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On June 13, Israel launched a series of air and missile strikes against Iran, targeting nuclear facilities, military installations, air defense systems, as well as prominent military leaders, politicians and nuclear scientists. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu justified the operation as a “preemptive strike,” claiming it was necessary to prevent Iran’s purportedly imminent development of a nuclear weapon. In response, Iran counterattacked with drone and missile strikes against Israel, with both sides hitting military and civilian targets.
On June 21, after several days of escalating tensions and uncertainty, the United States intervened on the side of Israel by launching airstrikes on three Iranian nuclear sites. According to U.S. President Donald Trump, the stated objective was to destroy Iran's nuclear capabilities and bring an end to the conflict. On June 23, Iran retaliated by firing missiles at a U.S. military base in Qatar; no casualties were reported. The following day, on June 24, Iranian state television announced a ceasefire with Israel, just hours after Trump announced that an agreement had been reached.
This issue of the ChinaMed Observer examines Beijing’s stance and Chinese analysts’ views on the Israel-Iran war. Official statements, echoing past crises, criticize Israel and the U.S. while calling for an immediate ceasefire and a return to diplomacy. Chinese commentators blame the war on Washington’s erratic policy and Israel’s carte blanche to act unilaterally, yet many analysts find it hard to square the conflict within the usual narrative of a declining U.S. and an ascendant China-led order. They note that regional actors, such as Arab states, Russia and Europe, are neither willing nor able to halt the hostilities. Regarding China itself, remarks are sparse and guarded, betraying a shared frustration: Tehran matters, but Beijing has limited leverage.
On June 13, Lin Jian, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson, stated that China was deeply concerned about Israel’s attack on Iran and its consequences, clarifying Beijing’s opposition to any violation of Iran’s sovereignty, security and territorial integrity. He also urged all parties to promote regional peace, avoid further escalation, and emphasized China’s readiness to play a constructive role in de-escalating the crisis.[1] When asked during the press conference whether China would support Iran in blocking the Strait of Hormuz as retaliation for Israel’s actions, Lin refrained from giving a direct response, limiting himself to reiterating China’s willingness to contribute constructively.
On the same day, the remarks by China’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Fu Cong, on the situation in the Middle East were published, stating that China urges Israel to “immediately cease all military adventurism,” and called on all relevant parties to abide by the UN Charter and international law, resolving disputes through political and diplomatic means. Moreover, Fu Cong emphasized that the international community should work together to promote a ceasefire in Gaza, de-escalate the regional situation, and effectively curb the spread of conflict.[2]
The following day, on June 14, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi held a telephone conversation with his Iranian counterpart, Abbas Araghchi. According to the official Chinese readout, Wang unequivocally condemned Israel’s violation of Iran’s sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity, adding that Israel’s actions constitute a serious breach of the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. He underscored the gravity of the attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities, warning that such actions set a dangerous precedent with potentially catastrophic consequences.[3]
On June 17, more than four days since the start of Israel’s campaign, Chinese President Xi Jinping addressed the conflict during the second China-Central Asia Summit in Astana. Xi reiterated China’s deep concern over the increasing tensions in the Middle East caused by Israel’s military actions against Iran. He also reaffirmed Beijing’s opposition to any infringement of the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of other countries and expressed China’s readiness to work with all parties to play a constructive role for peace in the Middle East.[4]
Subsequently, on June 21, the U.S. launched strikes against three nuclear sites in Iran. During the emergency meeting of the UN Security Council held the following day, Fu Cong stated:
“China strongly condemns the US attacks on Iran and the bombing of nuclear facilities under the safeguards of the IAEA. The actions of the United States seriously violate the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and international law, as well as Iran’s sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity. They have exacerbated tensions in the Middle East and dealt a heavy blow to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. The international community must uphold justice and make concrete efforts to cool down the situation and restore peace and stability. In this connection, I wish to put forward four appeals.”[5]
In short, Fu Cong called for an immediate ceasefire, the effective protection of civilians, a commitment to dialogue and negotiation, and swift actions by the Security Council.
On June 23, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun reported that China, along with Russia and Pakistan, had circulated a draft resolution at the Security Council, referring to the four appeals proposed by Fu Cong.[6] This marked the first instance in which China seemed to go beyond rhetorical condemnation, although no vote on the draft resolution took place. When asked whether China supported Iran potentially closing the Strait of Hormuz, Guo Jiakun stated that the Persian Gulf and its adjacent waters are important international trade routes for goods and energy, and that China calls on the international community to prevent regional instability that could impact global economic development.[7]
On June 24, Israel and Iran reached a ceasefire agreement. At subsequent press conferences, Guo Jiakun stated that China had repeatedly emphasized that the correct path to achieving a ceasefire is through dialogue rather than military means. He also emphasized that China and Iran are traditional friends, and that Beijing is willing to continue its partnership with Tehran and work to safeguard peace in the Middle East.[8]
To summarize, while the Chinese government openly condemned Israel and the U.S., its support for Iran remained essentially rhetorical. The joint draft resolution introduced with Russia and Pakistan appeared merely symbolic, as it was not brought to a vote, a choice likely driven by the certainty of a U.S. veto.
During the initial stage of the Israel-Iran conflict, Chinese experts debated what motivated Israel to launch military strikes against Iran, identifying three main reasons.
The first was Israel’s determination to prevent Iran from potentially developing nuclear capabilities. According to Li Shaoxian, President of the China-Arab Research Institute at Ningxia University, during last year’s Israel-Iran clashes, Tel Aviv was impeded from launching a “lethal strike” on Iranian nuclear facilities by the Biden administration. After Trump took office, the situation shifted significantly, as the new president intensified U.S. pressure on Iran.[9]
Tian Wenlin, Director of the Institute of Middle East Studies at Renmin University's Regional National Research Institute, used the Chinese idiom “choose the lesser of two evils” (liǎng hài xiāng quán qǔ qí qīng 两害相权取其轻) to analyze Israel’s decision to attack Iran. He explained that although Israel was aware of the heavy costs involved, it still chose to take the risk to eliminate Iran’s nuclear capabilities in order to avert future military threats. However, Tian concluded that this military action is likely to be counterproductive, as it will only strengthen Iran’s motivation to invest further in nuclear research and development, with him affirming that Israel’s attack represents the most “unprecedented existential challenge” faced by Iran since the 1979 Islamic Revolution.[10]
Similarly, in an interview with The Paper, Wang Jin, associate professor at the Institute of Middle East Studies at Northwestern University, explained that Israel believes that Iran has enriched uranium to the point of it being able to produce multiple nuclear bombs within days, and therefore an imminent threat that needed to be stopped. [11]
The second reason identified by Chinese experts was Israel’s intent to obstruct a potential U.S.-Iran nuclear deal. Li Shaoxian emphasized how Israel was concerned about the negotiations between the U.S. and Iran, noting that a sixth round was scheduled for June 15. Israel firmly opposed any compromise, especially if it would allow Iran to continue to enrich uranium on its own territory.[12]
The third reason was to foment chaos in Iran. Ding Long, professor at the Middle East Studies Institute at Shanghai International Studies University (SISU), concurred with other experts in affirming that the Israeli attack specifically targeted Iranian political and military leaders because it aimed to trigger internal political changes within Iran, potentially even threatening the stability of the current regime.[13]
In addition, Liu Zhongmin, also a professor at the Middle East Studies Institute at SISU, published a long analysis in The Paper’s Middle East column. He argued that “Trump 2.0” is a major contributing factor to the dramatic escalation of the Israel-Iran conflict. Liu explained that the U.S. has not effectively restrained Israel during its negotiations with Iran, while simultaneously exacerbating uncertainty in other Middle East flashpoints such as the Israel-Palestine conflict, the Red Sea crisis and the Syrian crisis.[14]
In sum, the perspectives of Chinese scholars do not substantially differ from those of their foreign counterparts, at least when it comes to understanding Israeli motivations.
Chinese experts discussed which actors are involved in the conflict and the possible reasons for their involvement. According to Niu Xinchun, executive director of the China-Arab Research Institute at Ningxia University, this round of conflict between Israel and Iran represents the most dangerous moment for the Middle East since October 7, 2023. Unlike the conflicts of the past two years, which largely involved Israel and non-state armed groups or militias, this round marks a direct clash between two sovereign states, and, notably, between the two biggest military powers in the region.[15] Niu further argued that the situation is rendered more perilous by the involvement of the U.S. This perspective is shared by Ding Long, who also stated that Israel’s attack on Iran constituted a full-scale declaration of war, as air strikes targeted strategic nuclear facilities, as well as prominent Iranian leaders and nuclear scientists.[16]
Some Chinese scholars have also expressed concern over the war potentially spilling over. Sun Degang, director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Fudan University, warned that the Houthis in Yemen and Shiite militias in Iraq may also launch attacks on Israel, both within and beyond its borders.[17] Regarding the likelihood of further escalation involving other state actors in the Middle East, Tian Wenlin argued that Arab countries lack the strength and motivation to compete with Israel militarily. Chinese experts noted that these states did not take substantive measures against Israel over the crisis in Gaza. Consequently, they concluded that “Arab countries are more likely to stay out of the matter.”[18] However, they did not rule out the possibility of regional states attempting to balance against Tel Aviv or launching mediation efforts.
Liu Qiang, Senior Research Fellow and Chairman of the Academic Committee of the Shanghai Centre for RimPac Strategic and International Studies, explained that on June 16, 2025, the foreign ministers of twenty-one Arab and Islamic countries, including Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Pakistan, Türkiye, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Oman, and Qatar, issued a joint statement condemning Israel’s attacks against Iran, calling for the respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries, as well for the de-nuclearization of the Middle East, urging the countries of the region to accede to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to prohibit attacks on nuclear facilities.[19] Liu pointed out that, among these countries, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye are two of the most influential and the leaders of both these states have sided with Iran, which “significantly strengthened the cohesion among the countries in the Middle East.”[20]
Chinese experts expressed concern about the Trump administration's capacity to bring about a resolution to the conflict. Liu Zhongmin characterized the U.S. policy in the Middle East under President Trump’s second term as “the three noes”: immoral, chaotic, and inconsistent (wúdào, wúxù, wúcháng; 无道、无序、无常). In a long, detailed explanation, he elaborated on these three points:
“[American foreign policy is] Immoral because the United States has abandoned the so-called ‘universal values’ of the past, such as saving the Middle East and democratic transformation; [...] chaotic because there is a lack of systematic and coordinated strategic planning in the Middle East policy of the United States; [...] Inconsistent because there is a lack of durability and sustainability, which has led to the continuous decline of the credibility of U.S. Middle East policy.”[21]
Similarly, Sun Degang argued that the current Trump administration operates on a transactional basis, and that Steven Witkoff, the U.S. special envoy for Middle East affairs, lacks understanding of the complexity of regional dynamics and does not have a clear strategy. As a result, according to Sun, the conflict between Israel and Iran has spiraled out of control.[22] He further added:
“The decline of American power and the absence of an experienced team to broker reconciliation in the Middle East have led to such an uncontrolled, chaotic conflict. The Trump administration seems not to be thinking about the consequences of its actions and what to do next. They only take it one step at a time.”[23]
Liu Zhongmin concurred with Sun Degang’s assessment, arguing that the situation in the Middle East has shifted from U.S. hegemony toward greater multipolarity. However, he acknowledged that it is far from clear what this means for China and other countries. On this note, Liu Qiang argued that Iran’s security is a matter of national security for China, affirming that:
“For China, how to ensure that Iran, the most fragile link in the international security chain, does not break due to this military conflict with Israel, or even a possible joint strangulation by the U.S. and Israel, requires taking proactive and positive actions to ensure that the impact on China’s national interests is minimized.”[24]
Liu Zhongmin wrote that the constructive role of emerging powers, represented by China, has become more prominent thanks to the promotion of practical cooperation around the Belt and Road Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, and the Global Development Initiative.[25] Nevertheless, neither Liu Qiang nor Liu Zhongmin offered concrete examples of what China could do. This lack of concrete proposals, however, has unsurprisingly not prevented some Chinese media outlets from highlighting statements from Iranian officials thanking China for “providing support in the most difficult moment”[26] and for “understanding Iran’s position.”[27]
As to Russia, Sun Degang pointed out that although Moscow has expressed a willingness to mediate in the Israel-Iran conflict, it is deeply mired in its own war with Ukraine. Additionally, he noted how Israel is unlikely to trust Russia as Tel Aviv is aligned with the Ukrainian side.[28] Similarly, Liu Zhongmin observed that Russia already abandoned Syria, dooming the Assad regime and negatively affecting Iranian security. Moreover, although Iran and Russia signed a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty, Moscow remains focused on the war in Ukraine.[29]
Regarding Europe, Dong Yifan, Associate Research Fellow at the Belt and Road Academy of Beijing Language and Culture University, argued that Europe is trapped in an awkward "two-hard” dilemma, as it hopes to promote a ceasefire, but it is unable to take a clear and distinct position from the U.S. and Israel.[30] According to Dong, Europe struggles to balance its geopolitical ambitions with its actual capacity to influence the situation, exposing the contradictions between its moral responsibilities and its practical interests. Discussing the possibility of Europe entering the negotiations, Cui Hongjian, a senior research fellow and director of the Department for European Studies at the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), stated that Iran's negotiations with European countries are largely symbolic.[31] He added that European countries are unlikely to initiate an independent diplomatic process with Iran because doing so would risk their relations with the U.S. and Israel, an outcome they are unwilling to accept.
Chinese experts have also tried to analyze potential pathways through which Iran might achieve peace on its own. Liu Zhongmin argued that even if Iran chooses the path of peace, its choices are constrained by both regional and international factors, including the erosion of U.S. leadership in global affairs and the weakening of international institutions such as the UN Security Council.[32]
Jin Liangxiang, Senior Research Fellow at the Center for West Asian and African Studies and Associate Professor as the Institute for International Strategic Studies, argued that while the Trump administration did express interest in negotiating with Iran, it faced several challenges. Jin also posited that Washington was unwilling to engage in direct military confrontation with Iran and had already invested significant diplomatic and economic resources in the Middle East, actions that risked provoking a strong domestic backlash, especially amid ongoing internal protests. While he argued that the U.S. would likely assist Israel’s missile defense efforts and might pressure Arab countries to do the same, the Trump administration would likely be unable to restrain Israel, given the strong influence of pro-Israel lobby groups and “Jewish capital” within U.S. politics.[33]
After Trump announced that Israel and Iran reached a ceasefire agreement, the debate among Chinese experts shifted toward evaluating this truce’s potential durability. Li Zixin, Associate Researcher at the China Institute of International Studies, argued that the current U.S. administration seems to have a "stop there" approach on the Israel-Iran conflict, attempting to avoid long-term entanglement in the Middle East as it does not align with Trump’s domestic political interests.[34] According to Li, the ceasefire was possible as all three parties, Israel, Iran, and the U.S., achieved what they needed to justify the deal to their domestic audiences: the U.S. “destroyed” Iran’s nuclear facilities, Iran retaliated against the largest U.S. military base in the Middle East, and Israel sabotaged the U.S.-Iran nuclear negotiations and interrupted Iran’s nuclear program.[35]
Liu Zhongmin offered a similar analysis but, while agreeing that Israel and the U.S. have successfully achieved their goal of destroying Iran’s nuclear facilities, he argued that Iran is unlikely to abandon its nuclear program, warning that the hostile relationship between Israel and Iran will continue.[36]
Wang Lixin, Assistant Research Fellow at the Institute of International Relations at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, stressed the uncertainty of the current situation after the U.S. intervention: on one hand, Trump appears motivated to rapidly secure stability in the region; on the other, he has the chance to strengthen the pressure on Iran, raising the risk of a new round of escalation.[37]
The official Chinese position was openly critical toward Israel and the U.S., adopting a stance consistent with its responses to previous crises in the region. Over the course of the twelve days of war, Beijing reiterated its rather boilerplate calls for an immediate ceasefire and diplomatic negotiations, reflecting a seemingly formulaic and rhetorical approach to regional conflicts.
Many Chinese experts echoed the official line, expressing serious concerns over the escalation and blaming the war on the U.S. for its erratic policy and for enabling Israel. At the same time, however, several analysts also acknowledged and explained Israel’s rationale for its military actions and accepted U.S. claims that its strikes had “destroyed” Iran’s nuclear capabilities.
It is also clear from their words that Chinese analysts struggle reconciling this crisis with the general and well-established narrative of U.S. decline in the Middle East and the parallel rise of China and other non-Western powers. Their assessment of the limitations of regional actors, Russia and Europe is not surprising. For them, none of these actors possess the will or the capacity to resolve such a crisis.
As to China’s role, there appears to be an underlying frustration, likely shared by Chinese officials and experts: Iran is an important partner but there is little that China can seriously do to help or assist Tehran. The few references to China in the sources reviewed are largely generic, suggesting that there is no interest to discuss a situation in which Beijing cannot, or does not wish to, commit to a substantive role.
Miriam VERZELLINO is Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. She holds a Master’s Degree in Language and Cultures of Asia and Africa from University of Naples “L’Orientale” and is currently pursuing a Master’s in Political Science (Chinese Language Program) at the School of Government and Public Affairs at the Communication University of China. Her research interests include scientific and technological cooperation between China and Europe, with a specific focus on Italy, as well as digital governance.
Dr. Andrea GHISELLI is Head of Research of the ChinaMed Project. He is also Assistant Professor at the School of International Relations and Public Affairs of Fudan University. His research focuses on Chinese foreign and security policy making and China’s policy toward the Middle East and North Africa.
[1] “Èr líng èr wǔ nián liù yuè shí sān rì wài jiāo bù fā yán rén Lín Jiàn zhǔ chí lì xíng jì zhě huì” 2025年6月13日外交部发言人林剑主持例行记者会 [Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lin Jian held a regular press conference on June 13, 2025], Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, June 13, 2025, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/fyrbt_673021/202506/t20250613_11648029.shtml.
[2] “Remarks on the Situation in the Middle East by Ambassador Fu Cong at the UN Security Council Briefing,” Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN, June 13, 2025, http://un.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/hyyfy/202506/t20250614_11648590.htm.
[3] Lu Yuansheng, “Wáng Yì fēnbié tóng yīlǎng wàizhǎng 、 yǐsèliè wàizhǎng tōnghuà” 王毅分别同伊朗外长、以色列外长通话” [Wang Yi had phone calls with the Iranian and Israeli counterparts respectively], Guancha, June 14, 2025, https://m.guancha.cn/internation/2025_06_14_779390.shtml.
[4] Yan Jun, “Xí Jìnpíng ： gèfāng yīnggāi tuīdòng zhōngdōng júshì jǐnkuài jiàngwēn” 习近平：各方应该推动中东局势尽快降温 [Xi Jinping: all parties should promote a de-escalation in the Middle East as soon as possible], CCTV, June 17, 2025, https://content-static.cctvnews.cctv.com/snow-book/index.html?item_id=4495386130084596908.
[5] “Remarks on Iran by Ambassador Fu Cong at the UN Security Council Emergency Meeting,” Official Website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, June 22, 2025, http://un.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/hyyfy/202506/t20250623_11654794.htm.
[6] “2025 nián 6 yuè 23 rì wàijiāobù fāyánrén Guō Jiākūn zhǔchí lìxíng jìzhěhuì,” 2025年6月23日外交部发言人郭嘉昆主持例行记者会, [Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Guo Jiakun held a regular press conference on June 23, 2025], Official Website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, June 23, 2025, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/202506/t20250623_11655121.shtml.
[7] Ibid.
[8] “2025 Nián 6 yuè 24 rì wàijiāo bù fāyán rén Guō Jiākūn zhǔchí lì xíng jìzhě huì” 2025年6月24日外交部发言人郭嘉昆主持例行记者会 [On June 24, 2025, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Guo Jiakun hosted a regular press conference], Official Website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, June 24, 2025, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/fyrbt_673021/202506/t20250624_11657850.shtml;
”2025 Nián 6 yuè 25 rì wàijiāo bù fāyán rén Guō Jiākūn zhǔchí lì xíng jìzhě huì” 2025年6月25日外交部发言人郭嘉昆主持例行记者会 [On June 25, 2025, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Guo Jiakun hosted a regular press conference], Official Website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, June 25, 2025, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/fyrbt_673021/202506/t20250625_11658600.shtml.
[9] Zhang Wenjun, “Yǐsèliè wèishénme xuǎnzài cǐshí kōngxí yīlǎng？ zhuānjiā fēnxī” 以色列为什么选在此时空袭伊朗？专家分析 [Why does Israel attack Iran? Expert analysis], CCTV, June 13, 2025, https://ysxw.cctv.cn/article.html?toc_style_id=feeds_default&item_id=16726319730139111086&channelId=1119
[10] Feng Qikun, “Zhōngdōng júshì zǒuxiàng shīkòng? Zhuānjiā jiědú cǐ cì yǐ yī chōngtú bèihòu yuányīn yǔ yǐngxiǎng” 中东局势走向失控？专家解读此次以伊冲突背后原因与影响 [Is the situation in the Middle East getting out of control? Experts interpret the causes and impacts behind the Israel-Iran conflict], CRI online, June 13, 2025, https://news.cri.cn/20250613/8c21ac01-e2ed-8cc8-2fcf-652e5e1b5341.html.
[11] Li Yiqing, “Yǐsèliè xíjí yīlǎng hé shèshī, zhuānjiā: Yǐ zhànzhēng biānyuán zhèngcè kěnéng dǎozhì chōngtú shēngjí” 以色列袭击伊朗核设施，专家：以战争边缘政策可能导致冲突升级 [Israel attacks Iran’s nuclear facilities. The experts: Israel’s war brinksmanship may lead to escalation of conflict], The Paper, June 13, 2025, https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_30977566.
[12] See note 9, Zhang Wenjun, CCTV, June 13, 2025, https://ysxw.cctv.cn/article.html?toc_style_id=feeds_default&item_id=16726319730139111086&channelId=1119.
[13] “Zāo wǔ lún kōngxí hòu Yīlǎng liào hěnhuà: Jiāng wú zhǐjìng bàofù! Duōfāng jǐnjí fāshēng! Yǐsèliè wèihé cǐshí dòngshǒu? Zhuānjiā fēnxī zhǔyào yǒu 3 dà mùdì!” 遭五轮空袭后伊朗撂狠话：将无止境报复！多方紧急发声！以色列为何此时动手？专家分析主要有3大目的 [After five rounds of air strikes, Iran said cruelly: there will be endless retaliation! Multi-party emergency voice! Why is Israel doing it at this time? There are three main purposes of expert analysis], The Paper, June 13, 2025, https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_30979310.
[14] Liu Zhongmin, “Zhōngdōng ruì píng ｜ tèlǎngpǔ de “sānwú” zhèngcè shì yǐsèliè yīlǎng chōngtū de zhòngyào gēnyuán” 中东睿评｜特朗普的“三无”政策是以色列伊朗冲突的重要根源 [Trump's "three nos" policy is an important source of the Israel-Iran conflict], The Paper, June 17, 2025, https://m.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_30991499.
[15] Su Xiaojing, “Yīlǎng duì yǐsèliè bàofù yǐ zhǎnkāi zhōngdōng chǔyú “zuì wéixiǎn” shíkè zhuānjiā fēnxī” 伊朗对以色列报复已展开 中东处于“最危险”时刻 专家分析 [Iran has already responded to Israel. The experts analysis: the Middle East is in the most dangerous moment], CNR, June 14, 2025, https://news.cnr.cn/sq/20250614/t20250614_527210408.shtml.
[16] Zhao Yifan & Han Jiaojiao, “Quánmiàn xuānzhàn”! Zhuānjiā jiědú yǐsèliè xíjí yīlǎng gēnběn yuányīn “全面宣战”！专家解读以色列袭击伊朗根本原因 ["Declaration of total war"! Experts explain the root cause of Israel’s attack on Iran], Sina Finance, June 13, 2025, https://finance.sina.com.cn/jjxw/2025-06-13/doc-inezxpez7122647.shtml.
[17] See note 13, The Paper, “After five rounds of air strikes, Iran said cruelly: there will be endless retaliation!,” June 13, 2025, https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_30979310.
[18] See note 10, Feng Qikun, CRI online, June 13, 2025, https://news.cri.cn/20250613/8c21ac01-e2ed-8cc8-2fcf-652e5e1b5341.html.
[19] Liu Qiang, “Liú Qiáng ： yǐsèliè yǔ yīlǎng jūnshìchōngtū de kě yùjiàn hé bùkěyùjiàn de wēixiǎnxìng” 刘强：以色列与伊朗军事冲突的可预见和不可预见的危险性 [Liu Qiang: The foreseeable and unforeseen dangers of military conflict between Israel and Iran], Aisixiang, June 20, 2025, https://www.aisixiang.com/data/164046.html
[20] Ibid.
[21] See note 14, Liu Zhongmin, The Paper, June 17, 2025, https://m.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_30991499.
[22] Zhu Runyu, “Yīlǎng háixiǎng jìxù hé měiguó tánpàn？ zhuānjiā ：“dǎtòng” yǐsèliè cáiyǒu tánpàn dǐqì” 伊朗还想继续和美国谈判？专家：“打痛”以色列才有谈判底气 [Does Iran still want to continue negotiations with the United States? Expert: Only by "striking" Israel can it have the confidence to negotiate], The Paper, June 17, 2025, https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_30995725
[23] Ibid.
[24] See note 19, Liu Qiang, Aisixiang, June 20, 2025, https://www.aisixiang.com/data/164046.html.
[25] See note 14, Liu Zhongmin, The Paper, June 17, 2025, https://m.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_30991499.
[26] “Gǎnxiè Zhōngguó zhèngfǔ hé rénmín zài Yīlǎng zuì jiānnán shíkè jǐyǔ de zhīchí” 感谢中国政府和人民在伊朗最艰难时刻给予的支持 [“We thank the Chinese government and people for the support given during Iran's most difficult time”], Sina, June 29, 2025, https://cj.sina.com.cn/articles/view/1887344341/707e96d502001myf8.
[27] “Yīlǎng fángzhǎng liányè gǎndào Zhōngguó, dāngmiàn gǎnxiè Zhōngfāng zhīchí, Shànghé shí guó fángzhǎng quánbù dàoqí” 伊朗防长连夜赶到中国，当面感谢中方支持，上合十国防长全部到齐[The Iranian Defense Minister rushed to China overnight to personally thank the Chinese side for its support. All ten defense ministers of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization were present], Sohu, June 26, 2025, https://www.sohu.com/a/908051021_121462186.
[28] Chen Qinhan, “Yuánzhuō ｜ cǐ lún yǐ yī chōngtū huìdǎozhì yīlǎng zhèngquán gēngdié ma？” 圆桌｜此轮以伊冲突会导致伊朗政权更迭吗？[Will this Israel-Iran conflict lead to regime change in Iran?], The Paper, June 17, 2025, https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_30992652.
[29] Ibid.
[30] “Dǒng Yīfán: Yǐ yī chōngtú, ōuzhōu lìchǎng wèihé níng bā?” 董一凡：以伊冲突，欧洲立场为何拧巴？[Dong Yifan: Why is Europe’s position so awkward in the Israel-Iraq conflict?], Aisixiang, June 24, 2025, https://www.aisixiang.com/data/164215.html.
[31] “Ōuzhōu jiēshǒu yī hé huìtán yǒu nǎxiē kǎoliáng? Zhuānjiā fēnxī” 欧洲接手伊核会谈有哪些考量？ 专家分析 [What considerations does Europe have in taking over the Iran nuclear talks? Expert analysis], CCTV, June 19, 2025, https://news.qq.com/rain/a/20250619A08FLO00.
[32] “Péngpài xīnwén ：Sūn Dégāng：yuánzhuō｜ yǐsèliè cǐ lún néng dǎozhì yīlǎng zhèngquán gēngdié ma？” 澎湃新闻：孙德刚：圆桌｜以色列此轮能导致伊朗政权更迭吗？[The Paper: Sun Degang: Round Table: Can Israel's round lead to regime change in Iran?] Institute of International Studies Fudan University, June 17, 2025, https://iis.fudan.edu.cn/43/66/c6893a738150/page.htm.
[33] Ibid.
[34] “Shi Xunfeng, Túshuō gǔn yǐsèliè yǔ yīlǎng tínghuǒ, zhōngdōng júshì zǒuxiàng rúhé” 图说丨以色列与伊朗停火，中东局势走向如何 [Illustration丨A ceasefire between Israel and Iran, what is the direction of the situation in the Middle East?], The Paper, June 24, 2025, https://m.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_31032902.
[35] “Yǐ yī 12 tiān zhànzhēng jiéshù tínghuǒ kě chíxù ma? Zhuānjiā fēnxī” 以伊12天战争结束 停火可持续吗？专家分析 [Is the ceasefire sustainable after 12 days of war in Iraq? Expert analysis], CNR, June 25, 2025, https://news.cnr.cn/sq/20250625/t20250625_527228959.shtml.
[36] “Liú Zhōngmín jiàoshòu jiù yǐsèliè yǔ yīlǎng tínghuǒ jiēshòu xīnhuá shè cǎifǎng” 刘中民教授就以色列与伊朗停火接受新华社采访 [Professor Liu Zhongmin was interviewed by Xinhua News Agency on the ceasefire between Israel and Iran], Shanghai International Studies University, June 24, 2025, https://mideast.shisu.edu.cn/07/02/c3991a198402/page.htm.
[37] “Yǐ Yī tínghuǒ néng fǒu chíxù? Zhuānjiā: quēfá zhànlüè hùxìn, chōngtú huò chángqī huà” 以伊停火能否持续？专家：缺乏战略互信，冲突或长期化 [Will the Israel-Iran ceasefire last? Experts: there is lack of strategic mutual trust, the conflict may be protracted ], Sina, June 25, 2025, https://news.sina.com.cn/w/2025-06-25/doc-infchyza7831346.shtml.
