Iranian Experts Debate the Future of the Iran-China Relationship After the Twelve-Day War

The Israel–Iran conflict of June 13–24, 2025 – christened the “Twelve-Day War” by U.S. President Donald Trump following his precariously brokered truce – represented the culmination of a protracted, multidimensional and steadily escalating confrontation between Tel Aviv and Tehran. Although relatively confined, the hostilities alarmed regional actors fearful of the potential for broader escalation across the Middle East. Although it is premature to judge whether the episode marks a lasting geostrategic turning-point – not least given the real prospect of renewed hostilities – the conflict nevertheless exposed Israel’s regional military predominance, notably in aerial operations, human intelligence and high-technology, while simultaneously revealing critical vulnerabilities in Iran’s air defense capabilities.

Many Iranians expected a stronger Chinese response to Israeli strikes. Instead, Beijing’s reaction was limited to a delayed condemnation and, as far as we know, no tangible assistance. In the aftermath, senior Iranian officials, including Defense Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, travelled to Beijing and publicly thanked China for its “valuable support.” Yet evident Chinese circumspection during the crisis prompts a crucial question: how do Iranians now perceive their country’s relationship with China, and has Beijing’s restraint eroded Iranian confidence?

This edition of the ChinaMed Observer explores these questions by examining Iran’s internal debate over China’s conduct during the Twelve-Day War. Much in continuity with our previous analyses, our findings show that Beijing’s caution has provoked pronounced reactions in Iran that ranged from criticizing China for not doing enough to blaming the Iranian government for failing to convince Beijing of Tehran’s importance and value as a partner.

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Below Expectations, at Least for Some

The predominant sentiment among Iranian experts is one of palpable disappointment. Many had expected – indeed, hoped – that China would promptly and unequivocally condemn the Israeli strike launched at dawn on June 13. Instead of directly criticizing Israel, on the day of the attack, the spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs merely stated that “China opposes any infringement upon Iran’s sovereignty, security and territorial integrity, and opposes any escalation of tensions and expansion of conflicts,” inviting both sides to deescalate. It was not until June 15, during a call with his Iranian counterpart, that Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi explicitly condemned Israeli actions.

This initial hesitancy has unsettled many Iranian experts from institutional circles, academia and the media. “China hasn’t condemned the attack before Iran’s reciprocation, but only asked for self-restraint,” stresses Mehdi Kharratiyan, the director of the Institute for Policy Revival,^[1] who regularly posts long-form video commentary on Iranian politics, security and regional affairs. His interpretation is that, from a Chinese vantage, the Islamic Republic might conceivably have been on the brink of collapse after Israel’s first blow. That is no trivial matter, given that many Iranian commentators regard closer ties with China as a form of “life-insurance” enabling their sanctions-constricted state to endure. As the academic and policy analyst Rahman Qahremanpour^[2] observes, “This may have consequences on China’s credibility,”^[3] an assessment shared by others.

Qahremanpour attributes Beijing’s restraint to the absence of any coherent Chinese security strategy for the region: in his words, China “has no security plan for the Middle East.”^[4] He invokes former Iranian ambassador to China Mohammad Hossein Malaek (1997–2001), who maintained that “China has no major plan beyond Pakistan.”^[5] From this standpoint, Chinese interests in the region are largely confined to securing oil supplies from the Persian Gulf and advancing infrastructure investments linked to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Hence, Qahremanpour contends that Iran cannot reasonably entrust its security to China: “What kind of power are you if, in a time of crisis, you say ‘I do not enter into this; solve your problems yourselves’?”

Zakiyeh Yazdanshenas, Director of the China-MENA Project at the Center for Scientific Research and Middle East Strategic Studies in Tehran (CSRMESS), amplifies this verdict by asserting that “Iran and China cannot have a strategic relationship.”^[6] She argues that because China pursues a non-aligned foreign policy and therefore maintains no formal allies, only “hierarchized” partners, “Iran cannot expect the same level of protection that the U.S. grants to its allies. […] A partnership with China implies an absence of obligations and no military support, and in the event that the Europeans adopt the snapback mechanism, China will not sell arms to Iran”^[7] (France, the UK and Germany – the so-called E3 – did indeed trigger the snapback mechanism on August 28, 2025).

For other commentators, the issue lies in the fact that China has failed to understand Iran’s strategic importance. For example, Mehdi Khorsand, Head of Tehran Municipality’s Economic Diplomacy Department and a specialist in Eurasian affairs, articulates this bluntly: “only Iran can be China’s strategic partner in the region as an ‘independent’ and ‘anti-Western’ actor.”^[8]

There are, however, also Iranian voices that are somewhat less critical of Beijing, appearing to have long accepted that expecting much from China reflects a misunderstanding of its foreign policy. For example, Hossein Qaheri, President of the Iran-China Institute for Strategic Studies and a prominent figure in the informal channels between the two states,^[9] contends that “China hasn’t kept a passive approach during the war.”^[10] He notes that “China maintained its purchases of Iranian oil and provided Iran with essential items […] and had a clear stance on Iran.”^[11]

Qaheri attributes China’s distance to recurring frictions in the bilateral relationship, notably the uneven implementation of numerous agreements and contracts across sectors – energy, industry, transport and ICT. Since the first major oil and gas contracts were signed in 2004, several projects, including many major ones, have been cancelled or deferred. The same pattern has been evident in civil-engineering projects. These setbacks, he stresses, cannot be ascribed solely to U.S. sanctions: in many instances contracts were terminated owing to technically inadequate Chinese implementation, while in others delays stemmed from the administrative burdens and rigidities that characterize the Iranian state apparatus (more on this in the next section of the analysis). It is on this basis that Qaheri delivers the trenchant, if bitter, assessment that “the Chinese don’t have ‘strategic trust’ in Iran anymore.”^[12] From his perspective, the signing of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement in March 2021 (the “25-year vision”) was essentially symbolic.

Hamed Vafaei, Director of the Asia Research Center and co-director of the University of Tehran’s Confucius Institute,^[13] situates Chinese reserve toward Iran within the fundamental principles of China’s foreign policy. According to him, Beijing’s approach to the Iran–Israel conflict unfolded in three phases: hesitation (“wait to see if the Iranian government was still stable and able to answer back”^[14]), decision (condemnation of the attack) and consolidation (offer for mediation).^[15]

In an interview with Asr-e Iran,^[16] Vafaei elaborates on his perspective, citing reports that the Chinese themselves describe their position as “Sitting on a mountain and watching the tigers fight.” He thus cautions that “Iran should not expect direct and full support from China,” insofar as “its support must be analyzed within the framework of China’s own rationality and national interests.”^[17] Vafaei stresses that China does not seek commitments, and that the very basis of its foreign policy should be understood as distinct from that of the United States.

He emphasizes the particularity of the Chinese viewpoint in which Iran, “which has little more to offer than oil,”^[18] has seen its strategic weight decline significantly in Beijing’s energy security calculations. In this respect, Vafaei highlights that China has markedly diversified its oil imports, and that Iran’s share, although still significant (10–13%), is likely to recede over the medium to long term and, above all, “is not sufficient for China to become seriously involved in Iranian affairs.”^[19]

In an article published in the economic newspaper Donya-e Eqtesad, Ehsan Citsaz, Deputy Minister of Communications, and Behzad Ahmadi, Advisor for International Affairs to the Minister of Communications, both holding research positions at the University of Tehran, further develop this argument:

“China has a balanced approach to protect its multifaceted interests in the region, and it is unrealistic for Iran to expect it to jeopardize its relations with Israel and the United States. Therefore, it seems that our romantic view of China is the product of years of myth-making and strategic wishful thinking, rather than an accurate understanding of the behavior of a pragmatic power.”^[20]

A Failed Strategy

While many Iranian commentators have seemingly come to accept the limits of Chinese assistance, and even to sympathize with the reasons behind Beijing’s caution, their criticism of the Iranian leadership’s own China policy is considerably sharper.

As noted above, Hamed Vafaei posits that a long-standing assumption has shaped the Iranian debate on China: namely, that Iran plays a critical role in China’s regional calculus. As he writes:

“The Islamic Republic is the western wall of defense of China. If it falls, China is going to be affected and injured. This was in the head of our politicians in these years: if we cut the oil, China is going to face problems; if there is no Iran, China is going to be affected by challenges. If we don’t keep America occupied in this region, America will go after China.”^[21]

However, the sources we consulted, including sustained monitoring of X (formerly Twitter),^[22] converge on a clear criticism of how successive Iranian governments have mishandled the relations with China. Experts are explicit about where responsibility lies. Whether their critique is directed at the “ruling elite” or specific administrations (notably the Rohani years, 2013–2021, and the Pezeshkian government since 2024^[23]), their assessments echo Mehdi Khorsand’s observation that “the Chinese have repeatedly made major offers of economic and infrastructure [cooperation] to Iran […] but there was no effective response from the Iranian authorities.”^[24]

For example, employing terms often associated with China’s own Middle East policy, Hossein Qaheri told Eghtesad 120 that “Iran’s China policy is essentially opportunistic. Iran only turned to China when it needed it, i.e. when the West turned its back on Iran.”^[25] He argues that the Iran–China partnership is scarcely “strategic” so long as Iranian leaders have not clarified the deeper meaning of these concepts, and, more importantly, so long as they have not reached agreement with their Chinese counterparts on how to integrate their bilateral relationship into their respective foreign policy frameworks. It is in this sense that Qaheri states unambiguously that “Iran should change its approach toward China.”^[26]

Hamed Vafaei advances a similar line:

“Iran must enter into a real strategic dialogue with China. Relations should not be limited to official visits, statements or slogans such as the Silk Road. The two countries should discuss what can concretely be Iran’s role in the realization of China’s initiatives. […] China’s initial uncertainty – during the Twelve-Day War – proves we severely lack a system of strategic bilateral relations.”^[27]

He develops this argument further by comparing the Iranian case with Sino-Saudi and Sino-Emirati relations:

“Iran has not established its position in Beijing’s strategic mindset. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have, by contrast, become part of China’s value chain. […] If Iran cannot consolidate its share in China’s value chain, it should not expect China to defend it in the security sphere. Iran has to demonstrate to China that Israel’s attack on one of its partners is equivalent to an attack on Chinese interests.”^[28]

These debates ultimately converge on the core issue animating Iranian discussions on China policy, both within and outside the country: arms procurement. Israeli strikes have starkly laid bare the serious technical and operational shortcomings of Iran’s defense apparatus. Iranians now have fully recognized the technological backwardness of their armed forces, despite the rhetoric and shows of strength advanced by entities such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The imperative to acquire advanced Chinese weaponry – especially in anti-aircraft systems, which have demonstrated their efficacy in the recent Indo-Pakistani clash – pervades the deliberations and observations of Iranian analysts.

The most lucid and well-contextualized perspective comes from Mohammad Keshavarzadeh, Iran’s former ambassador to China (2018–2023).^[29] In an interview with the reformist newspaper Shargh,^[30] he elaborates on several salient points regarding the stance and hesitancy of the Iranian authorities with respect to procuring Chinese arms. He argues that Iran squandered earlier opportunities to buy and train to use Chinese weapons and cannot expect immediate arms transfers after a sudden crisis. Iran historically relied on Western – and later Russian – systems and never seriously pursued Chinese armaments.

According to him:

“We should have pursued the weapons purchase earlier and more steadily, rather than […] rushing to the Chinese and now expecting that overnight they will give us the weapons we want.”^[31]

Keshavarzadeh insists that arms contracts and transfers require time, mutual trust and prior planning; emergency appeals will not produce instant results: realistic timelines and sustained engagement are necessary. In the interview, the former ambassador also refers to a matter that has recently returned to the public debate: Iran’s desire to reduce its dependence on U.S. satellites. “I even remember that at one point we attempted to use an alternative Chinese system instead of a GPS system for navigation, but regrettably we did not follow up on that measure.”^[32] This testimony is extremely revealing, as it plainly attests to the reflection – and indeed the debate – that has been under way in Iran for years regarding the possibility of equipping and training the armed forces to operate Chinese weapons. He emphasizes that China is now a credible military producer and supplier, and that Iran should establish with it formal, institutionalized long-term defense frameworks: “Its power is now no less than that of the Westerners.” From this account, thus, it would appear that the Iranians have in the past doubted the quality of Chinese weapons.

Hence, Keshavarzadeh puts forward a number of recommendations intended at elevating relations with China to the level of “ironclad” ties, liking them to Sino-Pakistani relations. He stresses the need to broaden and diversify barter mechanisms to circumvent sanctions: non-cash mechanisms, trade-in-kind arrangements and creative logistical frameworks. He criticizes the absence of political will and active diplomacy, as well as what he describes as Iranian “passivity and one-dimensional thinking” – perceiving China solely as an oil buyer – arguing that Tehran must proactively build military, diplomatic and logistical links. He recalls initiatives undertaken during his ambassadorship (led by figures such as Ali Larijani^[33]) and calls for the implementation of a sustained diplomatic campaign and domestic mechanisms to operationalize the relationship, with clear mandates and allocated resources.

Keshavarzadeh also expands his analysis to the regional level, insisting that Iran should capitalize on China’s current strategy of balancing relations across West Asia.

“The Chinese have been able to sign a non-aggression agreement with the GCC as well as with ASEAN. […] I raised these issues in discussions with Chinese think tanks, and some of them proposed a similar plan to regulate China’s relations between Iran and GCC countries, […] a joint non-aggression treaty. […] An agreement that can concretely lay the foundation for a collective security system in the Middle East.”^[34]

The former ambassador thus expresses a firm conviction that China could act as a genuine guarantor of regional security, promoting the development of a new architecture, though he seems aware that China neither possesses the capabilities nor necessarily the will to supplant the U.S.

Looking at the economic side of Sino-Iranian relations, Ehsan Citsaz and Behzad Ahmadi also offer several recommendations. In their view, as with most of the interviewees in this study, there is an imperative need­­ to redesign Iran–China relations from a strategic, not merely short-term or tactical, perspective. This requires preparing Iran’s economy to attract Chinese investment and enhance the country’s transit position: projecting a secure image to investors, pursuing specific projects integrated into BRI networks, reforming domestic legal frameworks, removing banking and financial barriers, and supporting the private sector. At the same time, it is necessary to diversify Iran’s China export portfolio beyond petroleum products by positioning Iran as a technological partner in ICT, AI, engineering, agriculture, pharmaceuticals, petrochemicals, minerals and mining. Iranian firms, they suggest, should expand their presence in the Chinese market via BRI and BRICS forums, trade fairs and e-commerce platforms. Finally, Iran must develop plans to secure loans from the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.^[35]

Against this background, it is important to mention the fact that Citsaz, Ahmadi, as well as Ambassador Keshavarzadeh also emphasize that Iran should “not to put all [its] eggs in China’s basket.”^[36] To avoid the risks of falling into a ”debt trap,” Citsaz and Ahmadi say, “Iran must be careful not to lose sight of its long-term interests (such as ownership of strategic assets or fair pricing of resources) in its thirst for Chinese investment, […] and must pursue development in a manner that ensures cooperation rather than exploitation.” It is also worth noting that they condition these recommendations on a number of political preconditions: a reduction in international tensions surrounding Iran, a clarification of mutual expectations, and a redefinition of the bilateral relationship with China “not on the basis of the fantasy of a ‘shared destiny,’ but on a clear understanding of ‘overlapping interests.’”^[37]

Conclusion

The Twelve-Day War was a pivotal event for Iran. Its repercussions on Iranian domestic and foreign policy are likely to be long-lasting. It is in this context that this issue of the ChinaMed Observer has shed light on how Iranian commentators see China’s role during the clash with Israel.

While some were greatly disappointed by Beijing’s conduct, talking about a loss of China’s credibility, others were somewhat more understanding of the Chinese position, emphasizing both Beijing’s overall diplomatic caution and, more specifically, the limits of its strategic interests in Iran. Against that background, the Iranian leadership has faced criticism for misunderstanding Beijing’s objectives, exaggerating Iran’s importance for China, and failing to transform the relationship beyond supplying discounted oil.

Interestingly however, the sources we consulted suggest that the proposed remedy is not disengagement but rather a cautious doubling down of ties with Beijing. Bilaterally, Iran is expected to pursue Chinese weapons acquisitions more vigorously. If Tehran was not interested before, as Ambassador Keshavarzadeh stated, it now appears that the initiative rests largely with Beijing: it will be China that decides if, and to what extent, Iranian forces gain access to its military technologies. Multilaterally, Tehran aspires to be more integrated in the global initiatives and international organizations launched by Beijing. Greater Iran-Gulf countries coordination, with China as mediator and guarantor, would also be the foundation for a new regional architecture.

It is likely that the main driver of these suggestions is the awareness that, despite the limits of which Iranian commentators are clearly cognizant, China truly remains the only possible great power that is capable and, possibly, willing to help Iran. Indeed, Chinese oil imports from Iran have reportedly reached a new peak. While it is far from obvious that Chinese fighter jets will ever become the backbone of the now-destroyed Iranian Air Force or that Chinese investors will start treating Iran as any other country, Beijing clearly wants to keep Iran afloat. If many in Iran continue to oppose being excessively dependent on China, this sense of vulnerability and frustration will likely increase. The repercussions of the Twelve-Day War will continue to shape Sino-Iranian relations for a long time.

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Theo NENCINI is a Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. He is also a Lecturer in International Relations and a PhD Candidate at Sciences Po Grenoble and the Catholic University of Paris. His research focuses mainly on Iran-China relations, approached from a long-term systemic perspective and through a multilevel analysis, both with regard to Iran’s strategic thinking, political complexity and regional integration dynamics, and China’s foreign policy toward the Middle East.

Veronica TURRINI is a Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. She holds a Master’s Degree in Language and Civilization of Asia and Mediterranean Africa from Ca’ Foscari University in Venice and a B.A. in Language, Culture and Society of Asia and Mediterranean Africa. During her studies, she spent a semester at the University of Tehran. Her research focuses on the media coverage of China in Iran.