Mediterranean Anxieties over the Sino-Moroccan Rapprochement: French, Algerian, and Tunisian Media Perspectives

On October 31, 2025, China abstained from the United Nations Security Council vote endorsing Morocco’s “Western Sahara Autonomy Proposal” for resolving the conflict between Rabat and the Polisario Front. Two days prior, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reportedly phoned his Algerian counterpart, Ahmed Attaf, to explain Beijing’s stance – an exchange that underscored China’s increasingly delicate balancing act between Algeria and Morocco. Analysts have previously noted China’s effort to maintain equilibrium between the two North African states, but this latest move is likely to reinforce the emerging perception, especially in Morocco, that Beijing is now tilting subtly toward Rabat.

In recent years, the rapidly expanding economic relationship between Morocco and China has emerged as one of the most significant political developments in North Africa. This partnership has been interpreted in both the international and Moroccan press mostly through the lens of Chinese economic pragmatism – seeking backdoor access to Western markets – and Rabat’s ambition to diversify its international partnerships. However, this Sino-Moroccan entente has also triggered a range of reactions across the wider Mediterranean, particularly in France, Algeria, and Tunisia – each filtered through distinctive political, historical, and media lenses.

This ChinaMed Observer examines how French, Algerian and Tunisian media and experts have interpreted and responded to the Sino–Moroccan relationship. In France, historically one of Rabat’s closest partners, many experts have expressed concern over their country’s waning influence in the Kingdom as China’s presence expands – allegedly to Paris’ expense. In North Africa, where press freedom remains uneven, some independent Algerian voices have echoed Western analysts by questioning their government’s official line of “perfect” relations with China, revealing a mix of anxiety and denial rooted in fears that closer Sino-Moroccan ties could further deepen Algeria’s regional marginalization. Meanwhile, in Tunisia, commentators struck a more reflective tone, oscillating between admiration for Morocco’s ties with China and cautious self-reflection regarding Tunis’ own place in the region.

Through a comparative approach, this Observer highlights how experts and journalists in the region are viewing the Morocco–China rapprochement as both a mirror and a catalyst of broader power reconfigurations in the Maghreb, challenging long-established postcolonial hierarchies and inviting local elites to reassess their foreign policy orientations.

France: “Waking Up” to China’s Rise in Morocco

Almost three years ago, Franco–Moroccan relations reached a nadir due to a series of political and diplomatic crises, notably the European Parliament’s January 2023 vote condemning the Kingdom for failing to respect press freedom, and France’s restrictive visa policy targeting Moroccan nationals.^[1] These developments provoked a sharp reaction from Rabat, with King Mohammed VI declaring that “our relations are neither good nor friendly” in response to President Emmanuel Macron’s February 2023 speech on France–Africa relations, outlining Paris’ new policy for the continent.^[2]

However, following the chill in France’s relations with Algeria, the Élysée recalibrated its North African diplomacy in favor of Rabat, with Macron’s state visit to Morocco in October 2024 marking a major turning point.^[3] During the visit, the French President explicitly recognized “Moroccan sovereignty” over Western Sahara, an unprecedented gesture that signaled both reconciliation and an attempt to reassert France’s strategic interests in the Kingdom and the region as a whole.^[4] The subsequent Franco–Moroccan diplomatic thaw led to a series of reciprocal ministerial visits in 2025,^[5] which showcased Paris’ efforts to restore the confidence that had eroded over years of mutual suspicion.

French media and policy analysts have increasingly acknowledged Morocco’s indispensable role in France’s regional strategy, especially as relations with Algeria remain strained. The conservative magazine Le Point noted that “the Maghreb countries are moving further and further away from Paris,” emphasizing France’s growing need to secure a reliable partner in North Africa.^[6] Le Monde journalist Frédéric Bobin similarly observed that “faced with the impasse on reconciliation with Algiers, Paris is inclined to rebalance its Maghreb diplomacy in favor of Rabat, particularly on Western Sahara.”^[7]

Despite the apparent rapprochement, official French discourse remained cautious. The Quai d’Orsay maintained that “its diplomacy in the region is not a zero-sum game,” suggesting that warming relations with Morocco do not necessarily imply a cooling of ties with Algeria.^[8] Yet, beneath this rhetoric of balance lies an implicit acknowledgment of Morocco’s growing leverage. “Though a small market on a global scale, Morocco has managed to position itself as a preferred interlocutor and economic partner for European countries – such as France and Spain – as well as for most French-speaking sub-Saharan nations,” observed Jeune Afrique^[9] CEO Frédéric Maury and UN Communications Specialist Nadia Rabbaa.^[10] In other words, Morocco’s strategic pragmatism and ability to attract diverse global partnerships have rendered it, in French eyes, increasingly indispensable to Paris’ Maghreb policy.

Against this background, the strengthening of Sino–Moroccan relations has been perceived by French and Moroccan commentators as a challenge to France’s historical predominance in the region. As journalist Mohand Hakhifi observed in Arab News, “France’s traditional and historical preponderance in Morocco is tending to diminish in favor of China, a country for which Morocco represents many interests, especially related to infrastructure investments.”^[11] More concretely, Chinese investments have reshaped Morocco’s economic landscape, particularly in sectors once dominated by French influence.

The transport sector, with the competition between France and China over Morocco’s high-speed rail network, exemplifies this shift. Through competitive pricing and strategic lobbying, China’s state-owned China Railway Construction Corporation (CRCC) has effectively undermined France’s long-standing dominance.^[12] While France had previously financed 51% of the Casablanca–Tangier high–speed train, China’s expanding role in the new Marrakech–Agadir railway project reflects a notable erosion of France’s once-privileged position, an influence Paris only recently managed to partially reclaim after President Macron’s 2024 state visit to Morocco.^[13]

This competitive dynamic extends to emerging sectors of the green and electric economy. As Jeune Afrique’s Bilal Mousjid noted, “between industrial ambitions and power struggles, Morocco has become the new arena of Sino–European competition.”^[14] Le Monde has criticized Brussels’ inertia in the global battery race, where Chinese giants CATL and BYD lead the field.^[15] Hakim El-Karoui, head of the French strategic consulting firm Volentia, further observed that Morocco’s interest lies not merely in attracting investment, but in acquiring technological know-how – a domain in which “the Chinese are much more advanced than the Europeans.”^[16]

In this context, French media have often adopted a dual narrative: casting China’s growing presence as a cause for alarm while simultaneously calling on France to “wake up” and respond. The French state-owned radio news network RFI, for instance, portrayed the influx of Chinese tourists and investors into the Cherifian Kingdom as both beneficial and destabilizing.^[17] While acknowledging that “relations with China are seen as a way to strengthen Morocco’s position vis-à-vis the West,” such alarmist framings reveal persistent anxieties about a perceived “Chinese colonization” of France’s former protectorate.^[18]

Morocco’s strategic tightrope between Paris and Beijing has become increasingly apparent in expert commentary. Economist Abdelmalek Alaoui, CEO of the Guepard Group, observed in a research note for the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique that Rabat’s decision to distance itself from the BRICS – which China has supposedly increasingly shaped into an “anti-G7” platform – reflects an acute awareness that deepening ties with Beijing could jeopardize its long-standing partnerships with the West.^[19] Conversely, François Lafargue, Senior Lecturer of International Affairs at the Paris School of Business, cautioned against exaggerating this shift, suggesting that China’s presence in the Maghreb remains largely “complementary to European investments.”^[20]

Ultimately, the overall tone of French media betrayed an underlying anxiety: that France’s traditional influence in Morocco is being outpaced by a more agile and pragmatic competitor. As reported by Le Monde in April 2024, quoting the head of a French CAC 40 company:

“The Moroccan Minister of Industry told us that the Chinese were contacting him every day and that we needed to wake up before it was too late.”^[21]

Algeria: Concerns about Regional Isolation

Algerian media presented diverging interpretations of China’s regional engagement, largely reflecting their political and institutional affiliations. Official outlets portrayed Sino–Algerian ties as exemplary and thriving, while independent and foreign commentators highlighted their stagnation and a growing anxiety over Morocco’s rising partnership with Beijing.

State-owned media, such as Radio Algérienne, described the 2025 China–Algeria bilateral forum as a milestone in bilateral ties, with the signing of eight agreements valued at over two billion dollars in areas such as automobiles, railways, and agriculture – projects that will reportedly generate “thousands of jobs.”^[22] The article by the Algerian public service broadcaster goes on to quote the Chinese Ambassador to Algiers Dong Guangli, who hailed Algeria as “an ideal destination for Chinese investors,”^[23] rhetoric echoed by Algerian political figures and by much of the non-state media. Assembly President Ibrahim Boughali praised China’s “consistent stance in favor of just causes” in reference to Beijing’s support for Palestine and Western Sahara,^[24] while the French-language private daily Le Carrefour d’Algérie even described the partnership as “perfect,” identifying the automotive industry as a flagship sector of cooperation.^[25]

By contrast, foreign and independent analysts tend to offer a less optimistic assessment of Sino-Algerian relations. As Isabelle Werenfels, Senior Fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), observed in Le Petit Journal Marocain, “while Algeria remains a market for China, Morocco has become a collaborative player in high-value-added projects.”^[26] This view, common in the Moroccan press, interprets China’s aforementioned abstention from the UN Security Council resolution endorsing Morocco’s autonomy plan for Western Sahara as evidence of the limits of Beijing’s “comprehensive strategic partnership” with Algiers, which now appears overshadowed by Sino–Moroccan economic ties. In other words, for many foreign and Moroccan commentators, while Morocco’s partnership with China has taken on a more strategic dimension, Algeria’s relationship with the People’s Republic remains largely transactional.

However, it is not just foreign experts who hold an ambivalent view of Sino-Algerian relations – independent Algerian voices have become increasingly outspoken as well. Algerian journalist Abdou Semmar, founder of the investigative outlet Algérie Part, has been a vocal critic of his government’s triumphalist rhetoric. On his YouTube channel, where he regularly reposts Algérie Part’s live investigative discussions, Semmar argued that real Chinese investment has dwindled since the end of Abdelaziz Boutefika’s presidency (1999-2019), as China increasingly perceives Algeria as “an unstable and closed-off country.”^[27] He further noted that Chinese President Xi Jinping’s stopover in Casablanca in November 2024 went almost unmentioned in Algerian state media, an omission that, he commented, “is not trivial” and “heralds a new geopolitical configuration that threatens Algeria’s regional influence.”^[28]

Semmar pointed to the relocation of a truck manufacturing project from Algeria to Morocco and the inauguration of the Shanghai–Casablanca air route as evidence of this shift, warning and lamenting that:

“Abdelmadjid Tebboune is isolating us … all major projects have been diverted to Morocco.”^[29]

He also interpreted the meeting between the Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune and the head of the French shipping giant CMA-CGM to discuss deeper involvement in Algerian port infrastructure as an indication of Algeria’s intention to “turn its back on China” in favor of renewed cooperation with France – a development he views as symptomatic of Algiers’ shifting alliances and waning appeal to Chinese investors.^[30]

Thus, while official Algerian discourse continued to celebrate a “perfect friendship,” independent and foreign media depicted a reality of missed opportunities and a growing sense of diplomatic isolation.

Tunisia: Between Self-Reflection, Comparison and Catching Up

With Tunis not sharing Algiers’ rivalry toward Rabat, voices in Tunisian media, both local and foreign, have presented a more nuanced stance, acknowledging Morocco’s successes and even viewing its trajectory as a potential model for Tunisia’s own development. Sino–Tunisian relations are often described as cordial and historically grounded, yet structurally limited. Many Tunisian and international observers thus see significant room for growth, provided that Tunis can define a coherent strategy, perhaps by drawing lessons from Rabat’s experience.

Appeals for deeper cooperation were widespread. As the Algerian newspaper Le Maghreb reported, the Chinese ambassador to Tunisia, Wan Li, called for “a new starting point for broader cooperation” on the occasion of the 60^th anniversary of diplomatic ties.^[31] Similarly, La Presse de Tunisie, Tunisia’s leading – and state-connected – French-language daily, celebrated the “mutually beneficial and friendly relations” between the two countries, emphasizing opportunities in green energy, agribusiness, and artificial intelligence.^[32] Tourism has emerged as a particularly dynamic field, following a new cooperation agreement between the Tunisian Federation of Travel and Tourism Agencies (Fédération Tunisienne des Agences de Voyages et de Tourisme, FTAV) and the Sino–North African Education Innovation Association (SNAEIA) for university exchanges, which, according to La Presse de Tunisie, brought 25,000 Chinese tourists to Tunisia in 2024.^[33]

Yet, Donia Jemli and Adrien Mugnier, Researcher and Director at the Observatoire Français des Nouvelles Routes de la Soie (OFNRS) respectively, observed that Tunisia’s engagement with China “came late” and remained “underexploited” due to a lack of strategic coherence.^[34] They argued that Tunisia’s weaknesses in logistics and connectivity have hindered it from integrating into China’s Belt and Road Initiative, in sharp contrast to Morocco’s proactive strategy.^[35] French diplomat Louis Dugit-Gros and Washington Institute senior fellow Sabina Henneberg echoed this diagnosis in Kapitalis, a popular independent online news platform in Tunisia, noting that “Tunisia’s structural obstacles and domestic crises have limited its attractiveness to Chinese investors.”^[36]

Tunisian discourse frequently juxtaposed the country’s trajectory with Morocco’s, often casting the latter as both a model and a rival. Regarding in-bound Chinese tourism, FTAV president Ahmed Bettaieb explicitly identified Morocco and Egypt as “competitors.”^[37] Moreover, former Tunisian diplomat Elyes Kasri lamented that “thirty years ago, Tunisia was a model for Morocco; today, the positions are reversed,”^[38] urging Tunisian leaders to “draw inspiration from the Moroccan model” in infrastructure, investment, and diplomacy.^[39] Writing in the Tunis-based economics and business magazine L’Économiste Maghrébin, Kasri further warned that “time is running out because the gap is widening dangerously.”^[40]

Tunisian digital news website Tunisie Numérique likewise emphasized Morocco’s advantage, presenting its alliance with China as “a significant advance over Tunisia and Algeria” and arguing that Rabat now occupies a privileged position in Beijing’s regional strategy.^[41] French Journalist Sébastien Le Belzic, quoted by the online news platform Tunisie Focus, reinforced this perception, describing Morocco as “the most legitimate country in the Maghreb” for China’s Mediterranean strategy, thanks to the Tangier port – “the third most important hub in the world after Shanghai and Panama.”^[42]

Recognizing Morocco’s lead, Tunisia’s economic circles have called for introspection. The 2017 report by the Arab Institute of Business Leaders Forum (Institut Arabe Des Chefs d’Entreprises - IACE) held in Tunis, recommended that policymakers “draw lessons from Morocco’s success” in attracting Chinese foreign direct investment through a consistent long-term strategy and institutional commitment.^[43]

Overall, Tunisian media discourse revealed a mix of admiration, envy, and self-critique, recognizing Morocco’s diplomatic dynamism while lamenting Tunisia’s own stagnation.

Conclusion

Across French, Algerian, and Tunisian media, the Sino–Moroccan rapprochement has provoked a range of interpretations from experts and commentators, likely reflecting national anxieties and shifting power dynamics. French discourse, oscillating between wistfulness and alarm, reveals the erosion of a postcolonial comfort zone. Whereas in North Africa, Algerian coverage – despite the dominance of official triumphalism – is challenged by independent voices that betray a growing insecurity about losing regional preeminence vis-à-vis China’s deepening cooperation with Morocco. Tunisian media, meanwhile, articulates a blend of admiration and frustration, positioning Rabat as both a competitor and a successful model to emulate.

Together, these discourses illustrate how Morocco’s pragmatic engagement with China – anchored in infrastructure, technology transfer, and industrial diversification – has redefined its image in the media within the Maghreb and beyond. The Kingdom’s strategy contrasts sharply with those of its neighbors’: while Algeria maintains an ideological and traditional rhetoric that obscures its weakening regional position, and Tunisia struggles with domestic and economic instability, Morocco has successfully positioned itself as a key node in the global reconfiguration linking Africa, Europe, and Asia.

Ultimately, the debate around the Morocco–China partnership serves not only as a barometer of shifting economic alignments but also as a mirror reflecting how North African countries perceive themselves in a changing world order. Our analysis of French, Algerian, and Tunisian media suggests that there is an understanding that China’s growing role in Morocco signals not only the end of a historical monopoly by the former colonial power in the Élysée – whether political, economic, or symbolic – but also the emergence of a new balance of power in the Maghreb.

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Bianca PASQUIER is Project Officer and Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. She is also a graduate student in International Sciences at the University of Turin and holds a B.A. in Political Science and International Relations from the University of Naples “L’Orientale.” Her research interests include the foreign policies of MENA countries and the media coverage of China in North Africa.