Tunisian and Egyptian Media on the 10th Ministerial Conference of the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum

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Mariateresa Natuzzi and Bianca Pasquier

On May 30, 2024, Beijing hosted the 10th Ministerial Conference of the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum, a platform for China and Arab states to discuss international issues and strengthen bilateral relations. During the Forum, three important documents were adopted: the “Beijing Declaration,” the Forum’s Action Implementation Plan for 2024-2026 and a joint declaration on the Palestinian issue. China also secured a series of agreements with various participating countries and the League of Arab States.

In this issue of the ChinaMed Observer, we explore how the Forum was covered in the North African media, in particular within Tunisia and Egypt. This event received extensive press coverage in both countries as Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi and Tunisian President Kais Saied were the only African leaders in attendance.

Our analysis reveals that both the Tunisian and Egyptian press whole-heartedly embraced the narrative of an alleged cultural and political bond between Arab countries and China. They also consistently portrayed China as an emerging global power whose policies and vision of the international order, unlike those of Western countries, more closely align with Arab interests. The Egyptian and, to a lesser extent, Tunisian media also expressed appreciation for China’s stance on Israel-Palestine conflict and its offers to mediate. Some Egyptian commentators even suggested that Beijing could play a role in brokering a solution to Cairo’s water security issue.  

North African journalists also paid considerable attention to the economic dimension of Sino-Arab cooperation. Analysts generally celebrated China as the world’s premier economic power and expressed significant enthusiasm for new cooperation opportunities in sectors such as renewable energy, infrastructure and tourism. However, some Tunisian commentators raised concerns that cooperation might not be as “fair and equal” as often described, emphasizing the need for Tunis to ensure a more balanced partnership with China.

A Strong Cultural and Political Bond for a New Global Order

In their speeches at the Forum, participating leaders emphasized the narrative that China and Arab countries share a strong cultural, economic and political bond. Chinese President Xi Jinping stated that:

"the friendship between China, the Chinese people, and the Arab countries and peoples stems from the friendly exchanges along the ancient Silk Road.”[1]

Tunisian President Kais Saied went even further, affirming that:

“From the country of Ibn Khaldoun to the country of Confucius, the path that unites us is not limited to the "Silk Road" but rather to decades of cultural and commercial exchange.”[2]

North African journalists not only quoted these statements but also actively argued in favor of this supposed link between China and the Arab world.[3] According to many of them, Beijing and Arab countries are united in their quest for a new, fairer multipolar international order.

The Tunisian media, in particular, emphasized the country’s supposed pivotal role in Sino-Arab cooperation, noting that this year marks the 60th anniversary of diplomatic ties between Tunis and Beijing. Journalist Meriem Khdimallah, writing in French-language Tunisian newspaper La Presse, maintained that Tunisia hosting the upcoming 11th Ministerial Conference of the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum “highlights the role of our country as a catalyst for Sino-Arab cooperation, [consolidating] the historical and cultural ties between the two civilizations, …and as regional crossroads paving the way for dialogue and cooperation.”[4]

According to journalist Mourad Allala, in an article for the Tunisian newspaper Essahafa, the “growing strength” of the Sino-Tunisian partnership is not surprising:

“Tunisia needs the People’s Republic of China as much as the latter needs it as it fulfills its historic dream of restoring the Silk Road to a country located in the heart of the world, without exaggeration, in the Mediterranean basin.”[5]

While this perspective on Tunisia’s “centrality” might be a bit self-aggrandizing, the article itself is emblematic of a prevailing narrative in the Tunisian media: the once-hegemonic West is in decline, China is rising, and a new multipolar world order is emerging. For Allala, this “dawn of a new era” is both inevitable and welcome. The journalist argued that historically the EU and the US have “blackmailed” Tunisia under the pretext of human rights and democracy, while now failing to support Tunis amid its economic crisis and bailout negotiations with the International Monetary Fund. Conversely, relations with China are based on respect of sovereignty, mutual interest, and shared stances on international issues, most notably on Palestine.

Similar views can be found in the Egyptian media, with the difference that it is Egypt, not Tunisia, that is supposedly the central country in Sino-Arab relations.[6] In an interview with the evening TV program Al-Hayat Al-Youm, Cairo University’s Mohamed Kamal argued that the international system is now characterized by the declining leadership of the US and the rise of China.[7] According to the political science professor, a significant factor behind this decline is Washington’s diminishing moral reputation amidst the Gaza War.

A comparable perspective can be found in the government-controlled newspaper Akhbar el-Yom, where Mohammed Handawi argued that Arab countries are turning to China due to:

“the United States’ absent role in resolving many crises in the Middle East… the most important [of which] is the brutal Israeli aggression in the Gaza Strip, which sees China currently playing a positive role, unlike the US which supports and backs Israel.”[8]

It is noteworthy that this narrative of a declining West and a rising China is pervasive in the tightly controlled media landscapes of Egypt and Tunisia. This indicates a level of acceptance or even endorsement of these views from national governments.

Another crucial aspect to consider is the reciprocity within the Sino-Arab partnership on global affairs. While China has aligned with the Arab world on Palestine, Arab states have reciprocated by backing Beijing on Taiwan. During the Forum, Ahmed Aboul Gheit, Secretary General of the League of Arab States, reiterated the League's support for China's sovereignty and territorial integrity and emphasized its firm commitment to the one-China principle.[9]

China as a Potential Mediator

At the Sino-Arab Forum, China reaffirmed its stance on the Palestinian issue. The People’s Republic advocates for a two-state solution, envisioning the establishment of a Palestinian state along 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital and full membership in the United Nations. It has also consistently criticized Israeli military actions in the Gaza Strip and its illegal occupation and settlement of Palestinian territory. To end the current outbreak of violence and the humanitarian catastrophe in the Gaza Strip, Xi Jinping has advocated for a large peace conference which should also lay the groundwork for a permanent peace settlement.[10]

Despite expressing appreciation for Beijing’s general stance on Palestine, the Tunisian press did not offer extensive analysis on China’s proposals and concrete actions, with the exception of Xi Jinping’s pledge to provide an additional RMB 500 million (USD 68.8 million) in aid to alleviate the humanitarian crisis and support post-conflict reconstruction in Gaza.[11] This aid comes on top of the RMB 100 million (USD 13.8 million) China had already provided, along with a new USD 3 million contribution to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).

It is interesting to note, however, that no Tunisian media outlet contextualized these figures, as these donations are rather modest when compared to the aid provided by the West. For instance, the European Union has provided almost EUR 1.1 billion in humanitarian support for Palestinians, EUR 841 million of which was mobilized since October 7, 2023.

The Tunisian press similarly refrained from offering in-depth analysis on China’s official stance on resolving the Israel-Palestine conflict, particularly its support for a two-state solution. While this reticence could simply derive from a lack of interested or capable analysts, it may stem from President Saied’s “full and unconditional support for the Palestinian people” expressed immediately after the October 7 attack. In his statement, Saied made no reference of a two-state solution, instead denying the legitimacy of the “Zionist entity” and asserting that the “Palestinian people have the right to reclaim… all of Palestine, and… to establish their independent state with Jerusalem as its capital.”

Thus, while Tunisian daily newspaper Le Temps celebrated China’s “consistent support for the Palestinian cause,” there was scant follow-up analysis on Beijing’s desire to “position itself as a mediator between Hamas and the Zionist entity” and its calls for a two-state solution.[12] Instead, rather than as a mediator, China was described more as a partner for reshaping the current Western-led international order, which is blamed for perpetuating the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza.

Former diplomat Ahmed Ounaies exemplifies this perspective. In an interview with La Presse, he stated:

“We must strive to form a united front against Western actors who seem to be asserting dominance in the current order. The clearest example of this is Israel's boundless arrogance, bombing without restraint, morality, or regard for international law. In my opinion, China should assist the Third World establish this moral tribunal and beyond.”[13]

Conversely, the Egyptian press focused more on China’s proposals for resolving the Gaza War, rather than speculating on the future of the international order. Mohammed Handawi, in his aforementioned article in Akhbar el-Yom, framed Chinese calls for convening a major peace conference as a credible mediation effort.[14] He underscored China’s successful track record, mediating between Saudi Arabia and Iran, as well as hosting talks in Beijing between Hamas and Fatah aimed at fostering Palestinian reconciliation and cohesion.

Indeed, many Egyptian analysts appear to trust that China is acting in good faith. Palestinian political analyst Abdul Mahdi Mutawa, in remarks to the Egyptian online news portal El Watan News, stated that the Palestinian cause is important to China, noting that the Chinese stance aligns with pro-Palestinian public opinion in Egypt, and highlighted Beijing’s capacity to put in place mechanisms that could influence the Palestinian dossier and the course of the war.[15]

Similarly, Professor Mohamed Kamal argued that:

“China's current position on the war in Gaza and the Palestinian issue represent a change in Chinese diplomacy, which has become clear and not grey as it was before.”[16]

Even the Egyptian political opposition appears to endorse the results of the China-Arab Forum and China’s stance on the Gaza War. Naji al-Shibabi, leader of the left-wing Democratic Generation Party, stated that the summit sent a powerful message to the West, especially to the US, criticizing its policy of duplicity and unwavering support for the Israeli occupation.[17] Similarly, Raja Attia, secretary of the social-democratic party Egyptian Freedom Party, told El Watan News that the Forum served as an alarm bell to the world on the gravity of Palestinian situation.[18]

However, not all Egyptian commentators believe China's actions are purely altruistic. Ahmed Aboudouh, an analyst at the British think tank Chatham House, told the Egyptian newspaper of record Al-Ahram that for China resolving the Gaza War is a "strategic opportunity to enhance its reputation and influence in the Arab world," with the aim of “diminishing US credibility and influence in the region.”[19]

The Egyptian media also discussed another potential issue area for Chinese mediation: water security. Back in May 2022, amidst tensions with Ethiopia over the Nile river and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, we noted Egyptians analysts’ confidence that China could play a role in resolving the dispute.[20] However, we also reported that Chinese enthusiasm for taking on such a role appeared far less evident.

With the China-Arab Forum, the idea that China could potentially help ensure Egyptian water security returned to the spotlight in the Egyptian press. Al-Ahram journalist Racha Darwich reported that during a bilateral meeting on the sidelines of the event, President Al-Sisi emphasized to Xi Jinping that his top priority is ensuring Egypt’s water security.[21] Major General Dr. Reda Farhat, a political science professor, also noted Al-Sisi's focus on Arab water security, interpreting it as an attempt by Cairo to prioritize achieving water security for all Arab countries within the framework of future Sino-Arab Forum cooperation.[22]

Moussa Mostafa Moussa, the chairman of the opposition El-Ghad Party, viewed President Al-Sisi’s emphasis on Sino-Egyptian cooperation on water security within the context of Cairo and Beijing’s strategic partnership and ensuring Ethiopia’s commitment to coordinate over this issue (Ethiopia and Egypt are both new members of the BRICS).[23] Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry’s warning at the Forum that Egypt “will confront any attempts to negatively affect its water security” was also likely intended as a signal to China and the other involved states of Cairo’s intransigent position on this matter.[24]

“We Can Do More”: Tunisian and Egyptian Voices on Sino-Arab Economic Cooperation

Alongside political considerations, Tunisian and Egyptian have also delved into the economic dimension of Sino-Arab relations, expressing confidence in the future of the Chinese economy.

For instance, Professor Mohamed Kamal hailed China as the world's foremost economy in both quantity and quality.[25] Similar praise for the Chinese economy and its alleged global primacy can be found in the Tunisian press, alongside exhortations for Tunis to strengthen its trade and investment ties with Beijing. In comments for La Presse, former diplomat Ahmed Ounaies explained that:

“Tunisia needs investments, and it seems to me that China is a global partner that understands developing countries much better… China is a fundamental partner, a partner of the future.” [26]

While these perspectives are commonplace across the North African media landscape, they contrast with mainstream narratives in the Western press—which often highlight China's ongoing economic woes and the risks associated with Chinese investments. This does not mean analysts from the region are unaware of the debate in Europe and the US on “de-risking.” For instance, Maha Salem, writing for the pro-government Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram argued that Washington’s narrative portraying growing Chinese engagement in the Middle East as a reflection of Beijing’s ambition for global hegemony “does not reflect the reality on the ground.” Instead, the journalist asserted that they are a sign of the region’s growing interest in Chinese investment.[27]

Regarding data, La Presse highlighted that the volume of total exports between China and Arab countries surpassed 260 million tons in 2023.[28] Meanwhile, Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram, citing data from its Center for Political and Strategic Studies, reported that the annual trade volume between China and Arab countries surged from US$36.7 billion in 2004 to US$398.1 billion in 2023 —an over tenfold increase, as emphasized by the newspaper.[29]

Interestingly, most of the Egyptian and Tunisian press did not provide detailed data on their countries’ bilateral economic relations China. This omission may serve to obscure Egypt and Tunisia’s significantly unbalanced trade relationship with Beijing. In 2023, Tunisian exports to China were valued at only US$245 million, while imports from China reached US$2,025 million. Similarly, Egypt exported goods worth US$881 million to China but imported almost US$15 billion. This focus on overall Sino-Arab trade, which includes substantial Gulf energy exports, may help create a false impression of a more equal economic relationship.

Source: ICT Trade Map
Source: ICT Trade Map

However, when comparing the media debate in Egypt and Tunisia, Egyptian commentators were more confident of their country’s ability to leverage the economic opportunities offered by China. This is particular evident in the extensive coverage El Watan News offered on Sino-Egyptian economic ties.

In an interview with the morning show "Hatha Al-Sabah," Mohamed Sabry, a researcher at the Egyptian Center for Thought and Strategic Studies, argued that Egypt was in a prime position not only due to its geographic position and historic relationship with China (Egypt was the first Arab and African country to recognize the People’s Republic), but also due converging views regarding investments in infrastructure and transport routes.[30] He thus predicted the coming period will witness greater Sino-Egyptian cooperation, noting that Cairo is banking on its partnership with Beijing in many fields, including communications, information technology and investment.

According to Amr Al-Qamati, a member of the Egyptian House of Representatives, the results of this cooperation are already evident. In a press statement, the MP highlighted that the volume of bilateral trade reached US$15.7 billion last year, with Chinese investment in Egypt totaling US$8 billion, spread over 2,600 Chinese joint-stock companies. He also emphasized that Egypt is an important partner for China, serving as its gateway into the African continent and a pillar of the Belt and Road Initiative.[31]

On the issue of energy, Dr. Hassan Hagras, a member of the Supreme Committee of the Democratic Generation Party, emphasized in an interview with El Watan News a key objective of Al-Sisi’s trip to Beijing was to boost Sino-Egyptian energy cooperation.[32] According to Hagras, the Egyptian President aimed to facilitate Chinese technology transfers to Egypt and encourage Chinese investment in the Egyptian energy sector, particularly in renewable and nuclear energy projects. Hagras emphasized that Egypt could potentially transform itself into a regional energy hub by involving Chinese firms in regional electricity projects and in the expansion Egyptian energy exports to neighboring markets. El Watan underscored Al-Sisi's meeting with the boards of China Energy Engineering Group and China State Construction Engineering Corporation, as proof of Cairo’s commitment to strengthening its energy partnership with Beijing.

In contrast, Tunisian commentators expressed more cautious views vis-à-vis China, citing the limited nature of Sino-Tunisian economic relations. Writing in La Presse, journalist Hella Lahbib noted how Tunisia has struggled to attract significant Chinese capital compared to other North African countries like Morocco.[33] Lahbib however expressed hope this could change with the Sino-Arab Forum, which could potentially elevate bilateral ties to a strategic partnership.

Journalist Madiha Maamri, in Essahafa, took aneven more critical stance, asserting that:

“Despite Tunisia's… strategic position…, with easy access to European and African markets and proximity to vital shipping routes, the real imbalance in trade and investment relations between [China and Tunisia] is starkly evident. This disparity is often likened by experts to a race between the tortoise and the hare, symbolizing China's dominant position over Tunisia. This dominance is clearly manifested in the trade deficit, where China contributes significantly, straining Tunisia's public finances.”[34]

Maamri went to note that many economic experts “advocate for increasing Chinese investment as a crucial step towards addressing the trade deficit and enhancing economic partnership.”[35] This perspective is common among Tunisian commentators and reflects a broader sentiment across the Global South. China's advocacy for fair, equal, “win-win” relations has heightened expectations and now officials and analysts are keen to see China’s rhetorical commitments be transformed into tangible results.

To ensure this occurs, several Tunisian experts have urged their government to take proactive steps. In an interview with Essahafa, economics expert Moez Hadidane stressed the importance of marketing, advising Tunis to seize the opportunity of the Forum to promote itself and its strategic geographic position as an attractive destination for Chinese investments. Hadidane remarked:

“When China builds a huge port in Africa, this opens the door to the Chinese market and the rest of the global markets for Tunisia.” [36]

Hadidane also noted how China can be a source of investments in the renewable energy sector. His comment is emblematic of Tunisian interest in attracting Chinese investment in emerging green technology industries, as highlighted by the extensive press coverage of President Saied’s visit to the headquarters of the Chinese electric vehicle giant BYD.[37]

There is also significant interest in attracting Chinese tourists to Tunisia. La Press noted how the Chinese market is one of the world's largest suppliers of tourists, with forecasts for 2030 predicting more than 280 million Chinese travelers worldwide.[38] In this context, the newspaper recalled how Chinese tourists will be able to travel visa-free to Tunisia starting from September 2024.[39]

Source: PRC Ministry of Finance


Our analysis reveals that Tunisians and Egyptians commentators capitalized on their heads of state attending the 10th China-Arab Forum to evaluate their countries’ bilateral relations with China. They also assessed Beijing’s regional and global influence, with many convinced that the West is declining, and that China is a rising power which can reshape the international order. The Gaza War further prompted many analysts to welcome this prospect, applauding Beijing’s position on and contribution to resolving the Palestinian issue.

Beside promoting a positive view of Chinese foreign policy, the North African press has also been expressing increasing confidence in Beijing’s potential as conflict mediator with regard to Palestine. However, on the issue of regional water security, we observed a growing concern within the Egyptian media over China’s ambiguous position.

On economic cooperation, all commentators were confident regarding the future of the Chinese economy and supported strengthening economic ties with China. Egyptian coverage reflected both satisfaction with the current benefits of the partnership with China and a desire to further enhance cooperation, particularly in the fields of energy and the green transition. In Tunisia, although the government and the press frequently emphasized the need to diversify investments, the habitual praises to Beijing’s economic partnership model seem to be counterbalanced by disappointment for the trade imbalance between the two countries and for the lack of Chinese investments.

In general, the coverage of this year’s Sino-Arab Forum reflects China’s positive image in North African countries. The enthusiastic tones within the press appear to have been bolstered by anti-Western sentiments and the hope inspired by China's official discourse on more egalitarian partnerships with Global South countries. Signs of discontent should be interpreted not as distrust, but as expectations for corresponding actions rather than just words.

Mariateresa NATUZZI is Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. She is also a graduate student in Transmediterranean Studies at Ca’ Foscari University of Venice and holds a B.A. in International Relations from the University of Naples ‘L’Orientale’. Her research focuses on the media coverage of China in North Africa, as well as issues related to food production and the environment in the region.

Bianca PASQUIER is Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. She is also a graduate student in Political Science and International Relations at the University of Naples "L’Orientale." Her research focuses on the media coverage of China in North Africa.

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 International License. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ or send a letter to Creative Commons, PO Box 1866, Mountain View, CA 94042, USA.

[1] Kalimat rayiys aljumhuriat fi aiftitah muntadaa altaeawun alsiynii alearabii : daewat almujtamae alduwalii lilailtihaq bialmujtamae al'iinsanii fi difaeih ean alhaqi alfilastinii كلمة رئيس الجمهورية في افتتاح منتدى التعاون الصيني العربي : دعوة المجتمع الدولي للالتحاق بالمجتمع الإنساني في دفاعه عن الحق الفلسطيني [Address by the President of the Republic at the opening of the Sino-Arab Cooperation Forum: Inviting the international community to join the humanitarian community in defending the Palestinian right], Essahafa, May 31, 2024, link.

[2] Forum Sino-Arabe : Kaïs Saïed aspire à une nouvelle ère de coopération, [Sino-Arab Forum: Kaïs Saïed aspires to a new era of cooperation], La Presse, May 30, 2024, link.

[3] Manar Magdy, Katib sahafi: alsiyn tudrik an misr hiya miftah alsharq al'awsatكاتب صحفي: الصين تدرك أنّ مصر هي مفتاح الشرق الأوسط [Journalist: China realizes that Egypt is the key to the Middle East], El Watan News, May 29, 2024, link.

[4] Meriem Khdimallah, Pour une communauté d’avenir partagé : Le Président chinois annonce cinq cadres de coopération sino-arabe [For a community with a shared future: Chinese President announces five Sino-Arab cooperation frameworks], La Presse, May 31, 2024, link.

[5] Mourad Allala, Ma baed musharakat tunis al'iijabiat fi muntadaa altaeawun alsiynii alearabii: tafeil alshirakat alastiratijiaما بعد مشاركة تونس الإيجابية في منتدى التعاون الصيني العربي: تفعيل الشراكة الاستراتيجية [After Tunisia's positive participation in the China-Arab Cooperation Forum: Activating the strategic partnership], Essahafa, June 2, 2024, link.

[6] Manar Magdy, Journalist: China realizes that Egypt is the key to the Middle East.

[7] Mona Shabana, Ustadh eulum siasiatun: tarajae aldawr alqiadii li'amrika wasueud alsiyn ealaa alsaahat alduwalia أستاذ علوم سياسية: تراجع الدور القيادي لأمريكا وصعود الصين على الساحة الدولية [Political Science Professor: the decline of America’s leadership role and the rise of China on the international scene], El Watan News, May 30, 2024, link.

[8] Mohammed Handawi, Eahd jadid alalaqat alearabiat - alsiyniat baed 20 eaman min altaeawun almushtarak عهد جديد للعلاقات العربية - الصينية بعد ٢٠ عامًا من التعاون المشترك [A new era for Arab-Chinese relations after 20 years of joint cooperation], Akhbar el-Yom, June 1, 2024, link.

[9] Nermin Afifi, 'Abu alghayt: jamieat alduwal alearabiat tadeam siadat alsiyn wawahdat 'aradiha, أبو الغيط: جامعة الدول العربية تدعم سيادة الصين ووحدة أراضيها, [Aboul Gheit: The Arab League supports China's sovereignty and territorial integrity], El Watan News, May 30, 2024, link.

[10] Guerre à Gaza : Xi Jinping appelle à une conférence de paix "élargie" [War in Gaza: Xi Jinping calls for an “expanded” peace conference], Al Ahram, May 30, 2024, link.

[11] Meriem Khdimallah, For a community with a shared future: Chinese President announces five Sino-Arab cooperation frameworks.

[12] Le président Saïed en visite d’Etat en Chine [President Saïed on state visit to China], Le Temps, May 28, 2024, link.

[13] Samir Dridi, La Chine, un partenaire qui comprend mieux les pays en développement [China, a partner that better understands developing countries], La Presse, June 3, 2024, link.

[14] Mohammed Handawi, A new era for Arab-Chinese relations after 20 years of joint cooperation.

[15] Muhammad Jamal Jafaar, Muhalil siasi: alsiyn tatafiq mae misr fi darurat aldaght li'iinha' harb ghaza محلل سياسي: الصين تتفق مع مصر في ضرورة الضغط لإنهاء حرب غزة, [Political analyst: China agrees with Egypt on the need to pressure to end the Gaza war], El Watan News, May 30, 2024, link.

[16] Mona Shabana, Political science professor: China’s diplomacy towards Gaza has become clear after it was gray.

[17] Makram Shaaban, Hizb aljil yushid biziarat alrayiys alsiysi 'iilaa alsiyn: alqahirat kanat bawaabat bikin li'iifriqiaحزب الجيل يشيد بزيارة الرئيس السيسي إلى الصين: القاهرة كانت بوابة بكين لإفريقي [The Generation Party praises President Sisi’s visit to China: Cairo was Beijing’s gateway to Africa], El Watan News, May 29, 2024, link.

[18] Muhammad Abaza, Qiadiun bi ”alhuriyat almisrii”: alrayiys alsiysiu haris ealaa wade alsiyn fi surat qadaya almintaqaقيادي بـ«الحرية المصري»: الرئيس السيسي حريص على وضع الصين في صورة قضايا المنطقة [A leader in the Egyptian Freedom Movement: President Sisi is keen to place China in the context of regional issues], El Watan News, May 30, 2024, link.

[19] Xi Jinping reçoit Sissi à Pékin, avant un forum avec des pays arabes [Xi Jinping receives Sisi in Beijing, before a forum with Arab countries], Al-Ahram, May 29, 2024, link.

[20] Mohammad Hefni, Hal tanjahu al-Sin fi hall azmat sadd al-nahdaهل تنجح الصين في حل أزمة سد النهضة؟ [Will China succeed in solving the Renaissance Dam crisis?], Okaz, May 1, 2022, link.

[21] Racha Darwich, Sissi et Xi réaffirment à Pékin la nécessité de mettre fin à la guerre à Gaza [Sissi and Xi reaffirm in Beijing the need to end the war in Gaza], Al-Ahram, May 29, 2024, link.

[22] Muhammad Abaza, 'Ustadh fi aleulum alsiyasiati: taeziz altaeawun mae alsiyn yakhdim masalih misr walduwal alearabiaأستاذ في العلوم السياسية: تعزيز التعاون مع الصين يخدم مصالح مصر والدول العربية [Professor of Political Science: Strengthening cooperation with China serves the interests of Egypt and the Arab countries], El Watan News, May 30, 2024, link.

[23] Mohamed Abaza, Hizb alghad”: khitaab alrayiys fi alsiyn rkkz ealaa qadaya 'asasiat waminha al'amn almayiyu limasr" حزب الغد»: خطاب الرئيس في الصين ركّز على قضايا أساسية ومنها الأمن المائي لمصر [Tomorrow Party: The president’s speech in China focused on basic issues, including Egypt’s water security], El Watan News, May 30, 2024, link.

[24] FM affirms necessity of coordination with China to handle regional crises, The Egyptian Gazette, May 30, 2024, link.

[25] Mona Shabana, Political science professor: China’s diplomacy towards Gaza has become clear after it was gray.

[26] Samir Dridi, La Chine, un partenaire qui comprend mieux les pays en développement [China, a partner that better understands developing countries], La Presse, June 3, 2024, link.

[27] Maha Salem, Entre la Chine et les pays arabes, un partenariat stratégique et global [Between China and Arab countries, a strategic and global partnership], Al Ahram, June 5, 2024, link.

[28] Meriem Khdimallah, For a community with a shared future: Chinese President announces five Sino-Arab cooperation frameworks.

[29] Maha Salem, China and the Arab countries, a strategic and global partnership;

Manar Magdy, bāḥiṯa siyāsiyyun: alṣṣīnu tadkhulu ifrīqiyyan abra bawābati alttaʿāwuni maʿa miṣra, باحث سياسي: الصين تدخل إفريقيا  عبر بوابة التعاون مع مصر [Political researcher: China enters Africa through cooperation portal with Egypt], El Watan News, May 29, 2024, link.

[31] Hisab Abu Ghazala, uḍwu bi“ālnnawābi”: miṣra awwala dawlatin ifrīqiyyata tuqīmu alāqāti dublūmāsiyyatinعضو بـ«النواب»: مصر أول دولة إفريقية تقيم علاقات دبلوماسية مع الصين منذ 68 عاما [Member of Parliament: Egypt is the first African country to establish diplomatic relations with China in 68 years], El Watan News, May 29, 2024, link.

[32] Ahmad Al-Sharkaoui, “āljīl”: ziyārata alrraʾīsi alssayasiyyi ilā alṣṣīni tuʿazzuzu alttaʿāwuna aliāqtiṣādiyyu bayna  «الجيل»: زيارة الرئيس السيسي إلى الصين تعزز التعاون الاقتصادي بين البلدين [“Al-Jeel”: President Sisi’s visit to China enhances economic cooperation between the two countries], El Watan News, May 31, 2024, link.

[33] Hella Lahbib, La Tunisie et la Chine, pourquoi pas, vers un partenariat stratégique [Tunisia and China, why not, towards a strategic partnership], La Presse, May 30, 2024, link.

[34] Madiha Maamri, ath-thukrā alʿishrūna litaʾsīsi muntadā alttaʿāwuni alṣṣīnā alʿarabiyyi: tuḍāʿafu ḥajmu alttaʿāwuni alṣṣīniā alʿarabiyyi: tuḍāʿafu ḥajmu alttaʿāwuni bayna alṣṣiyni wāldduwali alʿarabiyyatiالذكرى العشرون لتأسيس منتدى التعاون الصينى العربي: تضاعف حجم التعاون بين الصين والدول العربية إلى أكثر من عشر مرات [Twentieth anniversary of the Chinese-Arab Cooperation Forum: China's cooperation with Arab States has doubled to more than 10 times], Essahafa, May 30, 2024, link.

[35] Ibidem.

[36] Awatif Al-Suwaidi, muntadā alttaʿāwuni alṣṣīniyyu alʿarabiyyi : tūnnasa alā ṭarīqi tanwīʿi sharākātihā aliāqtiṣādiyyatiمنتدى التعاون الصيني العربي : تونس على طريق تنويع شراكاتها الاقتصادية [Sino-Arab Cooperation Forum: Tunisia is diversifying its economic partnerships], Essahafa, May 31, 2024, link.

[37] raʾīsu aljumhūriyyati yazūru sharikata "hawāwiyyun" wamuktabatihā alkubrā washarikatu mukhtaṣṣatin fīfī ṣināʿatin wasāʾili alnnaqli albarriyyi bi-ṭ-ṭāqati alkahrabāʾiyyati wabi-ṭ-ṭāqāti alhajīnatiرئيس الجمهورية يزور شركة "هواوي" ومكتبتها الكبرى وشركة مختصة في صناعة وسائل النقل البري بالطاقة الكهربائية وبالطاقات الهجينة" [The President of the Republic visits Huawei, its major library and a company specializing in the manufacture of road transport with electric and hybrid energy], Agence Tunis Afrique Presse, June 2, 2024, link.

[38] Hella Lahbib, La Tunisie et la Chine, pourquoi pas, vers un partenariat stratégique, [Tunisia and China, why not, towards a strategic partnership], La Presse, May 30, 2024, link.

[39] Meriem Khdimallah, For a community with a shared future: Chinese President announces five Sino-Arab cooperation frameworks.

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Published with the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation pursuant to art. 23-bis of Presidential Decree 18/1967. The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation.
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