Chinese Perspectives on Trump’s Middle East Tour

From May 13 to May 16, Donald Trump embarked on his first major international trip of his second term, a four-day tour of the Gulf, with the U.S. President visiting Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The visit focused heavily on securing business agreements, arms deals, and investment pledges aimed at boosting the U.S. economy. According to the White House, Trump secured enhanced cooperation with Saudi Arabia in sectors such as AI, defense and critical minerals, alongside a $142 billion arms deal and a commitment from Riyadh to invest $600 billion in the United States; meanwhile in Qatar and the UAE, agreements totaling over $1.4 trillion were signed, including plans to construct world’s largest AI campus outside of the U.S.

Beyond the business deals, this tour reflected a notable shift in U.S. policy on several critical regional issues, namely nuclear talks with Iran, engagement with Hamas, relations with Syria, and the ceasefire with the Houthis – negotiated without Israel’s endorsement. Significantly, unlike his previous 2017 trip, this visit to the Gulf did not include a stop in Tel Aviv or a meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, an omission that has been widely interpreted as indicative of a broader strategic orientation in this “Trump 2.0” era.

Against this backdrop, this edition of the ChinaMed Observer examines the Chinese perspective on Trump’s Gulf diplomacy. The first section explores Chinese analyses of Trump’s foreign policy approach in the Middle East. Unsurprisingly, Chinese experts characterize the United States’ Middle East policy under Trump as transactional and commercially driven, mostly in negative terms. The second part breaks down Chinese assessments of the changes in U.S. policy toward specific regional actors and issues, with commentators viewing the deterioration of U.S.-Israel relations as the most consequential development, one that both influences and is shaped by Washington’s shifting approach to the region. Chinese experts also maintain that constraining China’s influence remains a principal objective of U.S. Middle East policy; however, they offer only indirect suggestions regarding the manner in which American actions affect Chinese interests, and the potential responses Beijing might take.

Transactional President Trump

Chinese experts unanimously agreed that President Trump’s Gulf trip exemplifies his transactional vision of politics. Wei Zongyou, a professor at the Center for American Studies at Fudan University, highlighted that Trump prioritized diplomatic and economic wins that could strengthen his domestic political position rather than addressing regional issues.^[1] Wei further argued that this focus on trade and investment deals also serves to realign regional interests with those of the U.S., aiming to curb China’s influence – a goal that appears to take precedence over resolving the region’s real challenges.

Sun Degang, the director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Fudan University, concurs with Wei Zongyou, calling Trump a “transactional president” (‘交易型’总统) whose foreign policy is based on concrete material interests.^[2] Sun underlined that U.S.- Gulf relations are shaped not only by formal state-to-state diplomacy but also by “deeply entrenched and complex networks of nepotism among elites on both sides,” which he believes renders U.S. policy “overly self-interested and short-sighted.”^[3] More bluntly, Liu Zhongmin, professor at the Middle East Studies Institute of Shanghai International Studies University (SISU), characterized Trump's visit as “a blatant money-making trip,”^[4] adding that:

“Trump aggressively leveraged the United States’ advantages to extract wealth from the Gulf states, even blatantly enriching himself and his family, a rare and overt display of greed rarely seen in previous U.S. presidents.”^[5]

That said, Zhao Hai, director of the Department of International Political Studies at the National Institute for Global Strategy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, offers a more nuanced point of view. He characterizes the relationship as more balanced, stating that “both sides ‘got what they needed’: the U.S. secured the promise of large-scale investments from the Gulf states, thereby deepening the U.S.-Gulf security relationship. The Gulf states spent a lot of money buying U.S. arms, which can be understood as a ‘pledge of allegiance’ or ‘protection fee’ aimed at winning over the U.S.”^[6]

Zhao's analysis also echoes that of Zhu Yongbiao, the director of the Center for Afghanistan Studies at Lanzhou University, who argues that “the U.S. [is] attempting to outsource the costs of its Middle East strategy to regional partners themselves.”^[7] According to Zhao, “the main shift in Middle East policy during the ‘Trump 2.0’ era, compared to the past, lies in prioritizing the development of bilateral relations between the U.S. and the Gulf states, while relegating other regional hotspots to a secondary position.”^[8] In his view, Washington is “doing business” to maintain its influence in the region while avoiding involvement in thorny political issues like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Wen Shaobiao, assistant research fellow at the Middle East Studies Institute of SISU, has a similar view, noting that “Trump believes that the reconstruction of Gaza is a responsibility of the Arab states themselves, expecting them to provide both the funding and the manpower. The U.S. will not pay for the reconstruction of Gaza, Trump has made this point very clear.”^[9]

Chinese experts also note a shift in U.S. policy regarding the diffusion of AI technology in the Middle East. While the Biden administration’s approach was characterized by restrictions, under Trump Washington appears to be shifting to a comparatively more ‘generous’ approach. This shift may be partly explained by DeepSeek, which has demonstrated that the U.S. no longer holds a monopoly on advanced AI tech. Sun Degang affirmed that “this way, the U.S. can establish two pillars in the Middle East – the eastern Mediterranean coast (Israel) and the Persian Gulf region (UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar) – to reduce its dependence on East Asia, especially China’s high-tech supply chain.”^[10] From the perspective of the Gulf states, “they hope that the U.S. will lift these sanctions and allow them to integrate into the global value and technology chains dominated by the West, with the U.S. at their center.”^[11]

This issue is important because there is a broad consensus among Chinese experts that Middle Eastern countries are becoming gradually more assertive and independent in their foreign and security policies. These states are now more willing to diverge from U.S. positions on both regional and global matters, aligning with Washington only when they can secure tangible benefits in return. Liu Zhongmin argued that this trend “is irreversible and cannot be undone by the U.S., let alone by the opportunistic, transactional, and utilitarian diplomacy of the Trump administration.”^[12] He further observed that Arab elites are now eager to diversify external relations in pursuit of more balanced foreign policies, turning to non-Western powers in the security domain as well.^[13]

Similarly, Ding Long, professor at the Middle East Studies Institute of SISU, stated that:

“The Gulf countries are unwilling to dance to the tune of the U.S. With the implementation of national transformation strategies, countries such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates have significantly increased strategic autonomy and confidence. These nations are prioritizing domestic economic development and transformation, which necessitates a peaceful external environment. They are not keen on geopolitical confrontation and no longer believe in the security guarantees provided by the U.S.”^[14]

Will this approach be successful? Sun Degang argued that “the policies of the Trump administration are extremely unstable, thereby undermining the credibility of the U.S. strategic commitments.”^[15] Liu Zhongmin, again, was blunt about this:

“Both Trump’s strong emphasis on Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region and the subtle shift in U.S.-Israel relations reflect the increasingly utilitarian and transactional nature of his Middle East diplomacy. In recent months, U.S. policy in the Middle East has become more erratic and unpredictable. Trump’s latest visit to the region, marked by a blatant prioritization of interests and a pragmatic, deal-driven approach, certainly showcases his signature diplomatic style. Yet at its core, it underscores a deeper dilemma: the growing contradiction between the U.S.' strategic retrenchment in the Middle East and its ongoing efforts to maintain regional hegemony.”^[16]

Trump and the Regional Hotspots

According to Zhao Hai, there is considerable continuity in Middle East policy between Trump’s first and second term. Zhao argued that Trump will likely continue “promoting reconciliation in the region, specifically, the normalization of relations between key Muslim-majority countries and Israel, as a means of ensuring Israel’s national security while also preserving U.S. strategic interests in the Middle East.”^[17] However, the transactional nature of Trump’s approach has had important repercussions on how Washington deals with regional flashpoints, a development that has drawn extensive commentary from Chinese experts.

One of the most notable changes concerns the U.S.-Israel relationship. Wen Shaobiao suggested that the choice not to include Israel in Trump’s itinerary may have been strategic as “Trump does not want U.S.-Israel relations to become a disturbance.”^[18] Zhao Hai also commented that bilateral tensions may also stem from personal disagreements between Trump and Netanyahu,^[19] who allegedly sought to influence U.S. policy through the now-dismissed National Security Advisor Mike Waltz.

Against this backdrop, Ding Long observed that “Tel Aviv is facing unprecedented diplomatic isolation.” He noted that the U.S. has effectively “left Israel to face the Houthi challenge alone, further exposing the divergence in regional policy between Tel Aviv and Washington.”^[20] According to Ding, this divergence places Israel at a critical crossroads: it must either align with U.S. policy and work toward a ceasefire in Gaza, or pursue a more aggressive approach, potentially exacerbating the regional situation.^[21] However, Ding also believes that Netanyahu might have limited political flexibility. He contends that “a ceasefire could prompt factions to leave his coalition, potentially leading to the government’s collapse. Therefore, for the Netanyahu administration, abandoning the war option is politically difficult.”^[22]

At the same time, Trump also faces his own constraints. As Liu Zhongmin points out, “the special alliance between the two” imposes limits on how far Trump can criticize Israel or compel it to alter its course of action.^[23]

Regarding Iran, Ding Long noted that:

“While it remains unclear whether a final agreement will be reached, both sides have expressed a strong willingness to reconcile, and tensions have significantly de-escalated. This creates a favorable external environment for de-escalation in the Middle East and the Gaza ceasefire. It also suggests that the possibility of Israel dragging the U.S. into a joint war against Iran has been ruled out in the short term, significantly reducing the risk of regional upheaval.”^[24]

That said, Wei Zongyou argues that this renewed optimism inevitably generates heightened expectations for a potential breakthrough. In contrast, several other experts have a more pessimistic stance on the ongoing talks. For instance, Zhao Beiping, Deputy Director of the Center for Middle East Studies at Shandong Normal University, argued that the U.S. is pursuing too many goals simultaneously, including limiting Iran’s ballistic missile development and ensuring the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program, thus complicating the possibility of reaching a comprehensive deal.^[25] Qin Tian, Deputy Director of the Institute of Middle East Studies at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), also attributed the impasse in part to the lack of trust between Washington and Tehran, stating that they “are currently caught in a dilemma of ‘who will make concessions first.’”^[26]

Despite these challenges, some commentators maintain that a resolution remains possible. Zhao Jun, Associate Research Fellow at the Middle East Studies Institute at SISU, argued that “based on the mutual desire to avoid escalation and their respective practical interests, there is theoretically still a possibility for the U.S. and Iran to reach some form of ‘major deal.’”^[27] He further suggests that a third party with regional and global influence could facilitate the mediation process.^[28]

Turning to the Palestinian issue, Ding Long expressed an optimistic perspective. While Trump initially floated the proposal of the U.S. “taking over Gaza,” Ding notes that “after facing unanimous opposition from Arab countries, the U.S. has also become less enthusiastic about that idea. He adds that recent U.S. efforts to mediate a Gaza ceasefire have placed pressure on Israel and, objectively, contributed to advancing negotiations.^[29] Wei Zongyou, however, cautioned that Trump is generally reluctant to involve the U.S. in complex, resource-intensive issues.^[30] He also notes a fundamental divergence between U.S. and Israeli positions regarding Gaza.

Indeed, both Ding and Wei urged caution in evaluating the depth of Washington’s commitment to peace.^[31] Ding emphasized that the U.S. would need to “weigh the pros and cons of adapting to new regional dynamics versus prolonging the conflict.”^[32]

This tension was illustrated on May 27, when Hamas and the U.S. reached a verbal ceasefire understanding that would have essentially guaranteed Hamas a 70-day ceasefire and resumed unrestricted aid in exchange for the release of ten living Israeli captives. However, the proposal was publicly rejected by Israel. Shortly thereafter, the U.S. dramatically shifted its stance, with U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff condemning Hamas’ attitude as “disappointing and completely unacceptable.” Wei interpreted this abrupt shift as further evidence of Trump’s aversion to sustained diplomatic engagement: while he may not want escalation, he is equally disinclined to commit to prolonged negotiations.

Concerning Syria, Trump had a meeting on May 14 with Syrian interim leader Ahmed al-Sharaa (also known by his nom de guerre Abu Mohammad al-Jolani) in Riyadh, to discuss the potential normalization of bilateral relations and a deal with Iran.^[33] During the talks, Trump extended an invitation for Syria to join the Abraham Accords and normalize ties with Israel, despite an ongoing Israeli aerial campaign against Syria and the continued expansion of Israel’s military occupation over internationally recognized Syrian land.^[34]

Although Chinese expert commentary on this development has been limited, the overall perception is positive. Wei Zongyou stated that “this appears to give the green light to post-war reconstruction in the region, but in reality, it also leaves room for the U.S. to re-engage in Syrian affairs.”^[35] Similarly, Li Haidong, a professor at China Foreign Affairs University, underscored the pivotal role played by Saudi Arabia in facilitating the dialogue, stating that “the communication between the U.S. and Syria was essentially coordinated by Saudi Arabia.”^[36]

Conclusion

There is a widespread perception among Chinese scholars that Trump’s approach is fundamentally “transactional.” He is willing to enact important shifts in U.S. Middle East policy if that allows him to position himself as a successful negotiator in diplomatic and economic fields. Chinese experts point to a range of examples supporting this view, from the easing of restrictions on AI-related products to the U.S.’ cooling relations with Israel. That said, despite the potential for major policy changes, Chinese experts believe that they might likely be short-lived. Describing Trump’s approach as erratic and short-sighted, they cast doubt on his willingness to commit to any specific course of action if met with too much resistance.

Chinese commentators provided only limited and indirect hints as to what all of this means for China. Some argued that containing China remains a key goal of U.S. strategy. Trump’s focus on economic deals with Middle Eastern partners could, in this view, put pressure on Beijing, particularly in areas where it has long benefited from American reluctance to share advanced technologies. While Chinese experts often frame the growing diplomatic independence of regional powers as a trend that reduces U.S. influence and enhances China’s influence, they also acknowledge the risk these same countries may halt or limit their cooperation with Beijing if offered more favorable terms by Washington.

At the same time, some of Trump’s actions, such as his pursuit of an agreement with Iran, are seen as consistent with Chinese interests. However, due to the vague nature of Chinese sources, it remains difficult to understand Beijing’s position on these developments.

For further insight into the evolving landscape of Sino-American relations in the Middle East, we invite our readers to listen to our recent discussion with Grant Rumley (Washington Institute for Near East Policy) and Zhang Chuchu (Fudan University), recently published as an episode of The China-Global South Podcast, in cooperation with our partners at The China-Global South Project.

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Giorgia FACCHINI is Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. She is also a graduate student in International Relations and Institutions of Asia and Africa at the University of Naples “L’Orientale.” Her research interests include China's governance and administrative system, and China’s foreign policy and economic strategy.