From “Look East” to “Learn China”: Iran’s Expert Debate on China and the Ceasefire

With the ceasefire between the United States and Iran having fully broken down, this issue of the ChinaMed Observer looks back at the Iranian debate on China during the months of the fragile truce. We examine how Iranian commentators assessed Beijing’s role during the conflict and ceasefire, and how they believe Tehran should approach relations with China moving forward.

The Iranian media debate on China has traditionally been quite polarized, with “reformist” commentators often expressing open disdain for closer ties with Beijing. However, the first phase of the 2026 U.S.-Iran war, often referred to in Iran as the “Forty-Day War” or “Ramadan War,” appears to have reinforced a shift that began with the June 2025 Twelve-Day War. For much of the Iranian commentariat, China is now an indispensable partner whose support Tehran must leverage. While no one argues that Iran should depend solely on China; the debate has now turned to how Tehran can develop a more effective and balanced partnership with Beijing, a true alliance – one that can provide genuine support against U.S. hostility, contribute to national economic development, and reshape a new regional order.

The Evolution of the Iranian Debate on China

In a previous ChinaMed Observer, we argued that the Twelve-Day War of June 2025 shifted the Iranian debate on China. American military aggression and European acquiescence dealt a blow to the reformist argument that Iran’s future lay in rapprochement with the West – a camp that had long viewed China with skepticism. Yet, the war did not simply settle a once-polarized debate in favor of the “hardliners” championing Tehran’s “Look East” strategy. Instead, a consensus developed across much of the Iranian commentariat: China did not fail Iran as much as Iran failed to understand China.

Rather than blaming China for its muted response during the Twelve-Day War, many Iranian experts argued that successive Iranian governments – including that of President Masoud Pezeshkian – had misread China’s strategic priorities. Tehran had an exaggerated belief of its importance within Beijing’s global agenda while failing to build a partnership that extended beyond the export of discounted oil. The common policy prescription was therefore not disengagement from China, but rather a cautious doubling down of ties with Beijing (without ruling out engagement with other partners).

However, this is no small feat. As noted in our interview with Esfandyar Batmanghelidj, Iran’s weak relationship with China is due to deep structural constraints. Unlike the Gulf states, and even Iraq, Iran remains burdened by sanctions, financial isolation, and an underdeveloped investment environment.

If the Twelve-Day War shattered remaining illusions about the West, the 2026 conflict appears to have buried them altogether. This time, however, Iran came out of first phase of the war in a position of relative strength, with continued effective control over the Strait of Hormuz and the unbridled capacity to strike both Israel and Gulf Arab states. As such, Iranian analysts have recast the Forty-Day War as strategic inflection point, reinforcing the conclusion among many Iranian elites that Washington cannot be relied upon and that Beijing must become Tehran’s indispensable strategic partner.

This view was quite common within official circles during the months of the ceasefire. It was articulated clearly by Babak Negahdari, head of the Majlis Research Center, the research arm of Iran’s Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis, the country’s unicameral parliament). Speaking at an elite hearing on the consequences of the war and Iran’s new opportunities in the international arena, Negahdari argued that “the martyred leader always advocated and pursued the expansion of relations with China, and he personally followed up on relations with China across successive governments.” He also credited the current Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei with continuing this strategic orientation, which he judged as a response to the fundamental difference between relations with Beijing and Washington: unlike with United States, relations with China are conducted “on an equal footing, between equals.”^[1]

For Negahdari, closer alignment serves Beijing’s interests as well, as he framed the war as part of a U.S. strategy to undermine Chinese interests in the region. For Iran, however, deepening relations with China is a strategic necessity. Negahdari claimed – presciently, in hindsight – that the June 2026 U.S-Iran memorandum of understanding would not constitute a lasting resolution. According to him, the Forty-Day War was merely one chapter of a much larger conflict, arguing that Iran must seek a stronger and more comprehensive partnership with China as a result.^[2]

A concrete indication of Tehran’s intention to prioritize relations with Beijing came on May 17, when Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, Speaker of Iran’s parliament, was appointed by the Supreme Leader as Iran’s Special Representative for China. According to Negahdari, Qalibaf was selected because of his pragmatism and the importance he attaches to expert-driven policymaking. In his view, the appointment represents a turning point in Sino-Iranian relations.^[3]

Firstly, with the Supreme Leader absconded, Qalibaf has arguably become the regime’s de facto wartime leader, making his direct involvement in the China file a strong signal that Tehran views the relationship as a priority. Even more significantly, he appears to have taken in much of the criticism directed at Iran’s previous approach toward China. During a June 17 meeting with representatives of Iran’s Chamber of Commerce, he acknowledged that Tehran had so far failed to fully capitalize on its relationship with Beijing. He called for reforms and the development of the logistic, transportation, and infrastructure capacity needed to establish stronger economic links with strategic partners like China.^[4]

China as a Mediator, Ally and Untapped Partner

Interestingly, unlike elsewhere in the region, the possibility of direct Chinese military support to Iran has received remarkably little attention from Iranian analysts, even though Iranian media outlets have reported on international allegations.⁵ Likewise, there has been little discussion if China has leverage over Iran or if China has come out of the war as victor. For almost all Iranians, regardless of political stripe, if the war has winner, it’s Iran, first and foremost.⁶ Instead, the debate has focused on a different question: how much did China actually contribute to Iran’s perceived victory?

Two sometimes overlapping interpretations have emerged on China’s role in the war and the ensuing peace negotiations. The first, more positive outlook emphasizes Beijing’s diplomatic support for Iran, particularly its opposition to what Iranian commentators describe as “anti-Iranian resolutions” at the United Nations. The second stresses the limits of Chinese support, arguing that Beijing’s extensive economic and diplomatic ties with the Gulf Arab states constrained how far it was willing to align itself with Tehran, particularly on issues such as the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.^[7]

Representing this more skeptical interpretation, Kioomars Ashtarian, associate professor of public policy at the University of Tehran, argued that many Iranian commentators failed to grasp the “subtle but fundamental” distinction between an ally and a mediator. Writing in the reformist daily Shargh, Ashtarian claimed that China has primarily acted as the latter, pursuing regional stability only insofar as it serves its own interests, including by opposing Iranian control of the Strait of Hormuz.^[8]

A similar view came from journalist Hani Rastegaran, writing for Shargh shortly before the May 2026 Trump-Xi summit in Beijing. He cautioned against placing excessive faith in China as a mediator, hypothesizing that Beijing may pursue a “grand bargain” with Washington. In his view, China “does not necessarily see U.S. involvement in Middle East crises as completely contrary to its interests,” particularly if it diverts American attention and resources away from East Asia and Taiwan.^[9]

Offering a more favorable assessment, Zakiyeh Yazdanshenas, an assistant professor of international relations at the University of Tehran, argued that Beijing provided truly meaningful diplomatic support during the war. In an analysis published by the Tehran-based Center for Scientific Research and Strategic Studies for the Middle East, she presented China’s actions as evidence of Beijing’s role as a responsible international actor. At the same time, she implicitly acknowledged that Chinese support was due to its own interests: Beijing’s need for a stable regional environment to protect and expand its investments. Moreover, despite China’s efforts to diversify its energy sources, the Strait of Hormuz remains a critical vulnerability (before the war, approximately 56% of fossil fuel exports to China passed through this waterway). As such, regional stability and constructive relations between Iran and the Gulf states are not solely diplomatic preferences for Beijing, but national interests.^[10]

For Yazdanshenas, the war has also created a strategic opening for China. By demonstrating to Gulf states that reliance on the U.S. does not necessarily guarantee security, and in fact creates new vulnerabilities, the conflict has strengthened Beijing’s influence in the region. According to her, this shift also benefits Iran: its demonstrated resilience has reinforced its perceived strategic importance for China. She thus argues that Beijing will help improve ties between Iran and its Arab neighbors as well as support the new mechanisms proposed by Iran and Oman regarding fees for safe navigation in the Strait of Hormuz.^[11]

Hamed Vafaei, director of the University of Tehran’s Asia Research Center and co-director of the university’s Confucius Institute, offered a similar positive assessment of China’s wartime diplomacy in an interview with Tabnak News Agency. He rejected the argument that China was passive during the conflict, criticizing expectations that Beijing would provide overt battlefield support. Such expectations, he argued, stem from a misunderstanding of Chinese foreign policy principles. From Vafaei’s perspective, “China was one of the most active countries,” noting that Foreign Minister Wang Yi held more than thirty phone calls with Arab, Iranian, American, European and Israeli officials, as well as Beijing’s decision to dispatch envoys and a special representative – a level of engagement unmatched by Russia, the U.S., or European states. For him this diplomatic outreach demonstrates:

“On the one hand, that the Chinese are willing to play a role, and on the other hand, that various countries such as Iran, the United States, and even the Arabs expect China to act as a counterweight.”^[12]

According to Vafaei, the result of this diplomatic outreach was the five-point plan proposed by China and Pakistan, which he judges as somewhat tilted toward Arab positions. He posited that this was partly the result of Iran’s limited diplomatic engagement with Beijing during the conflict, especially when compared to the extensive dialogue China maintained with Arab governments. As he revealed, he had “insisted that someone from the Islamic Republic also go and meet with this special representative, but unfortunately, that did not happen.”^[13]

The Hormuz Blockade

Across much of the preceding commentary, one issue repeatedly surfaced: the Strait of Hormuz, Iran’s most powerful geopolitical card. However, Iranian commentators were divided over how China views Tehran’s control of the Strait. Some argued that Beijing is prepared to support Iran’s greater control over maritime transit.^[14] Others contended that China fundamentally opposes any disruption to shipping but may have to be forced to accommodate a new strategic reality if Iran succeeds in imposing it.^[15]

Closely linked to this debate is the issue of how the blockade is affecting China. While some analysts portrayed such a scenario as a potentially devastating blow to the Chinese economy – albeit one that would inflict comparable damage on the world economy as a whole^[16] – others reached a different conclusion. Mohammad Hossein Emadi, Iran’s former vice minister of agriculture (1996–2004) and a former ambassador, reasoned that a prolonged disruption of the Strait may ultimately strengthen China’s global position. In his view, Beijing’s vast strategic reserves provide it with greater room for maneuver, allowing China to exert pressure on India and Southeast Asian states through energy and trade leverage. At the same time, a crisis in the Strait could accelerate trends favorable to Beijing, including global de-dollarization and the green energy transition.^[17]

Regardless of these competing assessments, Iran declared that China is expected to receive preferential treatment under its proposed transit fee system for navigation through the Strait. Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli, Iran’s ambassador to China since May 2025, indicated this in early July during the World Peace Forum in Beijing, stating that “for friendly and allied countries, among which China, facilitations and special considerations will be taken into consideration.”

The Iranian Leadership is Still Not Doing Enough

However, for some Iranian analysts, preferential treatment in the Strait of Hormuz alone is insufficient to secure China’s long-term attention or support. For Hamed Vafaei, the lesson of the war is that Iran must adopt a far more ambitious strategy toward China. Tehran, he argued, has too often reduced the relationship to narrow economic exchanges, particularly oil exports, while other regional actors have expanded cooperation in areas such as artificial intelligence, digital infrastructure, and green energy. The goal, he stresses, is not dependence on China, but a partnership built around Iran’s own interests. In his view, Tehran has realized this fact (according to him “there is almost no one in Iran now who says we should not work with China”^[18]), but a gap remains between understanding and action.^[19]

In an interview with the Iranian Students’ News Agency, Vafaei argued more forcefully that cooperation with China is “not a choice, but a necessity.” In his view, Beijing had already demonstrated its willingness to play a meaningful role during the war with its intensive diplomatic engagement, asking rhetorically: “If we do not call this China’s willingness to play a role, then what should we call it?”^[20]

For Vafaei, the main shortcoming therefore lies not with China but with Iran’s own diplomacy. “We cannot simply sit and ask why China is not doing anything; we are the ones who have to tell China what to do.” Rather than expecting Beijing to align automatically with Tehran, Iran must end its passivity identify concrete areas of convergence and engage China on the basis of its “progressive doctrine of non-alignment.” More fundamentally, Vafaei argued that Iran has yet to present China with a coherent vision for a new regional order. Such a framework, he contends, should be developed jointly by Iran and the Gulf Arab states, whose shared interest in regional stability aligns with China’s own interests.^[21]

However, not all commentators are just as optimistic about Iran’s ability to seize this opportunity. In an interview on the Azad podcast, Mehdi Kharratiyan, director of the Institute for Policy Revival, argued that Tehran has repeatedly squandered favorable diplomatic openings. He pointed to May 2026 when Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin both visited Beijing while Xi Jinping travelled to Pyongyang, creating what he views as an unusually positive diplomatic environment that Iran failed to exploit. Kharratiyan also noted that Russia indicated both Moscow and Beijing were prepared to support Iran during the negotiations in Islamabad. He criticized the Iranian negotiating team, describing its performance as weak, having failed to mobilize the backing of the major powers to strengthen Tehran’s bargaining position. Implicit in his criticism is the view that the proposal made by Iran’s ambassador to China, Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli, was never pursued with sufficient political determination.^[22]

Hossein Qaheri, head of the Iranian and Chinese Strategic Studies Think Tank, offered a similarly critical assessment of Iran’s approach to Beijing. In an interview with Eghtesad 120, he argued that Tehran failed to clearly define what it expects from the relationship. In his view, the Islamic Republic has traditionally turned toward China during moments of need but neglected the partnership once immediate threats receded, because, according to him, “[Iranians] are intrinsically in love with the West.” Qaheri therefore claimed that Iran requires a structural change in how it manages ties with Beijing. The ambassador to China, he contended, should be a high-level representative with sufficient authority to shape policy rather than a conventional diplomat. As such, regarding the nomination of Qalibaf as Iran’s new Special Representative for China, he affirmed that his success would depend on whether the position is used to develop a clear strategic vision of what Iran wants from China.^[23]

A more unconventional proposal for achieving a durable partnership with China comes from Kioomars Ashtarian. In a twist on the commonplace view that China has leverage over Iran, he instead argued that Iran, paradoxically, can strengthen its position with Beijing by maintaining greater autonomy rather than seeking closer alignment. Iran should operate independently regarding the Strait of Hormuz and use its “power of destruction,” its ability to make regional economic development and energy trade impossible without Iranian participation, to demonstrate its indispensability. Only by showing Beijing that its own economic and strategic interests depend on Iran, he argued, can China be persuaded to move from the role of mediator to that of a genuine strategic ally. As Ashtarian writes:

“If Iran can firmly establish the understanding that the region’s “glass palaces” of development cannot be built upon the “mud huts” of Iran’s underdevelopment through sanctions and exclusion, […] China may reconsider the scale and direction of its investments in the Persian Gulf and ultimately emerge as a strategic partner to both Iran and the Gulf Arab states.”^[24]

At the same time, some analysts caution against making China the centerpiece of Iran’s foreign policy. Rahman Qahremanpour, an academic and policy analyst, maintained that Tehran should keep its possibilities open, remaining willing to cooperate with all countries willing to invest in Iran, including China, the U.S., and other major powers. In his view, Iran should avoid dependence on great powers and instead speak with middle powers, which provide greater room for maneuver. A great power like China, he argued, represents a resource but also a constraint because it can support Iran but also limit its options when its own strategic interests require it. Considering how China’s global influence continues to expand, Qahremanpour warned that Iran should be careful not to give the false impression that negotiations with the United States equal getting closer China and fully aligning with them.^[25]

Conclusion

While maybe excessively emboldened by its successes in the Forty-Day War and the subsequent negotiations with the U.S., the conflict has reinforced the belief among Iranian commentators that Tehran must reassess its foreign policy priorities. Even prior to the resumption of hostilities, China was viewed across much of the Iranian political and expert landscape as one of Iran’s – if not its only potential strategic partner. The debate is thus no longer mainly about whether Iran should engage more with Beijing, but rather about whether China is willing to move beyond a pragmatic partnership to become a genuine ally for Iran.

Many Iranian commentators argue that China provided very meaningful diplomatic support during the conflict, demonstrated a willingness to assume a more active role in the region and even showed a willingness to back Tehran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz. However, in their view, it is Tehran which has failed to translate this opening into concrete gains. The main obstacles, they argue, are Iran’s own diplomatic shortcomings: passivity, bureaucratic inefficiencies, weak negotiation strategies, and a tendency to reduce the relationship to oil exports rather than developing a region-wide strategic agenda.

Others remain more cautious. They argue that China’s actions during the war were ultimately due to its own interests, such as its need for regional stability, secure energy supplies, and good relations with the Arab states – and, to a certain extent, Washington. From this perspective, Beijing may support Iran when their interests overlap, but it is unlikely to fully align itself with Tehran at the expense of its core and regional interests, as illustrated by its statement over the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. These voices therefore warn that Iran should avoid dependence on China advocating instead for a network of partnerships, particularly with middle powers.

Nevertheless, even among these more skeptical voices, criticism is directed primarily at Tehran rather than Beijing. The central question is not whether China should be trusted unconditionally, but why Tehran has been unable to better leverage China. A few argue that Iran’s leverage lies in demonstrating its autonomy and capacity to impose costs when necessary, thereby convincing China that Chinese regional interests cannot be secured without accommodating Iran’s position. For most analysts, however, the challenge is less confrontation than transformation, turning China from a cautious mediator into an ally by presenting Beijing with a clear vision of Iran’s future regional role and by creating the institutional conditions necessary for deeper economic, diplomatic and strategic cooperation, not only between China and Iran, but also, with Beijing’s support, between Iran and the Gulf Arab states.

The appointment of the increasingly politically central figure of Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf as Iran’s special representative for China appears to reflect a recognition of these shortcomings. According to most Iranian experts, whether his nomination becomes a genuine turning point for relations with China will depend on Tehran’s ability to establish clearer objectives, improve coordination among state institutions, remove barriers to Chinese investment, and move beyond a transactional relationship. This ambition appears to enjoy broad support across the Iranian political spectrum; as “there is almost no one in Iran now who says we should not work with China.”

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Veronica TURRINI is a Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. She holds a Master’s Degree in Language and Civilisation of Asia and Mediterranean Africa from Ca’ Foscari University in Venice, as part of which she did an academic exchange at the University of Tehran. Her research focuses on media coverage of China in Iran.

Leonardo BRUNI is the Project Manager of the ChinaMed Project. He is also a Doctoral Researcher in History at the European University Institute. His research interests include China-EU relations, the history of Sino-European relations, and Chinese foreign policy in the wider Mediterranean region.