Chinese Officials, Experts and Media Discuss the Ceuta Crisis

On July 31, approximately 60,000 people crossed from Morocco into Ceuta, a small Spanish enclave on the North African coast. Overwhelmed, Ceuta became the center of the most recent of a series of EU border crises, including the 2023 Lampedusa crisis, the 2022 Ukrainian refugee crisis, the 2021 Belarus border crisis, and, before that, the 2015 European migrant crisis.

However, unlike those previous episodes, the Ceuta crisis showcased a surprising lack of EU solidarity. Rather than providing or even expressing support, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni called for Spain to be suspended from the Schengen Area. She blamed the influx, which left 88 people dead, on Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez’s recent amnesty scheme which provided a pathway to legal status for up to 1.2 million undocumented migrants and asylum seekers.

Meloni was far from alone. Twenty-two EU leaders signed a letter expressing “serious concern,” explicitly linking the crisis to Madrid’s migrant regularization plans, while several also endorsed Spain being suspended from Schengen. All this despite Ceuta (and its sister enclave of Melilla) already operating under a distinct border regime requiring checks before entry into the rest of the EU; there being no legal mechanism for suspending a member state from Schengen; and the overwhelming majority of those who entered Ceuta having already been returned to Morocco, with none allowed onward to mainland Spain.

Sánchez has condemned the “selfish, polarizing and unlawful reaction,” but the episode has led POLITICO to describe him as “effectively a pariah in the bloc,” arguing that Ceuta revealed “how thin Europe’s patience has worn” with the Spanish PM, one of the very few left-wing leaders left in the European Council. Interestingly, the news outlet suggested that this “frustration” with the Spanish PM may also be connected to China, as Sánchez has “infuriated” other European leaders by “pursuing a softer line” on Beijing.²

Finbarr Bermingham, Chief Europe Correspondent for the South China Morning Post, also made a connection between Ceuta and China. But rather than the intra-EU crisis being the result of Madrid’s friendly policy toward Beijing, he views the lack of solidarity to a member state under hybrid attack as being motivated by party politics. For Bermingham:

“This does not bode well as they stand on the precipice of a trade war with Beijing. Does Brussels still believe a ‘solidarity fund’ can convince capitals to band together to take on China? You can hang as many big-character posters on the side of EU buildings as you like, but we are currently seeing zero solidarity; zero unity.”³

On this note, this edition of the ChinaMed Observer examines how Chinese officials and media have framed the Ceuta crisis, and if Chinese analysts see it as evidence that internal EU divisions could weaken the bloc’s ability to respond to external threats, such as China’s assertive trade policies.

The analysis finds that Chinese officials have largely avoided commenting on the crisis, likely reflecting Beijing’s interest in preserving positive relations with both Spain and Morocco, two increasingly important partners for China. Consequently, Chinese state-aligned media has similarly remained close to the official narratives advanced by Madrid and Rabat. While more “independent” and “outspoken” Chinese news outlets have offered a wider range of explanations for the crisis than their more government-aligned counterparts, they converge on one central argument: the episode has exposed tensions in EU solidarity. This coverage also carries some sympathy toward Spain, portraying Madrid as facing disproportionate criticism from other EU members.

China’s Careful Silence on the Crisis in Ceuta and its Causes

Several European officials and commentators – especially on the right – have blamed a recent Spanish Supreme Court ruling restricting the immediate return of migrants arriving by sea for creating a “pull factor.” However, it must be noted that this decision does cover Ceuta or Melilla, Spain’s – and the EU’s – only two (very militarized) land borders with Africa.

Sánchez has instead argued that the crisis was manufactured by trafficking gangs that deliberately misrepresented the ruling on social media. Moroccan authorities have echoed this explanation. The two sides have in fact maintained coordination and rather cordial official rhetoric, with Madrid careful not to blame Rabat for what it described as “a violation of Spain’s territorial integrity.”

That restraint has not prevented others from drawing a different conclusion. Several analysts, journalists and Spanish officials have contended that Moroccan authorities either tolerated or actively facilitated the crossings. This accusation is not without precedent. Beyond its claim that Ceuta and Melilla are occupied Moroccan territories, Rabat has previously used migration pressure as a diplomatic instrument, particularly in disputes over Western Sahara. Some observers have thus speculated that the crisis was linked to Sánchez’s recent visit to Algeria, Morocco’s regional rival and main backer of the Polisario Front.

Another interpretation, reported by Al Jazeera, situates the episode within Morocco’s close ties with the United States and Israel under the Abraham Accords. According to this reading, the migrant surge was linked to Madrid’s strong pro-Palestine stance, its criticism of the U.S.-Israel war on Iran, and its resistance to U.S. President Donald Trump’s demands for increased European defense spending.⁴ U.S. Vice-President JD Vance offered a different explanation, blaming the events in Ceuta on “far-left globalist policies.”

China, by contrast, has conspicuously avoided endorsing any of these competing narratives, or assigning responsibility. During the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s regular press conference on July 31, spokesperson Mao Ning was asked about Beijing’s position on the crisis. Her response was surprisingly brief:

“China is against all forms of illegal migration. At the same time, we believe relevant parties should enhance coordination and properly handle the issue.”

This was the entirety of Beijing’s official reaction.

As RUSI Associate Fellow Sari Arho Havrén observed on X, this response lacks condolences, did not affirm Spanish sovereignty over Ceuta, and implicitly placed Spain and Morocco on equal footing. For Havrén, this lack of solidarity toward Spain, China’s premier partner within the EU, reflects both China’s growing relationship with Morocco (a trend we have documented extensively in a recent ChinaMed report) and sensitivity over Ceuta as a disputed territory.⁵

However, it must be said that framing two sides on an equal footing, even when one party is widely perceived as the aggressor, is consistent with China’s diplomatic playbook, as shown in the cases of Russia-Ukraine and Iran with the Gulf states. Additionally, while Havrén contrasts China’s curt response with the European Commission’s declaration of “full solidarity” with Spain during the 2021 Ceuta crisis, on this occasion, China’s response, while brief and neutral, was not critical, unlike those from allies and fellow EU member states.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry’s statement also conspicuously avoided addressing the possible causes of the migrant wave. Yet most (but not all⁶) of the Chinese media ecosystem – which provided extensive coverage of the Ceuta crisis – could not entirely sidestep the issue.

A Xinhua explainer (also available in English on CGTN) largely echoed the line advanced by both Sánchez and Moroccan authorities, arguing that “migrant-smuggling networks had deliberately amplified false information on social media,” citing a Moroccan scholar, Mohammed Zakaria Aboudahab of Mohammed V University.⁷

Other interpretations, including claims that Spain’s policies acted as a pull factor or that Morocco sought to punish Sánchez for his rapprochement with Algeria, were mostly absent. This was true across other major outlets, including Guangming Daily, Shangguan News, and Guancha, which likewise only entertained the official Spanish and Moroccan explanation.⁸ Even when covering the accusations by other European leaders such as Meloni, these outlets immediately juxtaposed them with Sánchez’s rebuttals and factual reporting on the legal context of Ceuta and the Schengen Area.

Even experts appeared reluctant to engage with other explanations. In an interview with Jiefang Daily, Jian Junbo, director of Fudan University’s Center for China-Europe Relations Studies, was asked about the speculation that the migrant surge could represent Moroccan “retaliation” against Spain. Jian seemingly set aside these “contingent circumstances” to instead discuss how the crisis was deeply rooted in structural inevitabilities.⁹

Equally absent was the narrative linking the crisis to the U.S. and Israel, despite Chinese media typically not being shy to blame both countries. The sole exception was The Paper, known internationally for its English-language sister publication Sixth Tone and generally regarded as having greater editorial flexibility. Nan Boyi, in an article for The Paper, and Zhang Wuwei, on the outlet’s 907 Editorial Department podcast, openly discussed allegations that Moroccan authorities had facilitated or deliberately tolerated the crossings as a diplomatic bargaining tool, accusations of anti-black racism by Moroccan police, violence by the Spanish Guardia Civil, as well as the “Israel factor.”¹⁰

The Paper also published an analysis by Zhang Lubo, a special correspondent for the outlet and Associate Researcher at the Institute of Mediterranean Studies of Zhejiang International Studies University. Beyond social media and its role spreading misinformation about legal rulings, idealized images of life in Europe and practical guides for migrating illegally, Zhang hypothesizes that Morocco deliberately relaxed restrictions to create an opportunity for a “smuggling rush.” Noting past accusations against Morocco regarding the 2021 Ceuta crisis, Zhang explained the concept of the “weaponization of immigration.” For him:

“The Spanish enclave of Ceuta, located only “a step away” from Morocco, represents a permanent geopolitical pressure point for Spain. In other words, if border control becomes a diplomatic tool, it would mean that Morocco has long-term leverage to influence Spain and even the EU. In that case, the migration issue would extend into the realm of diplomatic bargaining, and even into matters of national security and regional order.”¹¹

Despite this notable exception from The Paper, an outlet with a relatively distinct status, the editorial consistency from the rest of the Chinese press suggests a deliberate effort to avoid antagonizing either Madrid or Rabat, two increasingly important partners for Beijing. Yet one theme was consistently present across all Chinese media coverage and expert commentary: this crisis has exposed divisions within Europe.

Europe’s Fault Lines Exposed

Across all Chinese media coverage of the Ceuta crisis, one recurring theme was EU division. Most of the focus, however, was not on the bloc’s geopolitical cohesion, but rather the strains the migrant influx exposed about the bloc’s migration governance and the Schengen system.

Writing in Guangming Daily, journalist Wang Tianyang argued that the dispute eroded the mutual trust on which Schengen depends and could have lasting repercussions for its future. Journalist Wu Yuzhen, writing for Shangguan News, suggested that the divergent responses have “torn apart the superficial unity of Europe.” According to Wu, these divisions, “coupled with xenophobic sentiments, have led to the increasing politicization of migration issues, raising the bar for reaching consensus and exacerbating the chaotic governance situation,” while doing little to address the underlying reasons why migrants continue to come to Europe.¹²

Wu Huiping of Tongji University’s German Studies Center, speaking to Xinhua, noted how different migration pressures depending on geography have led to varying attitudesamong EU members: southern frontline states continue to demand greater burden-sharing, while several Central and Eastern European countries remain firmly opposed to mandatory migrant relocation. The Xinhua article further argued that migration, and the Ceuta crisis in particular, has become increasingly politicized. Alongside the far-right, even mainstream parties have started to adopt tougher positions on immigration to expand their electoral support, further fragmenting European migration governance.¹³

This interpretation was widely echoed by Chinese scholars and across the entirety of the mainstream Chinese press.¹⁴ In a joint interview with Wenhui Daily, Wu Huiping and Ding Chun, director of Fudan University’s Center for European Studies, likewise portrayed the EU’s migration challenges as structural rather than episodic. Both rejected the claim that Spain’s policies triggered the crisis, arguing instead that migrant numbers have declined over the past decade and that the deeper problem lies in the EU’s failure to coordinate among member states with different demographic and economic realities.¹⁵

For Ding, these structural divisions, reinforced by the rise of far-right parties, make a genuinely common European migration policy unattainable, including the implementation of the EU’s new Pact on Migration and Asylum, which replaces the Dublin Regulation’s “first country of entry” system. Looking ahead, he predicted that Europe would continue to harden its external borders, rely more heavily on North African partners to contain migration, and resort more frequently to temporary border controls within the Schengen Area.¹⁶

Cui Hongjian, professor at the Academy of Regional and Global Governance at Beijing Foreign Studies University, offered a very similar assessment in comments to the Global Times, but also added that:

“the political fallout from criticism of the Sánchez government by officials in the US could extend well beyond the migration crisis itself. If the issue continues to be exploited for political purposes, it risks further straining Madrid’s relations with Washington and could lead to broader diplomatic tensions.”¹⁷

The Global Times was among the few outlets that did not frame the Ceuta crisis solely as an intra-EU migration management issue. While highlighting divisions within the EU and the rise of the far-right, the nationalist tabloid placed slightly more emphasis on the wider diplomatic context, particularly the way the crisis was being used by Washington for its ideological ends.¹⁸ At the same time, it acknowledged that Sánchez’s stance on migration, despite reflecting legal and practical realities and retaining some European support, has left him increasingly “out of step” with the bloc’s overall rightward shift.¹⁹

In an opinion piece for the Global Times (that was translated into English), Dong Yifan, an associate research fellow at the Academy of International and Regional Studies of Beijing Language and Culture University, offered the clearest defence of Spain. While emphasizing that the protection of human rights and dignity remains “an essential component of EU identity,” Dong argued that Spain had “bucked the trend amid Europe’s broader rightward shift on migration” by recognizing “the various benefits legal immigration brings to its national economy and labor market.” He further maintained that the security concerns raised by other EU member states over Spain’s handling of the Ceuta crisis were “devoid of practical foundation.” In his view:

“the bickering among member states over the Ceuta crisis reflects how political headwinds are continually squeezing the space for compromise, coordination and mutual support on EU refugee and migration policy. This persistent governance dilemma and societal anxiety are bound to add fuel to the fire of Europe’s ongoing political rightward shift.”²⁰

Jian Junbo reached a similar conclusion, arguing that the criticism directed at Spain was not about Madrid itself or the “mixed reputation” of the Sánchez government within the EU. Rather, it reflected the fact that migration has become one of the EU’s most politically contentious issues, through which the far-right may gain more influence and power.²¹

Zhang Lubo, writing in The Paper, moved beyond the conventional divide between left-wing support for openness and integration and right-wing demands for stricter controls and deportations. He underscored “a third, increasingly influential approach [which] seeks to externalize border management by preventing migrants from reaching Europe in the first place through partnerships with countries such as Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, and Mauritania.”²²

Zhang argued that this approach, which many Chinese analysts view as the most likely future direction of EU migration policy, has gained momentum and broader acceptance across the political spectrum after the Ceuta crisis. The episode has reinforced the framing of irregular migration as a national security – or even “hybrid” – threat requiring intervention before migrants reach EU borders. As such, rather than weakening European integration, Zhang sees the crisis as consolidating externalized border control as the EU’s most viable response. As he concludes:

“From this perspective, the 2026 Ceuta crisis may represent the beginning of a new phase in European border governance. Its defining features include the direct deployment of military forces, the swift reintroduction of border controls by member states, and the European Commission’s rapid intervention to coordinate the response. Looking ahead, debates over migration are likely to shift away from the traditional ideological divide between openness and restriction, or between the left and the right, and instead focus increasingly on questions of state capacity and the effectiveness of migration governance.”²³

Conclusion

The official Chinese response to the crisis in Ceuta likely reflects in its scarcity a careful balancing act. By avoiding discussing responsibility or causes of the migrant surge, Beijing showed its interest in maintaining good relations with both Spain and Morocco. Chinese state-aligned media largely followed the same line, echoing the narratives advanced by Madrid and Rabat while avoiding interpretations that could place either partner in an unfavorable position, for instance blaming U.S. and Israeli influence on Morocco.

However, at the relative extremes of the Chinese media ecosystem, more differentiated views were expressed. More “investigative” outlets, The Paper in particular, acknowledged allegations of Moroccan involvement. Meanwhile, more nationalist publications expressed greater sympathy for Spain, defending against criticism from other EU member states, the far-right and the Trump administration. Together, these perspectives – although only permitted within the relative margins of the Chinese media landscape – suggest interest in two themes: the potential weaponization of migration as a diplomatic tool and concern for Spain and the implications of Europe’s rightward political shift.

Although the weakness of European solidarity was a recurring theme, Chinese observers largely framed the Ceuta crisis through the lens of migration governance rather than as evidence of the EU’s broader dysfunction. Unlike many Western critics, Chinese analysts did not attribute the crisis to Spanish policies. Instead, they interpreted Ceuta as a manifestation of structural tensions between member states and between the Global North and Global South.

Where Chinese experts differed most was whether these tensions could ultimately be managed. This debate mirrors the wider discussion in China about the EU’s future, particularly its capacity to remain a coherent actor in its relationship with China. The dominant view portrays the EU as politically fragmented, increasingly aggressive, institutionally constrained, and led by weak political leadership, leaving member states vulnerable to external divide-and-rule tactics. Yet a small minority continue to argue that the Union retains a narrow window of opportunity to adapt and strengthen its internal cohesion.²⁴

This debate is reflected in Chinese assessments of the Ceuta crisis and European migration governance. Most Chinese experts argued that a real, effective common EU migration policy is impossible due to divisions between Southern European and Central and Eastern European states, exacerbated by the rise of far-right parties. A few viewed the crisis as accelerating a different trajectory: the emergence of irregular migration as a security or “hybrid” threat that could legitimize further externalization of EU borders. Therefore, Chinese assessments of the crisis in Ceuta were not uniformly pessimistic about the EU’s ability to adapt – though, for now, most are.

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Leonardo BRUNI is the Project Manager of the ChinaMed Project. He is also a Doctoral Researcher in History at the European University Institute. His research interests include China-EU relations, the history of Sino-European relations, and Chinese foreign policy in the wider Mediterranean region.