The Chinese Expert Debate on Southern Europe’s Rising Far Right

The electoral success of Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD) in the German state of Saxony-Anhalt has attracted international attention to the rise of the far right in Europe, including from China. In comments to the nationalist Chinese tabloid the Global Times, Jiang Feng, former Minister-Counsellor at the Chinese Embassy in Berlin and now professor at Shanghai International Studies University, argued that the party’s growing influence reflects mounting strains on Germany’s post-war political order. In his assessment, the weakening of establishment parties and the growing polarization of European politics are far from isolated phenomena, but symptoms of a structural transformation of the continent’s political landscape.¹

The rise of the right is also evident across Mediterranean Europe. In Italy, Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d’Italia, FdI) has maintained a solid hold on government, while growing support for France’s National Rally (Rassemblement National, RN) and Spain’s Vox could break the cordon sanitaire that has traditionally kept such parties from power. Against this background, Chinese commentators have examined not only the normalization of Europe’s right-wing populist parties but also the socioeconomic tensions underlying their rise and its potential implications for Sino-European relations.

Given the upcoming Spanish, French and Italian elections, in which right-wing parties are poised to do well, this issue of the ChinaMed Observer analyzes the past couple years of Chinese official, expert and media statements on the rise of the far right in Southern Europe. Looking at Chinese diplomatic statements, media commentary, and academic analyses of Europe’s rightward shift, we find a distinction between the emphasis on diplomatic continuity in formal Chinese statements and the more explicit discussion of the far-right phenomenon in Chinese expert analysis. Across the latter, the recurring language is that Europe’s right-wing populist parties are not a temporary protest phenomenon but have become enduring actors in the political landscape. However, according to some Chinese scholars, their electoral successes and normalization should not be mistaken for ideological moderation, much less for an ability to solve the structural problems behind their growth. Moreover, the normalization of the far right may result in a more fragmented European political context, yet, according to some scholars, not necessarily a more favorable one for China.

Chinese Official Discourse: Diplomatic Continuity amid Europe’s Rightward Shift

Chinese official discourse has consistently cast fascism as an ideological enemy. China’s 14-year War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression is presented as a key front in the World Anti-Fascist War (世界反法西斯战争, Shìjiè Fǎn Fǎxīsī Zhànzhēng), the preferred historical and ideological framework through which Beijing commemorates the Second World War.² While this narrative is used to reinforce the Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy and China’s claim to a prominent role in the international order, it typically foregrounds Japanese militarism and the risk of its resurgence.³

However, Beijing’s anti-fascist narrative is not confined to East Asia. Chinese officials also emphasize Russia’s decisive contribution to the defeat of fascism, toeing the line with regard to Russian narratives on the Ukraine war.⁴ However, although Chinese officials draw on the legacy of anti-fascism to push their foreign policy objectives with Russia and against Japan, they have shown little inclination to apply comparable ideological scrutiny to European governments with far-right or post-fascist roots.

Italy offers a clear illustration. FdI traces its origins to the neo-fascist Italian Social Movement. Although Meloni has sought to recast the party as a “national-conservative” force, especially since becoming prime minister in October 2022, its post-fascist legacy remains visible in its symbols and recurring controversies over far-right sympathies among its members. Despite bilateral tensions following Italy’s 2023 withdrawal from China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing has continued to ignore this ideological baggage, maintaining high-level engagement with Rome and reaffirming the two countries’ comprehensive strategic partnership. This approach is consistent with China’s longstanding emphasis on non-interference in other countries’ domestic affairs and its willingness to engage with governments across the political spectrum. Chinese official communications have thus never referenced FdI’s political background – a diplomatic restraint better understood as a means of preserving functional state-to-state relations over public ideological scrutiny.⁵ It does not, however, establish Beijing’s underlying political preferences or demonstrate an endorsement of Europe’s rightward shift.

AfD offers an illustrative case of less-than-official contacts and preferences. German tabloid Bild reported on recurring meetings between AfD co-leader Alice Weidel and the former Chinese ambassador to Berlin, sparking media speculation about Beijing’s interest in the party. Separately, an aide to lead AfD candidate Maximilian Krah during the 2024 European elections was convicted of spying for China. In turn, the AfD’s parliamentary group has called for an end to EU sanctions on China and ratification of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment, criticizing what it regards as an unnecessarily confrontational European approach.

Whatever the nature of China’s relationship with the AfD, it may not be generalizable to the rest of Europe’s populist right. Mediterranean Europe’s far right parties such as Italy’s FdI, France’s RN and Spain’s Vox differ in their stated positions on China, reflecting divergent views on transatlantic relations, economic security and international human rights norms.

Chinese commentary has likewise been far from uniformly supportive of these parties. During the 2022 French presidential elections, for instance, Fudan University scholars explicitly expressed a preference for President Emmanuel Macron over RN leader Marine Le Pen, viewing him as a more predictable interlocutor and a figure better positioned to sustain stable China-EU relations.⁶ While this was expert commentary, not an official government endorsement, such statements in China’s tightly controlled media environment likely reflect how Chinese assessments of European parties are shaped by their implications for Beijing’s strategic and economic interests, rather than by any supposed ideological affinity with Europe’s populist right. Indeed, Chinese state-affiliated media have not been shy in acknowledging Europe’s rightward shift with a degree of concern.⁷

From Political Outsiders to Mainstream Actors

A recurring theme in Chinese analyses is that the rise of Europe’s right-wing populist parties marks a fundamental transformation of European party politics. Once confined to the political margins, these parties have now acquired substantial institutional influence. Writing in the journal People’s Tribune⁸ back in March 2024, Lin Deshan, a professor at China University of Political Science and Law, identifies “de-radicalization” (去极化, qùjíhuà) as central to this shift:

“The political positions [of ‘populist radical-right’ parties] are relatively moderate and their extremist characteristics less pronounced, and they primarily seek to express their political and policy demands through populist rhetoric. […] Yet, in the descriptions of mainstream parties and the media, they continue to be categorized as ‘far right’ […] Emphasizing the extremism of right-wing populist parties is one of the most common and effective means by which mainstream parties constrain their political space.”⁹

What is noteworthy is that Lin echoes these parties’ own account of their political evolution. He presents their positions as having become more moderate; it is only their rhetoric which is “populist” (民粹主义, míncuì zhǔyì), arguing that the “far right” (极右翼, jí yòuyì) label is imposed by mainstream parties and the media as a means to constrain their political space.

For Lin, it is this tension, between growing popular support and continued political exclusion, that has driven the de-radicalization of populist right parties, a process undertaken not out of choice, but “out of necessity for survival and development.” It involves shedding or downplaying extremist elements at both organizational and ideological levels. Some policy shifts have been substantive, including a weakening of their opposition to European integration; others have been more rhetorical. On immigration, Lin notes, right-wing populist forces have distanced themselves from violence, racism and fascism (implying they were once commonplace) toward narratives framed around national interests. As such, on this issue these policy positions have not changed, but as Lin contends, this may have helped them, “as a harsh stance on immigration has become a common policy choice across European countries.”

Another development that has assisted these right-wing populist parties is the gradual weakening of the political cordon sanitaire (防疫线, fángyì xiàn) which traditionally prevented cooperation between established mainstream parties and the radical right. Across Europe, center-right parties have become increasingly willing to cooperate with their hard-right counterparts, shifting the left-right balance in many European countries toward greater conservatism.

“De-radicalization” has become a popular framework among Chinese academics to explain the right-wing turn in European politics, being used for instance by Fudan University’s Yan Shaohua and Li Bingxuan in their 2025 article.¹⁰ It was also used in a July 2024 analysis by Fang Lexian and Meng Xiangyi of Renmin University’s Center for European Studies, published in Beijing Cultural Review¹¹ and subsequently abridged and republished in the newspaper The Paper. Writing after the strong showing of right-wing parties in the June 2024 European elections and French legislative elections, Fang and Meng likewise accept that these “right-wing populist parties” have de-radicalized due to electoral incentives, access to institutional opportunities and competition with established political forces.¹²

However, in a July 2024 analysis for Guangming Daily, Ma Jiahong, a lecturer at Renmin University’s School of International Relations, does not adopt the de-radicalization framework. Ma describes the aforementioned movements as “far-right parties” and objects to commentators who treat the far left and far right as equivalent threats under the umbrella term of “populist.” He argues that these far-right parties “manipulate public opinion and incite xenophobia,” “politicize the climate issue,” “exploit the discontent of underrepresented ordinary people, uniting disadvantaged groups, lower-class voters, and extremist groups,” thus “posing major challenges to Europe’s future.”¹³

While these analyses differ over whether these parties have truly de-radicalized, they all agree that they have shifted European politics to the right. However, even scholars who argue that there was de-radicalization do not think it is irreversible. Lin Deshan argues that the pursuit of mainstream legitimacy may weaken parties’ anti-establishment identities, and when moderation fails to deliver the desired electoral results, these parties may return to more confrontational strategies.¹⁴ Indeed, there is consensus that these parties will struggle to solve the problems that led to their rise.

Europe’s Far Right: A Symptom, but Not a Certain Solution

Across Chinese expert analyses, the European far right’s growing appeal is frequently understood as a manifestation of unresolved structural tensions. This diagnosis was already visible in a 2021 commentary by Mu Yangzi, the Head of French Studies at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), a think tank affiliated with China’s Ministry of State Security. The article discusses France’s issues with economic inequality, demographic change, immigration, religious tensions and disputes over political reform, situating these developments within the disruption of the traditional left-right divide across the West. The article implicitly links the situation in France to the commonplace Chinese narrative of the decline of the West: Western political systems are increasingly unable to manage the contradictions within their own societies.¹⁵

A similar criticism of the European political establishment can be found in an August 2024 CICIR commentary by Guo Mingxu, head of the think tank’s European Economy Program. Following Meloni’s then recent visit to China, Guo analyzed the Italian Prime Minister’s autobiography Io sono Giorgia with him arguing that she is “an important case study,” with her serving as a key representative of the continent’s “emerging political forces.” In this rather hagiographic analysis of Meloni’s background and stances, Guo gives space to Meloni’s views on the EU (a “soulless bureaucratic machine”) and the importance of national identity. Following his implicit praise for the Italian leader’s pragmatism, Guo goes on to criticize European political elites for remaining absorbed in factional competition and for dogmatically excluding the populist right, while ordinary citizens confront pressing social and economic hardships:

“The continued growth of Europe’s emerging political forces reflects the public’s yearning for new political alternatives and its dissatisfaction with the policies pursued by those currently holding the reins of power. […] While Europe’s centrist forces are intent on building a new ‘firewall’ against these emerging political forces, they have, in the process, erected a ‘buffer zone’ between themselves and the public. As more and more new parties cross the thresholds of the electoral system and scale the walls erected to keep them out, these political forces will become an increasingly significant presence in Europe.”¹⁶

Ma Jiahong, in his aforementioned article for Guangming Daily, also blames established political parties for the growing appeal of “far-right parties” (what Guo euphemistically refers to as “emerging political forces”). While critical, he acknowledges that these parties offer “a relatively complete and truthful description of the problems plaguing European society and their reflection of public sentiment.”¹⁷

Indeed, despite expressing concern over the far right, Ma agrees with their diagnosis, accusing the “increasingly elitist” establishment of having ignored the social problems created by immigration “such as crime and ethnic conflict, which have severely impacted the lives of Europeans.” Moreover, he blames the European elites for aligning with the United States and NATO, thus allegedly prolonging the Russia-Ukraine war and raising energy prices for average Europeans, already impacted by the green energy transition. Europeans’ livelihoods are further hampered by the policies of the continent’s neoliberal regimes, which have hollowed out social welfare, all the while the center-left ignores class issues in favor of identity politics and political correctness.

Despite agreeing with far-right parties on the sources of Europe’s problems, Ma warns that their rhetoric encourages the “masses to fight each other” (群众斗群众, qúnzhòng dòu qúnzhòng), as they lack an understanding of how to solve Europe’s problems. For him, the political mobilization on legitimate social grievances should not be confused with the ability to resolve them.

It is noteworthy that this perspective which blames the rise of the far right parties on the failure of the European political establishment is not solely being expressed by scholars but also by Chinese state media, such as in a recent October 2026 Xinhua commentary.¹⁸ However, this report, like many commentators, does not seem confident in the European populist right’s capacity to resolve the issues that have fueled their rise. For instance, in our previous analysis of the expert and media debate on the August 2026 Ceuta crisis, Chinese scholars and media expressed the view that while the mass migration event would boost the European right, its rise would only further disrupt Europe’s capacity to coordinate the coherent, organized response required to manage international migratory flows.¹⁹

A similar view is present in a September 2026 discussion in People’s Daily Online, featuring Mao Jing, director of the European Studies Center at the Grandview Institution, and Cui Hongjian, director of the Center for EU and Regional Development Studies at Beijing Foreign Studies University. Both scholars agree that the far right has successfully become a normalized force in European electoral politics, facilitated by widespread distrust of the political establishment. Yet the article notes that the ability to capitalize on public discontent does not necessarily translate into the ability to govern effectively. The article uses Meloni’s government as a case in point, which after nearly four years in office, can point to some achievements in fiscal discipline, employment and political stability. Nevertheless, Italian economic growth continues to slow, the plan to process migrants offshore in Albania has been legally blocked, and labor shortages have led Rome to organize the admission of 500,000 non-EU workers. As the article notes:

“The far right is a product of Europe’s many contradictions, not a cure. It has changed Europe, but it is unlikely to heal it.”²⁰

Cui further expands on the dilemma facing the far right: compromising on their campaign platform risks alienating their base; maintaining radical positions limits their ability to attract public support. Failure to navigate this tension, he warns, could lead to these parties’ demise.

Regardless of the constraints imposed by coalition politics, EU laws and institutions, judicial oversight, fiscal rules, and labor-market needs, Mao argues that the far right’s influence extends beyond implementing policies. For him, the rise of the far right has already shifted the boundaries of European political debate, pushing mainstream parties toward more radical positions on immigration, public security, welfare and national sovereignty. In the longer term, he warns, this shift may weaken social trust and deepen political and social divisions. Cui identifies a parallel challenge at the European level as while EU institutions seek to consolidate power, national governments face mounting domestic pressure from the far right to defend sovereignty and resist further integration, making it harder for the Union to reach common positions.

What Does Europe’s New Normal Mean for China?

The European implications of the far right’s normalization have featured in Chinese analyses, particularly regarding the functioning of EU institutions and policymaking. Far less attention, however, has been paid to what this political shift might mean for the future of EU-China relations.

For instance, in a June 2024 Global Times article, Cui Hongjian shared that the far right’s electoral gains in the European Parliament would not have immediate consequences for China-EU relations. Though Europe’s growing conservatism could reinforce protectionist policies, potentially generating further trade frictions with Beijing, Cui considered the outcome of the U.S. presidential election far more consequential to China-EU relations than the European Parliament vote itself.²¹ While this perspective reflects the tendency among many Chinese commentators to see relations with the EU as secondary – or even dependent – on the United States, not all experts dismiss the electoral shift occurring in Europe in favor of a focus on great power politics, especially in more recent years.

In their 2025 article, Yan Shaohua and Li Bingxuan argued that the implications of Europe’s rightward shift could have significant consequences for relations with Beijing. One possible outcome is a weakening of a common European approach to China, including the EU’s economic security agenda. As right-wing populist parties place greater emphasis on national sovereignty and economic interests, individual member states may become more willing to challenge Brussels’ positions when these conflict with their own priorities. This could create openings for China, particularly in economic and trade relations. Yan and Li nevertheless caution against treating Europe’s far right as a coherent political bloc. Although these parties increasingly cooperate across borders to advance agendas rooted in national interests, they have not developed a common position on China. Their attitudes vary considerably: while some are relatively pragmatic or open to economic cooperation with Beijing, others remain highly critical of Chinese policies and trade practices.²²

For Yan and Li, the result is an increasingly heterogeneous European political landscape that will complicate the formulation of a common EU position on China and make future policy shifts harder for Beijing to anticipate. They point to differences between Hungary’s Fidesz, which has actively pursued closer economic ties with China, and France’s National Rally, which has criticized China’s human-rights record and trade practices. The authors also caution that national-interest-driven pragmatism does not necessarily translate into consistently favorable policies toward China. Moreover, some may seek closer relations with Washington, potentially exposing Europe to greater U.S. pressure over trade and China policy.

This argument is particularly interesting in light of what can sometimes be an overly cozy reading of the relationship between Beijing and Europe’s far right among some European analysts. It cautions against treating these parties as a unified, implicitly China-friendly camp, or extrapolating from the positions of individual movements, in particular the AfD or fringe parties, to the wider European radical right, let alone to Europe’s far left.²³

Conclusion

The Chinese government’s account of its own legitimacy and China’s leading role in the post-war international order places significant emphasis on the country’s historic contribution to the defeat of fascism, with this anti-fascist legacy featuring prominently in China’s current diplomacy toward Japan and Russia. Nevertheless, Beijing has refrained from noting the normalization of Europe’s post-fascist far right. Although this restraint most likely reflects the diplomatic convention of non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs and elections, the commonplace view in the Chinese expert debate provides a different reading, that the European far right, in the eyes of Beijing, has effectively de-radicalized and is on the rise. While not all Chinese scholars agree that these parties are no longer far right, or that this shift is permanent, many, including those close to Beijing’s halls of power, offer notably sympathetic portrayals of figures such as Giorgia Meloni, presenting them as representatives of a new political force responding to popular dissatisfaction.

Despite these differences, there is a shared diagnosis: the far right’s success is rooted in structural problems that Europe’s mainstream parties have failed to resolve. It is in this context that Chinese commentators view right-wing populism not as a passing electoral disturbance, but as a lasting feature of European politics. However, they are far less convinced that these parties can offer solutions to the crises that brought them to prominence. Nor does their growing influence make them a coherent political force: national interests and competing priorities continue to divide them, limiting their capacity for cooperation even within individual countries, let alone across the EU.

For Beijing, this fragmentation presents both an opportunity and a challenge. A less unified Europe may struggle to sustain a common position on China, potentially creating greater room for China to divide and conquer. However, some scholars caution that a Europe divided by the far right is not necessarily more China-friendly as populist parties’ diverse and often contradictory approaches to Beijing could make EU policy difficult to anticipate and engage with or, worse still, align Brussels firmly with President Donald Trump’s United States.

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Eleonora LONGHI GELATI (周苗曦柔) is a Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. She is also a graduate of the Master of Arts in International Affairs program at Johns Hopkins University SAIS and holds a Certificate in Chinese and American Studies from the Hopkins-Nanjing Center. Her research interests include China-EU relations, human rights and gender justice.

Leonardo BRUNI is the Project Manager of the ChinaMed Project. He is also a Doctoral Researcher in History at the European University Institute. His research interests include China-EU relations, the history of Sino-European relations, and Chinese foreign policy in the wider Mediterranean region.