.

Against this background, this edition of the ChinaMed Observer examines the evolution of Chinese media and expert discourse from early 2024, when municipal elections resulted in significant setbacks for Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AK Party), to today. The analysis explores how Chinese reactions to the 2025 protests in Türkiye reflect concerns about the country’s deepening political polarization and public discontent, especially in light of economic struggles and the treatment of opposition figures. While earlier Chinese coverage emphasized Erdoğan’s political strength and role in maintaining stable China-Türkiye relations, Chinese experts have also shown concern about his governance approach and its long-term impact. These differing views reflect a cautious Chinese interest in Türkiye’s changing political landscape, shaped by strategic considerations and a desire to maintain stable bilateral relations.

Chinese Experts and the Turkish Protests

Chinese experts have closely followed the Turkish protests, largely interpreting the unrest as indicative of growing political tensions and rising dissatisfaction with President Erdoğan’s leadership.

For example, Chen Yubao, a researcher at the Center for Turkish Studies at Zhejiang International Studies University, contends that the protests reflect the longstanding and increasingly pronounced rivalry between the ruling AK Party and the opposition.^[1] Similar views were expressed by Li Shaoxian, president of the China-Arab Research Institute at Ningxia University.^[2]

Li Yanan, the deputy head of the Middle East Research Institute at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, pointed out that President Erdoğan’s decision to detain his political opponents is not without precedent.^[3] He cited the 2016 arrest and prosecution of Selahattin Demirtaş, chairman of the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP), along with other party members, on charges of alleged support for terrorist activities.^[4] According to Li, such developments are symptomatic of a broader trend of democratic backsliding in Türkiye. While the immediate trigger for the protests was the imprisonment of İmamoğlu, he argues that economic dissatisfaction constitutes the underlying cause of growing public opposition to the government.

This assessment is echoed by Niu Xinchun, executive director of the China-Arab Research Institute at Ningxia University. In an interview with Phoenix TV, Niu argued that Türkiye’s economic performance over the past decade has been very poor, contributing to heightened social tensions.^[5] He further added that Erdoğan has taken advantage of this period to consolidate his power by asserting control over the military, police, and media, thereby exacerbating conflicts with other political parties.

However, other analysts, like Dong Manyuan, a senior researcher at the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), have underscored the significance of İmamoğlu as a rising political figure within the CHP. Dong highlighted İmamoğlu’s charisma and relative youth, at 54 years of age, as key assets, especially when contrasted to Erdoğan, who is now 71.^[6] As Dong stated:

“In 2019, during the first round of Istanbul's mayoral election, İmamoğlu won by 25,000 more votes than his opponent. In the second round in June, he won by more than 80,000 votes, becoming the mayor of Istanbul. In early 2024, he won the local elections again, marking a major victory for the CHP. The mayors of all three of Türkiye’s largest cities are members of the CHP, giving voters hope that in 2028, İmamoğlu could potentially defeat Erdoğan, as the party increasingly rallies around him as its primary candidate.”

Looking ahead, Chinese commentators foresee an intensification of government repression against the opposition. For instance, Chen Yubao remarked:

“Although the unrest is relatively serious, it will not have a significant impact on Erdoğan's governance and future choices. This series of moves is likely to be a special move taken by the ruling party to gain an advantageous position in the future political competition, to weaken the opposition party's campaign power.” ^[7]

Chinese Commentators and the Trends in Turkish Politics

To contextualize the Chinese reaction to the recent protests in Türkiye and their impact on Sino-Turkish relations, it is important to consider how media commentators and experts in China have discussed key moments in Turkish politics in recent years. A useful starting point is the 2023 presidential election, in which President Erdoğan secured a third term by defeating opposition candidate Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu in a run-off vote.

At the time, The Observer published a particularly interesting interview with Dong Manyuan. In addition to his role at CIIS, which is affiliated with China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dong also has substantial diplomatic experience, having served as a diplomat in Egypt from 1993 to 1997 and later as First Secretary and Director of the Research Office at the Chinese Embassy in Ankara from 1999 to 2002.^[8]

In the interview, Dong characterized Kılıçdaroğlu as a relatively weak candidate, suggesting that the opposition might have had better prospects with a more compelling figure. While he acknowledged that Türkiye’s economic difficulties and the aftermath of the devastating February 2023 earthquakes had damaged Erdoğan’s public standing, Dong argued it was unsurprising that these factors failed to significantly erode his popular support. In his view, Erdoğan's enduring appeal could be attributed to his notable achievements in both foreign and domestic policy. Moreover, Dong emphasized that, given the scope of Türkiye’s challenges at home and abroad, what the country required was “a strong political figure to lead from the perspective of strengthening the country.”

Dong, along with other experts such as Fudan University’s Zou Zhiqiang,^[9] also expressed optimism regarding Türkiye’s political stability and economic trajectory under Erdoğan’s continued leadership.

The interview concluded with a question on the implications of Erdoğan’s victory for bilateral relations with China. Dong was unequivocal: “Erdogan's victory is good for China-Türkiye relations” because the two countries have increasingly supported each other on important domestic and international issues, often finding themselves both under pressure from the West. Dong thus anticipated continuity in Ankara’s China policy under Erdoğan, though he also suggested that even in the event of a Kılıçdaroğlu victory, a radical departure in foreign policy would have been unlikely.

Less than a year later, however, there was a shift in tone in Chinese commentary. Following Türkiye’s 2024 local elections, reporters from the Shanghai-based The Paper characterized the results as a huge blow to Erdoğan, interpreting them as a clear expression of widespread dissatisfaction over the state of the country’s economy. The Paper noted that this electoral success for the CHP significantly bolstered the party’s political profile and positioned it as a credible challenger in the 2028 presidential election.^[10] Similar views were published in other Chinese media outlets.^[11]

At the same time, Chinese scholars offered diverging interpretations of the election results. Yang Chen, Executive Director of the Center for Turkish Studies at Shanghai University, acknowledged that the scale of the opposition’s victory had taken him by surprise:

“I originally thought that the opposition party and the AK Party were evenly matched, but I did not expect that the opposition party would have a significant advantage, ultimately winning with a clear majority.”^[12]

In contrast, Tan Jinghong, a lecturer at the School of History and Culture at Nantong University with expertise in Turkish regional and national history, offered a more cautious reading. While acknowledging the CHP’s electoral gains, Tan argued that the party would likely remain the main opposition party and that the structure of the Turkish political landscape was unlikely to change in the near term.^[13] Nonetheless, he noted that Türkiye’s growing economic problems could present challenges for the ruling AK Party in the near future.

Despite these political developments, Chinese analysts once again generally agreed that these elections would not significantly affect China–Türkiye relations. Liu Zhongmin, a professor at the Middle East Studies Institute at Shanghai International Studies University, highlighted the resilience and strategic depth of the bilateral relationship:

“China-Türkiye relations have been stabilized in recent years, as China offered significant support and aid to Türkiye after the deadly earthquake in 2023, and both sides are willing to further promote relations to boost economic growth. After Saudi Arabia and Iran successfully re-established diplomatic ties with the support and mediation of China in 2023, a wave of reconciliation has occurred in the Middle East, and Türkiye has also fixed its ties with other major powers, while the ongoing crisis in Gaza also further strengthens unity among Muslim countries.”^[14]

As we noted in past issues of the ChinaMed Observer, Turkish policymakers have undertaken considerable efforts to strike a balance between improving relations with Beijing and addressing domestic political imperatives. These include responding to public concerns over the treatment of the Uyghurs and defending the development of Türkiye’s national electric vehicle industry.

These efforts have yielded notable results. Bilateral relations between Türkiye and China have improved significantly, especially when compared to the chill that followed Ankara’s endorsement of a joint statement at the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2022, which condemned China’s policies in Xinjiang. For a time, especially after Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s visit to China in June 2024 and the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria at the hands of Turkish-backed rebel forces in December 2024, Chinese media coverage of Türkiye was markedly more favorable. Chinese scholars, too, appeared less critical of what they once described as the “overreach” of Turkish foreign policy, a significant departure from previous discourse. Nonetheless, this more conciliatory tone could be temporary, given that the new Turkish-supported regime in Syria has done little to curtail the influence of Islamist Uyghur fighters, a development that could easily reignite Chinese concerns.

However, the Chinese expert discourse regarding this recent wave of protests in Türkiye serves as a reminder that, despite the re-evaluation of Turkish foreign policy given its recent successes, longstanding anxieties remain among Chinese scholars regarding the trajectory of Turkish domestic politics under President Erdoğan. These concerns center on the increasing role of religion in public life, the perceived erosion of democratic institutions, and Ankara’s financial and economic policies that are seemingly not responding to immediate public concerns.

Conclusion

While Chinese scholars acknowledge that İmamoğlu’s disqualification and subsequent arrest played a role in triggering the protests in Türkiye, they generally interpret the unrest as a reflection of deeper, more systemic public dissatisfaction. This discontent stems not only from the Turkish government's treatment of the political opposition but also from the enduring economic hardships facing the country. These concerns are not new. Although some analysts recognize President Erdoğan’s political resilience and the stability he has brought to China-Türkiye relations, Chinese experts have consistently expressed reservations about Ankara’s domestic policies. These criticisms have become more pronounced in the wake of the AK Party’s poor performance in the 2024 local elections and the increasingly centralized nature of political power under Erdoğan, which is viewed as a potential source of domestic instability.

Despite these concerns, Chinese commentators have largely avoided speculating on the potential foreign policy consequences of the protests. Whether these events will undermine the cautiously optimistic reassessment of Türkiye’s international orientation that has taken hold among Chinese analysts in recent months remains uncertain. For now, Chinese scholars seem to continue to view the trends in China-Türkiye relations positively, with Erdoğan still regarded as a stabilizing figure in the bilateral relationship.

Although Erdoğan’s previously mentioned an expected visit by President Xi Jinping to Türkiye in early 2025, this state visit has yet to take place. As we await to see whether the two leaders will meet in the coming months, it is clear that Chinese observers will continue to follow developments in Türkiye closely. Their evolving assessments may offer important insights into Beijing’s strategic recalibrations in its engagement with Ankara moving forward.

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Miriam VERZELLINO is a Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. She is currently pursuing a Master’s in Political Science (Chinese Language Program) at the Communication University of China. Her research interests include scientific and technological cooperation between China and Europe, with a specific focus on Italy, as well as digital governance.

Dr. Andrea GHISELLI is Head of Research of the ChinaMed Project. He is also Lecturer in International Politics in the Department of Social and Political Sciences, Philosophy, and Anthropology of the University of Exeter. His research focuses on Chinese foreign and security policy making and China’s policy toward the Middle East and North Africa.