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In this follow-up to our previous analysis of China’s official position on the Cyprus Problem, we present original interviews conducted by the author with Chinese, Turkish, and Turkish Cypriot academics and experts. Drawing from these firsthand conversations, we examine Chinese, regional, and local perspectives on China’s stance toward this long-standing frozen conflict, as well as the potential role Beijing could play.
The Cyprus Problem briefly returned to international attention following informal talks held in Geneva on March 17, 2025. These discussions brought together representatives from the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot sides, alongside those from Greece, Türkiye, and the United Kingdom. Hosted and mediated by United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres, the talks were described as having made “meaningful progress,” resulting in a series of confidence-building measures. Dialogue is set to continue; however, deep divisions remain regarding the framework for a future settlement. Greek Cypriots continue to advocate for reunification under the UN-prescribed federation model. In contrast, Turkish Cypriots, with Türkiye’s backing, call for a two-state solution based on the formal recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) as a sovereign and equal entity.
However, despite Turkish Cypriot efforts, the goal of international recognition for the TRNC, currently recognized only by Ankara, appears increasingly remote. While the TRNC was recently admitted as an observer to the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), the April 4 summit between the European Union and Central Asian nations has seemingly resulted in some OTS member states backpedaling. At this summit’s conclusion, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan signed a joint communiqué which includes a statement supporting UN Security Council Resolutions 541 and 550, which deem the TRNC’s declaration of independence, and all associated secessionist actions, legally invalid. These Central Asian countries subsequently appointed ambassadors to the Republic of Cyprus, and some observers suggest the OTS may now reconsider the TRNC’s participation, potentially downgrading its status or limiting it to informal engagements.
It is within this context of renewed diplomatic activity and shifting international alignments that we return to the Cyprus Problem, engaging with Chinese, Turkish and Turkish Cypriot experts to assess Beijing’s position and its potential diplomatic influence. Unfortunately, this analysis does not include the equally valid perspectives from Greek and Greek Cypriot voices, and we acknowledge this as a limitation that we intend to address in future work.
China officially recognizes the (predominantly Greek Cypriot) Republic of Cyprus as the sole legitimate authority over the entire island, in accordance with UN resolutions, despite the northern third having functioned as a de facto independent entity for over fifty years. This stance is consistent with China’s long-standing diplomatic principles, particularly its emphasis on sovereignty and territorial integrity.
As previously discussed, Chinese diplomats stationed in Cyprus have at times articulated this stance with notable assertiveness, drawing parallels between the People’s Republic of China’s claim over Taiwan and the Republic of Cyprus’ claim over the island’s north (the supposed “One China, One Cyprus” principle). However, official statements from China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs tend to adopt a more measured and nuanced tone. This likely reflects China’s broader diplomatic strategy, which prioritizes neutrality in international disputes and favors dialogue and peaceful, mutually acceptable resolutions.
In this context, China appears intent on maintaining strong bilateral relations with both Türkiye and Greece, while also preserving a constructive relationship with the EU, of which the Republic of Cyprus is a member. Rather than taking definitive sides, Beijing prioritizes facilitating negotiations, an approach underscored by Assistant Researcher Wang Siyu of Shanghai International Studies University. Although China does not dispute Cyprus’ sovereignty under international law, it also avoids explicitly rejecting Turkish Cypriot claims. This ambiguity allows room for Türkiye’s concerns to be acknowledged without comprom ising China’s diplomatic stance.
Such caution is consistent with China’s broader diplomatic posture toward ethno-political and regional conflicts, as seen in Central Asia and East Africa, where economic integration is leveraged as a tool for conflict mitigation. Wang notes that China’s contribution to the Cyprus issue could manifest through diplomatic mediation and economic engagement, particularly under the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Still, he concedes that China’s influence remains limited, largely due to its lack of direct geopolitical involvement in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Strategic interest in Cyprus has nonetheless intensified following the discovery of substantial natural gas reserves in the region, a development that Assistant Researcher Wen Shaobiao, also from Shanghai International Studies University, highlights as shifting the conflict’s nature from purely ethno-political to one increasingly centered on energy security. However, despite this shift, Wen argues that unless a clear economic incentive or diplomatic opening emerges, China is unlikely to assume an active role. The strong presence of Türkiye, Greece, and the EU already constrains the space for meaningful Chinese involvement. As such, major Chinese investors remain hesitant to commit resources to Cyprus until the conflict finds a resolution.
From a different angle, Associate Professor Zhang Chuchu of Fudan University emphasizes that China’s primary interests in Cyprus lie in trade and cultural cooperation, rather than conflict resolution. The Republic of Cyprus is seen as a valuable EU member state supportive of the BRI, making it a strategic partner within the Union. Furthermore, Zhang notes that China generally refrains from engaging with non-state actors, making formal recognition or direct engagement with the TRNC unlikely. This position aligns with China’s broader foreign policy approach, which avoids entanglement in disputes that do not serve core national interests.
Additional caution stems from China’s sensitivity to Turanist movements, with some of the scholars interviewed pointing to Beijing’s concern over ideologies that might embolden separatist sentiments in Xinjiang. While this caution does not translate into an anti-Türkiye position, it does reinforce China's reluctance to engage in ways that might be interpreted as legitimizing ethnic nationalism, within or beyond Cyprus.
Supporting this perspective, Research Fellow Zou Zhiqiang of Fudan University underscores that China primarily sees the Cyprus Problem as a matter for the United Nations. According to Zou, China neither possesses the willingness nor the capacity to assume a leading role in resolving the issue. Instead, it prefers to endorse existing UN frameworks, particularly the “bi-communal, bi-zonal federation” model outlined in relevant resolutions.
Zou also stresses that, unlike other global powers, China does not treat Cyprus as a strategic bargaining chip. According to him, Beijing does not explicitly link the dispute to its own sovereignty concerns over Taiwan or the South China Sea. While China is open to playing a constructive role, it does not seek the position of primary mediator. Rather, it encourages regional actors, especially the EU and Türkiye, to lead reconciliation efforts.
In conclusion, the prevailing consensus among Chinese scholars suggests that Beijing will continue its cautious approach to the Cyprus Problem. Despite its global diplomatic and economic reach, Cyprus remains a low-priority issue for Chinese foreign policy. While the BRI could offer pathways for engagement, persistent political uncertainty deters investment. China’s desire to maintain balanced relations with both Türkiye and Greece further disincentivizes any assertive stance. Moreover, concerns over separatist movements in Xinjiang contribute to Beijing’s reluctance to engage with Turkish Cypriots. Unless a compelling strategic rationale or formal invitation emerges, China is expected to preserve its current non-interventionist posture.
Cyprus, situated at the crossroads of Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa, holds strategic significance for China due to both its geographic location and the Republic of Cyprus’ status as an EU member state. The Republic of Cyprus (which Turkish and Northern Cypriots officially refer to as the “Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus” or more simply “Southern Cyprus”) has actively promoted itself as a gateway for Chinese companies seeking access to European markets, and it has attracted affluent Chinese nationals through its controversial “Golden Passport” and “Golden Visa” schemes. Despite these economic incentives, China’s political engagement with Cyprus remains limited, a stance likely shaped by its broader diplomatic considerations involving Türkiye, Greece, the EU, as well as its own sensitivities regarding secessionist movements.
Against this backdrop, Turkish Cypriot experts largely characterize China’s involvement in Cyprus as minimal, cautious, and primarily economic motivated, rather than politically driven. While a few analysts recognize the potential for China to act as a balancing force, most contend that Beijing has historically aligned itself more closely with the Greek Cypriot side, thereby reinforcing the status quo rather than contributing to a resolution of the conflict.
China’s limited presence in Cyprus stands in stark contrast to the visible involvement of actors such as the UK, the U.S., France, and, more recently, Russia. This absence, as Professor Sertaç Sonan (Cyprus International University) puts it, makes China “conspicuous by its absence,” a deliberate posture that reflects Beijing’s unwillingness to complicate an already intricate geopolitical landscape. From his perspective, China neither has the will nor perceives an imperative to intervene actively.
This stance is echoed by Professor Ahmet Sözen (Eastern Mediterranean University), who characterizes China’s approach as one of deliberate disengagement. Given that Cyprus problem negotiations are supervised by the United Nations under the bi-communal, bi-zonal framework, and not conducted between two sovereign states, Sözen notes that Beijing’s non-recognition of the TRNC effectively rules out any formal engagement with Northern Cyprus outside the UN mechanism.
Professor Muhittin Tolga Özsağlam (European University of Lefke) reinforces this view, highlighting that while China maintains robust economic and political ties with Southern Cyprus, it remains unlikely to play a proactive role in resolving the island’s division. This tendency toward neutrality aligns with China's broader diplomatic strategy of avoiding direct involvement in regional disputes that do not touch upon its core interests.
Among Turkish Cypriot scholars, a common thread emerges: a perception that China aligns more closely with Southern Cyprus. This is particularly evident in the assessment of Professor Erol Kaymak (Eastern Mediterranean University), who suggests that China’s position on Cyprus mirrors its "One China" principle, implicitly supporting the idea of a unified Cyprus and, by extension, aligning with the Greek Cypriot side. China’s endorsement of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, often invoked by Greek Cypriots to justify their Exclusive Economic Zone claims, further supports this alignment. Notably, these legal references also bolster China’s own maritime claims in the South China Sea, indicating a pragmatic coherence in its foreign policy.
Professor Hasibe Şahoğlu (Girne American University) points to China’s voting behavior at the United Nations as another indicator of alignment. Although initially abstaining on Cyprus-related issues, Beijing’s voting pattern has gradually converged with that of other permanent Security Council members, typically favoring the Greek Cypriot position. This shift, she argues, is less about ideology and more about economic pragmatism. As an EU member, Southern Cyprus offers China a strategic entry point into European markets, an incentive that heavily influences its diplomatic calculations.
Beyond economics, Cyprus is increasingly framed as part of a wider geopolitical contest. Professor Devrim Şahin (Cyprus Science University) observes that the conflict has evolved beyond a local dispute, becoming entangled in the rivalries of guarantor powers. China’s non-interventionist approach, while consistent with its global policy, does little to alter this dynamic and leaves the regional status quo intact.
Yet this apparent neutrality is not without nuance. Professor Sadık Akyar (Girne American University) argues that China’s posture has subtly shifted in response to Türkiye’s growing presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, seeking a more balanced approach that avoids alienating either side. However, he does not specify the nature of these adjustments. Akyar also highlights Chinese concerns about Cyprus’ “Golden Visa” program, which has enabled affluent Chinese nationals to obtain EU citizenship. This issue has supposedly led Beijing to adopt a more cautious stance in its relationship with Southern Cyprus.
Further complications are evident in educational diplomacy. Plans to open a branch of a Chinese university in Northern Cyprus were reportedly blocked by Greek Cypriot authorities, a development that, according to Akyar, underscores China’s reluctance to openly challenge Greek Cypriot political dominance, even as Beijing engages more deeply with Türkiye.
China’s broader geopolitical ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean are also tied to strategic priorities. As Şahoğlu notes, Beijing is less interested in acting as a neutral mediator and more focused on safeguarding trade routes, securing energy supply chains, and maintaining a diplomatic equilibrium with both the EU and Russia. In this context, China’s engagement with Cyprus becomes part of a larger effort to extend its influence across critical maritime zones without entangling itself in contentious sovereignty disputes.
Journalist Hasan Hastürer adds a further dimension, suggesting that China’s historical stance has often followed Russia’s lead, especially in the UN Security Council. However, he proposes that a more independent and objective reassessment of the Cyprus issue could allow China to engage more meaningfully with Turkish Cypriots and perhaps assume a more constructive role.
This possibility is echoed by Rauf Alp Denktaş (President of the Board, Rauf Denktaş University), who situates China’s engagement with Cyprus within the framework of its core international principles, such as its “One China” policy and deference to UN-mediated resolutions. He suggests that deepened Turkish-Chinese relations might eventually create an opening for Beijing to reassess existing UN positions on Cyprus.
Nonetheless, skepticism persists among many Turkish Cypriot experts. Professor Şahin cautions that China’s historical preference for preserving the status quo, coupled with its aversion to geopolitical risk, makes it an unlikely candidate for mediation. Professor Sözen concurs, maintaining that China’s long-standing commitment to non-intervention ensures that Cyprus will remain a peripheral concern on Beijing’s diplomatic agenda.
In conclusion, Turkish Cypriot experts generally see China involvement in Cyprus as largely driven by economic interests and its relations with the European Union, Russia, and Türkiye. They also see Beijing as more aligned with the Greek Cypriot side, particularly in its support for a unified Cyprus, an approach that mirrors its stance on Taiwan. Although some analysts argue that recent successes in Türkiye’s foreign policy have led China to adopt a less confrontational stance, these adjustments have not translated into tangible benefits for Northern Cyprus. As a result, Turkish Cypriots remain skeptical of China’s neutrality, perceiving Beijing more as a passive observer than as a possible active mediator.
The Cyprus issue remains a central point of contention in Eastern Mediterranean politics, with Türkiye and Greece holding diametrically opposed positions. Türkiye emphasizes the security and political equality of the Turkish Cypriots, advocating for a two-state solution that recognizes the TRNC as a sovereign entity. In contrast, Greece and the Republic of Cyprus support the bi-communal, bi-zonal federation model within the framework of UN resolutions, aligning with the EU’s stance on preserving Cyprus as a unified state.
Turkish experts mostly agree that China’s engagement in the Cyprus issue is limited, driven primarily by economic interests rather than a desire to mediate or resolve the dispute. China’s alignment with the status quo reflects its broader non-interventionist foreign policy and the need to balance its relationships with multiple actors, including the EU, Türkiye, and Greece.
China’s approach to the Cyprus issue appears to be guided not by a direct stake in the conflict, but rather by its broader strategic priorities and foreign policy principles. As Dr. Altay Atlı (Koç University) observes, Beijing’s posture is fundamentally shaped by its preference for stability over change, a stance that naturally leads to opposition toward any revisionist agendas, including the recognition of the TRNC. This position aligns with China’s Taiwan policy, which emphasizes territorial integrity and rejects separatist movements, further reinforcing its insistence on diplomatic continuity and international legal norms.
Atlı also notes that China’s official statements consistently endorse a “comprehensive, just, and lasting settlement” within the framework of United Nations resolutions, specifically in support of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. This not only places China firmly within the bounds of international law, but also allows it to maintain neutrality and avoid direct confrontation with Türkiye, an important regional partner. Atlı also underscores the importance of China’s engagement with the Republic of Cyprus as part of its wider European strategy. Cyprus, in this context, serves as a logistical and investment gateway into the European Union, and the reciprocity in diplomatic support is evident: while the Republic of Cyprus backs China’s position on Taiwan, Beijing returns the favor by supporting Nicosia within the UN system.
Dr. Emre Demir (TED University) adds another dimension to this perspective, arguing that China views Cyprus less as a political or ideological matter and more as an issue embedded within geopolitical and economic calculations. From his point of view, unless Beijing is formally invited to participate in a mediation process, it is unlikely to become actively involved in the dispute. China’s default position, therefore, remains one of cautious distance. This caution is understandable, Demir continues, given the complexity of the Cyprus issue, which is deeply tied to Türkiye’s national security doctrine and heavily influenced by EU dynamics. For Chinese policymakers, involvement would pose a diplomatic dilemma, as it risks straining relations with key stakeholders: Türkiye, Greece, and the EU. Thus, any future participation would likely be conditional on a formal request that aligns with China’s strategic interests and enables it to preserve its neutrality in the Eastern Mediterranean.
This preference for economic engagement over political intervention is echoed by Dr. Ceren Ergenc (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona), who draws a broader comparison between China’s role in Cyprus and its involvement across the Middle East and North Africa. In her view, China perceives Cyprus primarily as an economic node, a hub for supply chains and connectivity under the BRI, rather than a venue for political engagement. She argues that Beijing’s track record in regional conflict resolution, as seen in its limited impact in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and in Syria, reveals that China lacks both the diplomatic leverage and contextual understanding required to play a meaningful role in solving the Cyprus Problem. Furthermore, Ergenc, much like other experts, suggests that China’s position is heavily influenced by its Taiwan policy; any move that could be construed as endorsing separatist entities would risk setting a precedent that undermines its own national interests. Yet, from the perspective of the Republic of Cyprus, China is not considered a major actor in the negotiation process. Instead, it is viewed as a secondary player, one that may serve as a balancing force, but not a decisive mediator.
Atlı and Ergenc also point to the increasingly complex nature of China’s relationship with Europe, which is undergoing a recalibration amid global political shifts, including the return of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency. These developments have prompted Beijing to reassess its trade diplomacy strategy, contributing to a broader realignment of its economic priorities. In this evolving environment, China’s multilateralism and economic diplomacy may allow it to assume a secondary or supportive role in the Cyprus issue. However, as Atlı argues, Beijing is unlikely to exert direct pressure on any of the involved parties. Instead, it will continue to advocate for an UN-based resolution, seek to safeguard its strategic interests in the region, and avoid entanglements that could jeopardize its carefully calibrated relations with both European and Eastern Mediterranean stakeholders.
Prof. Kadir Temiz, President of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies (ORSAM), one of the few scholars to have examined China’s position on the Cyprus issue, suggests that Beijing's stance is influenced by broader political developments in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean. For Temiz, China’s main objective in this geographically distant region is to leverage U.S.-EU tensions to its advantage and enhance its prestige within the Global South. To achieve this, he argues, China must balance its relationships without taking a clear position, as seen in its approach to Israel and Gaza, as well as Cyprus.
Temiz is somewhat more optimistic about Sino-Turkish relations, emphasizing that Türkiye is a key actor China cannot ignore. He suggests that Ankara could facilitate Chinese involvement in Syria's reconstruction, and China recognizes the destabilizing consequences of any negative shift in Türkiye’s regional position. Consequently, Temiz argues that China will pursue a flexible, geo-economically focused foreign policy on Cyprus. While it will not be a primary mediator, he sees the possibility of Beijing playing a facilitating role. He also notes that, given Russia’s declining influence in the region, a crisis in Cyprus may present China with an opportunity to consolidate its diplomatic and economic power in the Eastern Mediterranean.
To sum up, Turkish experts do not foresee a significant increase in China’s involvement in the Cyprus issue. However, while most scholars believe that Beijing is hamstrung by its concerns over Taiwan, non-interventionist diplomatic principles, desire to maintain good relations with all parties, and preference for maintaining the status quo, others give more importance to broader regional dynamics. They suggest that global and regional shifts, such as Türkiye’s stronger position or a possible Russian withdrawal, could lead China to play a facilitating role to defend its interests and keep instability at bay.
On this note, it is worthwhile to consider the broader region when analyzing China’s position on the Cyprus Problem. While the immediate stakeholders—Cypriots, Türkiye and Greece—remain central, the evolving regional landscape, particularly involving Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and Palestine, significantly shapes the strategic calculations of external actors, including China.
First, as noted by some of our scholars, China is likely to deepen its engagement and come to terms with Türkiye, not only due to growing economic ties with Ankara, but also because of Türkiye’s expanding influence in Syria following the collapse of the Assad regime. Indeed, Ankara was widely seen by Chinese experts as the country that benefitted the most from that event. Moreover, reports of Uyghur militants occupying senior positions in the new Syrian administration are a major concern for Beijing, directly impacting its regional security considerations. Meanwhile, Russia’s future role in the region remains uncertain, especially regarding the status of its naval base in Tartus, as it increasingly shifts military focus toward Libya, where it may once again find itself indirectly at odds with Türkiye.
Second, rising instability in the region poses a threat to Chinese interests. With Iran and Hezbollah weakened, Israel has taken a more aggressive posture, not only resuming attacks in Gaza, breaking the ceasefire to the disastrous detriment of Palestinian civilians, but also expanding its occupation over additional parts of southern Syria. At least to some extent, this assertiveness was likely enabled by expectations of support from the incoming Trump administration. Yet, while Trump’s first term was marked by strong support for Israel and a confrontational stance toward Türkiye and Iran, his current unpredictability is prompting regional actors to both pursue engagement with him in hopes of striking deals and simultaneously hedge by aligning with other powers. Chinese experts have been paying great attention to these developments.
Amid these complex and overlapping regional tensions, China is trying to promote its Global Security Initiative, including in the Eastern Mediterranean. As conflicting interests intensify, maintaining a neutral stance on Cyprus while engaging constructively with all relevant actors may prove increasingly difficult for Beijing. Insights from our interviews with Professor Sadık Akyar, Professor Kadir Temiz, and Dr. Emre Demir suggest a growing hope that China may reconsider its current passive position and begin using its economic and diplomatic leverage to facilitate greater dialogue on the Cyprus issue. One potential approach could be pragmatic cooperation with key regional players such as Türkiye, Greece, Egypt, and the European Union. This could encourage China to play a more active role, particularly economically, in the Eastern Mediterranean and in Cyprus, to promote stability and safeguard its strategic interests in this increasingly crucial region.
This article explores China's stance on the Cyprus Problem through interviews with Chinese, Turkish, and Turkish Cypriot scholars. While China officially supports the Republic of Cyprus under UN resolutions, it avoids direct involvement in the conflict, preferring a neutral, status-quo-oriented approach that prioritizes diplomatic balance with both Türkiye and Greece. Chinese experts emphasize that Beijing lacks strategic incentive or geopolitical urgency to mediate, although some see potential for limited engagement through economic tools like the BRI.
Turkish Cypriot academics largely view China’s role as minimal and pragmatic, shaped more by its EU relations and concerns about separatism, especially in Xinjiang, than by local dynamics. Many argue that China subtly aligns with Greek Cypriot positions and has historically supported the unified state model, mirroring its “One China” principle.
Turkish scholars agree that China’s position is driven by non-interventionism and economic priorities. While some suggest China could play a future facilitating role, especially if regional instability escalates or Russia influence declines, most believe Beijing will remain a passive observer unless invited or compelled by major geopolitical shifts.
Ultimately, despite China's rising global profile, almost all analysts believe that policymakers in Beijing do not perceive Cyprus as a priority. China is expected to continue advocating UN-led solutions while safeguarding its regional interests through cautious diplomacy and economic engagement.
Ahmet Faruk ISIK is Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. He is also a Ph.D. candidate at Shanghai International Studies University with a project on Comparative Politics and Area Studies. His research interests include Türkiye’s relations with Greater China and the economic and political dimensions of Chinese foreign policy toward Türkiye.
