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On October 9, after indirect talks in Egypt between Israel and Hamas, the two sides reached an agreement on the “first phase” of Trump’s 20-Point Gaza Peace Plan. During this initial phase, a ceasefire came into effect with both sides agreeing to halt hostilities.[1] Israeli troops were expected to withdraw to a temporary “Yellow Line” inside the enclave while Hamas was required to release all living hostages and return the bodies of deceased hostages in exchange for almost 2,000 Palestinian prisoners held by Israel.[2] On November 25, Qatari and Egyptian mediators met in Cairo to discuss the second phase of the agreement, despite accusations of ceasefire violation by both Israel and Hamas.[3]
This issue of the ChinaMed Observer analyzes Beijing’s official position and the Chinese expert debate on the ratification of the ceasefire agreement. While official statements endorsed the “two-state solution” as the only viable solution to the conflict, both Chinese officials and scholars remain highly skeptical of the sustainability of the deal, which faces significant challenges ranging from the complete lack of trust between Israel and Hamas to the mercurial nature of the Trump administration, which has assumed the responsibility to safeguard the agreement.
On October 10, Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi stated Beijing’s official response to the first-phase of the Gaza ceasefire during his official visit to Switzerland:
“China welcomes all efforts aimed at restoring peace and saving lives. The humanitarian disaster in Gaza is a stain on the 21st century, and humanity’s conscience must be awakened.”[4]
In the speech that followed, Wang underscored Beijing’s principles of inclusivity and national ownership of the peace process in three appeals. Firstly, that all parties should work together toward regional stability. Secondly, that future arrangements for Gaza should respect the will of the Palestinian people according to the principle of “Palestinians governing Palestine” (Bā rénzhì Bā, 巴人治巴). Lastly, he emphasized China’s endorsement of the Two-state Solution (Liǎng guó fāng’àn, 两国方案) as the only viable framework to resolve the conflict. As per Beijing’s role in the peace process, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun declared China’s willingness to work with the international community to achieve “a comprehensive, just, and lasting resolution to the Palestinian question and to promote peace and stability in the Middle East.”[5]
However, several officials have voiced concern regarding the practical implementation of the next phase of the ceasefire agreement. At an open debate of the UN Security Council on October 24, China’s Permanent Representative to the UN Fu Cong warned that recurrent violations of the ceasefire risk undermining any prospect of lasting peace.[6] He urged Israel to fulfill its obligations under international humanitarian law as the occupying power by lifting remaining “restrictions on aid operations conducted by humanitarian agencies.”[7] Previously, Fu had also criticized the United States for complicity, it using its veto power in the Security Council role to enable Israel’s actions and exacerbate the humanitarian crisis in Gaza:
“If it were not for the United States’ repeated abuse of the veto, the Security Council’s response to the Gaza crisis would not have been so inadequate. If it were not for the United States’ shielding of Israel, Council resolutions and international law would not have been so flagrantly violated.”[8]
These statements are not that dissimilar from those made by Chinese officials in the past. Domestically, however, Chinese media have conveyed a far less nuanced opinion on the topic. In particular, state broadcaster CCTV struck a sharp tone in its coverage of the Sharm El Sheikh Summit by labelling it a “shallow and hollow political PR stunt (zhèngzhì zǒuxiù, 政治走秀)” rather than a solemn conference, and pointing out the absence of representatives from both Israel and Hamas:
“What was most surprising was that the ceasefire agreement, which common sense suggested should have been signed between Israel and Hamas, ultimately turned into a document […] jointly signed by the four mediators: the United States, Egypt, Qatar, and Türkiye.”[9]
Chinese scholars discussed the motivations that led both parties to reach an agreement on the ceasefire, acknowledging both internal factors and external pressure. Internally, both sides were showing clear signs of war fatigue, and their leaders faced rising domestic pressure to halt the fighting, at least temporarily. This, according to Chinese analysts, played a key role in creating a shared incentive to advance toward compromise.[10] On this foundation, there is broad consensus that it was external pressure from the international community that played the decisive role – especially for Israel – which has faced growing diplomatic isolation due to its actions in Gaza, even from the United States and European partners.
Li Shaoxian, President of the China-Arab Research Institute at Ningxia University, argued that with no major shift in Israeli policy toward the war, the current ceasefire can be largely attributed to President Donald Trump’s pressure.[11] Sun Degang, Director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Fudan University, however, doubted Trump’s genuine concern by characterizing his efforts as primarily driven by his desire to win the Nobel Peace Prize.[12] With regards to European countries, Su Xiaohui, Associate Researcher at China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), posited that widespread anti-Israeli sentiment drove governments and enterprises to weigh more seriously the reputational risks associated with dealing with Israel.[13]
That said,Chinese experts believe there is a dual nature to American pressure on Israel. For instance, Li Yanan, Deputy Director of Institute of Middle East Studies at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), argued that while Trump was behind Netanyahu accepting the ceasefire, the U.S. remains a significant supporter of Israel, providing it with continued political leeway despite its unprecedented diplomatic isolation.[14]
As for Hamas, it was also facing significant pressure, both to accept and reject the deal. On the one hand, as noted by Liu Zhongmin, Director of the Middle East Studies Institute at Shanghai International Studies University (SISU), accepting the terms risked alienating Islamist organizations and the wider “Axis of Resistance.”[15] On the other, Qatar, Egypt, and Türkiye, in coordination with the U.S., were actively mediating the conflict and were forcefully pushing Hamas to accept the agreement, especially after the Israeli strike on Doha aimed at killing Hamas negotiators on September 9, 2025.[16] For Li Yanan, regional states, alarmed by the Israeli strike and determined not to be dragged into military escalation, pressed Hamas to moderate while the U.S. constrained Israeli actions.[17] Even so, she argued, regional mediators’ priority remains that to “create a favorable environment to implement their own development plans.” [18]
Since Hamas’ negotiating position was remarkably weaker than Israel’s, rejecting the plan would have placed moral and political responsibility for the continued conflict entirely on itself – it “had no cards left.” [19] According to this understanding, Fudan Professor Sun Degang considered the U.S. commitment to act as guarantor of the agreement as the critical assurance that ultimately persuaded Hamas’ leadership to accept the deal.
As discussed, Chinese experts see significant factors that have pushed Hamas and Israel toward an agreement. Many noticed that the large-scale hostage exchange and the withdrawal of Israeli forces are “more thorough” and “significant” than in previous agreements,[20] providing a crucial window for meaningful humanitarian relief and crisis management in Gaza. While Zhu Yongbiao, Executive Director at the Research Center for the Belt and Road in Lanzhou University, expressed that, if implemented thoroughly, this settlement could mean a major breakthrough in the conflict,[21] other observers stressed that the first phase’s swiftness was due to its “transactional character,” as the parties were essentially picking low-hanging fruits.[22]
Given the short-term nature of this convergence, the Chinese debate remains largely pessimistic about the long-term prospects for peace, fearing the accord is unlikely to mark a fundamental shift in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. With the transition to the second phase still pending, many scholars foresee procedural and political issues that could likely derail the entire process. Niu Xinchun, Professor at the China-Arab Research Institute in Ningxia University, captured this general sentiment by assessing that the now-completed first phase of negotiations is but the “first step towards ending the conflict.”[23]
Qin Tian from CICIR’s Institute of Middle East Studies concurred, noting the similarities between current negotiations and the January 2025 ceasefire, which ultimately stalled despite promising initial outcomes.[24] Stressing the importance of maintaining momentum, he stated that:
“If the second phase cannot be initiated quickly and early, it may result in a loss of mutual trust between the two sides and could also bring about the risk of renewed conflict.”[25]
Experts also unequivocally pointed out that key issues such as Hamas’ disarmament were delegated to the second phase of the negotiations, making it “crucial and challenging.”[26] According to Dong Manyuan, a senior research fellow specialized in Middle East studies and ethnic issues at China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), Hamas’ disarmament is a core issue whose procedural details remain highly ambiguous:
“Does it mean they disarm on their own, or are they forced to disarm by external forces? Should an international stabilization force be established first to supervise and implement Hamas’s disarmament, or should the Israel Defense Forces [...] take action themselves if Hamas refuses to disarm?”[27]
Dong warned that this ambiguity could even work in Tel Aviv’s favor, “if Hamas refuses to disarm, the U.S. and Israel will blame Hamas, and Israel will be able to restart the fight.”[28] Similarly, the destruction of Hamas’ tunnels is another issue that could bring the truce to a quick end. Both locating the small tunnels and deciding who and how to destroy them remains a time-consuming problem complicated by the looming danger of clashes re-erupting at any moment.[29]
After all, according to Chinese experts, extremist actors on both sides are still capable of deliberately provoking violence to advance their own agendas.[30] On the Israeli side, the “two-state solution” endorsed by the international community and accepted by Hamas is far from a mainstream stance in Israeli domestic politics, where disruptive and intransigent actors benefit from positioning themselves as hardliners on the Palestinian question.[31] Sun Degang warned that this divisive rhetoric may push Prime Minister Netanyahu to adopt a tougher line to win the next general elections by complying with the demands of far-right officials known for their uncompromising stance against Hamas, such as National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir.[32]
“Against this backdrop, the Israeli government may be forced to resume military operations to win over right-wing voters [...] even promising to ‘completely eradicate’ [Hamas].”[33]
Regarding Hamas, Professor Ding Long of the Middle East Studies Institute at SISU argued that the group may be unable or unwilling to satisfy Israel’s conditions for hostage exchanges, as some bodies may simply be unrecoverable for the time given, thus contributing to a perceived lack of good faith.[34] Moreover, Niu Xinchun underscored the suspicion that Hamas may intend to use the remains of hostages as leverage in the negotiations.[35]
In general, all these risks stem from the fact that the two sides’ bottom lines are irreconcilable.[36] Hamas, as a resistance movement, insists it will only disarm once Israeli military occupation in Palestine ends. Israel, viewing Hamas as a terrorist organization, is unwilling to end the war until Hamas is eliminated. Accordingly, Niu maintained that Hamas’ very existence may continue to serve as a pretext for Israel’s right to claim that negotiations are impossible, stall any peace process and undermine Palestinian moderates.[37] Though they appear to be mortal enemies, extremists on both sides ultimately sustain one another.[38] As such, Chinese experts seriously doubt the ceasefire can develop into a long-term peace settlement, because “the core demands of the two sides are fundamentally different.”[39]
Trump’s Peace Plan was not nearly as consequential as the war it sought to end, which has profoundly reshaped both Israel and Hamas’ standing, as well as regional power dynamics over the past two years. Chinese experts discussed possible scenarios that could emerge from Israel and Hamas’ decisions, and by extension, the role that the United States and Iran may play in sustaining or undermining the ceasefire.
According to Niu Song, an associate professor at the Middle East Studies Institute at SISU, both parties find themselves in a “lose–lose” situation worse than at the start of the war.[40] On the one hand, Hamas’ monopoly over Gaza has been shaken while the group and its Iran-backed allies in the region suffered significant military setbacks. On the other hand, Israel has neither retrieved all hostages nor eradicated Hamas as a security threat.[41] Israeli actions in Gaza have also severely damaged its moral standing and international image, leading numerous countries to recognize the State of Palestine. Li Yanan linked Tel Aviv’s diminishing diplomatic standing to Washington’s loss of credibility and its contested hegemonic influence, ultimately undermined by its unrestrained support for Israel’s military operations in Gaza.[42]
Chinese observers expect the Trump administration to prioritize upholding the agreement by fulfilling its responsibility as the guarantor state, leaving Israel with fewer legitimate grounds to resume hostilities.[43] Nevertheless, they worry this may not alter Washington’s unwavering and unrestrained support to Tel Aviv.[44] In this context, Su Xiaohui, Director of the Department for American Studies at CIIS, observed that moral pressure on the U.S. has already decreased because of the Summit and its short-term results.[45] This is why it was labelled as a mere “political stunt” (政治表演) by CCTV.[46] For Niu Xinchun, the core problem is that Trump and Netanyahu interpret the agreement in fundamentally different ways. For Trump, its primary value lies in the ability to make a sweeping claim of diplomatic success and celebrate a foreign policy achievement. For Netanyahu, however, this is just a temporary situation.[47]
Equally temporary, however, may be Israel’s enhanced security environment following its military actions against the Axis of Resistance.[48] Liu Zhongming, argued that Tel Aviv’s reliance on “expansion through military power” has set a dangerous precedent that is likely to push Arab states toward deeper security cooperation with other regional actors such as Iran and Türkiye.[49] This potential “wave of reconciliation” may coalesce into a regional mechanism aimed at containing Israel’s hegemonic aspirations. Pointing to the Israeli strike on Qatar as a watershed moment in regional security, Niu Xinchun commented:
“Before the conflict, both Israel and the Gulf Arab states considered Iran to be their greatest security threat. Now, almost all countries, including Iran, Türkiye, and Arab nations, view Israel as their greatest security threat.”[50]
Hamas’ position, by contrast, is generally characterized as fighting for survival. Israel’s clearly defined bottom line is the complete removal of Hamas from Gaza’s governance, a stance understood by both Western and Arab states and endorsed by Trump’s Peace Plan, which, if carried out fully, would result in Hamas’ political demise.[51] However, Hamas’ operations eliminating the Doghmush clan, a Palestinian group suspected of collaborating with Israel, and other alleged collaborators, suggest to some Chinese analysts that it may be premature to declare the organization dead.[52] Hamas’ apparent struggle to maintain control within the Strip indicates its determination to remain and participate in Gaza’s post-war governance. As both Niu Xinchun and Liu Zhongmin observed:
“Recent developments show Hamas has restored governance in Gaza after Israeli withdrawals, demonstrating that both its combat and administrative capacities remain intact.”[53]
As such, both Niu and Liu raised doubt on the difficulty of determining at what point Hamas can be considered disbanded. As mentioned earlier, this cannot but risk giving a pretext to Netanyahu to resume the war.[54] After all, estimating Hamas’ fighting force has always been problematic, especially after the slowing down of Israeli military operations provided it with breathing room to rebuild its forces.[55]
Unsurprisingly, the lack of Palestinian national ownership over the ceasefire deal, including Hamas’ exclusion from it, was widely interpreted as a setback for Palestinian self-governance. Sun Degang observed that the current settlement merely acknowledges the Palestinian people’s “wish” for statehood, without any reference to a “two-state solution.”[56] Liu Zhongmin warned that the marginalization of the Palestinian Authority led by Fatah (a secular nationalist movement opposed to Hamas) in the drafting of the agreement risks further dividing the Gaza Strip from the West Bank by placing the former under an externally appointed administration – something he likens to a form of colonial governance.[57] After all, Netanyahu has repeatedly shown he is more interested in “creating more divisions within Palestinian society,” substantiating the suspicion that “the Israeli leadership will not allow an independent Palestine” to exist.[58] In this vein, Israel’s control of the territory behind the “Yellow Line” in Gaza could become permanent and further its aim to completely remake the security and organizational model in the Strip.[59] Qin Tian contends that this is ultimately a counter-productive move, because Israel will inevitably undermine the prospects of long-term peace if it insists on completely excluding Hamas from Palestinian politics.[60]
Among these scenarios, Iran, the principal supporter of Hamas, appears to be the least concerning actor. Severely weakened by the Twelve-Day War against Israel, Chinese experts agree that Tehran is now primarily interested in de-escalation.[61] Even if Liu Yanting, Middle East observer at Guancha,[62] defined the relationship between Hamas and Israel and, by extension, between Iran and the United States, as one of “symbiotic hostility,”[63] she argued that having reached a rare convergence with regard to the conflict in Gaza, all sides, and especially Iran, are intent on preventing escalation into a full regional war.[64]
The Chinese official position on the issue reiterated the importance of collaborating with the Palestinian people as the ultimate solution to the conflict. Principles such as “Palestinians governing Palestine” and the two-state solution, in Beijing’s view, must be taken into consideration for a just resolution of the conflict. Unsurprisingly, some officials grasped the opportunity to criticize both the United States and Israel’s behavior, stating that Washington’s use of its veto to shield Tel Aviv in the Security Council and Israeli attacks on civilians compromised the already complex situation and worsened the humanitarian crisis in Gaza.
As for the expert perspective, there is widespread criticism of the same actors and concern over the sustainability of the ceasefire. Chinese commentators have widely denounced the transactional nature of Trump’s deal. The lack of a detailed timeline for the implementation of the plan’s next steps and the frequent ceasefire violations further complicate the seemingly irreconcilable demands of the warring parties, Israel and Hamas. According to Chinese experts, the biggest issue in Trump’s Peace Plan is the lack of consideration for the root causes of the Gaza War, itself part of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Given Israel’s ultimate objective being to disarm and eliminate Hamas, as prescribed in the deal, and Hamas being unlikely to accept its exclusion from Gaza’s future governance, Chinese experts expressed concern regarding the durability of an agreement that marginalized, if not excluded, Palestinian agency in both its formulation and implementation.
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Ádám KOI is a Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. He is a PhD candidate in Sinology at ELTE Eötvös Loránd University in Budapest. His primary areas of research are China’s governance and administrative system, and China’s foreign policy and economic strategy.
Giorgia FACCHINI is a Research Fellow at the ChinaMed Project. She is also a graduate student in International Relations and Institutions of Asia and Africa at the University of Naples “L’Orientale.” Her research interests include Sino–Middle Eastern relations, with a focus on China’s role in key maritime chokepoints and strategic corridors, and its economic interests and foreign policy behavior in the region.
[1] Mariel Ferragamo, “A Guide to the Gaza Peace Deal,” Council of Foreign Relations, October 29, 2025, https://www.cfr.org/article/guide-trumps-twenty-point-gaza-peace-deal.
[2] Jason Burke, “Israel and Hamas hand over bodies as part of Gaza ceasefire deal,” The Guardian, November 3, 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/nov/03/israel-remains-hostages-gaza-hamas.
[3] Sky News, “Talks begin on the next phase of Gaza ceasefire deal as Hamas and Israel hand over remains,” November 26, 2025, https://news.sky.com/story/talks-begin-on-the-next-phase-of-gaza-ceasefire-deal-as-hamas-and-israel-hand-over-remains-13475639.
[4] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC, “Wang Yi States China’s Position on First-Phase Agreement Regarding the Gaza Conflict,” October 11, 2025, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjbzhd/202510/t20251013_11731389.html.
[5] Global Times, “China hopes for a permanent and comprehensive ceasefire in Gaza, advocates ‘Palestinians governing Palestine:’ FM,” October 9, 2025, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202510/1345228.shtml
[6] Global Times, “Chinese envoy calls for durable ceasefire in Gaza,” October 24, 2025, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202510/1346415.shtml
[7] Ibid.
[8] People’s Daily, “China expresses disappointment over U.S. veto of UN Gaza draft resolution: envoy,” October 3, 2025, https://en.people.cn/n3/2025/1003/c90000-20373779.html
[9] CCTV Chinese, “《Jīnrì Yàzhōu》20251014” 《今日亚洲》20251014 [Asia Today, 20251014], October 14, 2025, https://tv.cctv.com/2025/10/14/VIDEIvf9vOaLpigyBZ6VWFhx251014.shtml?spm=C45305.PiIkmPvmwrBJ.E3GBGR5JxwmC.29.
[10] Wenhui News, “Bā rén zhì Bā” cái shì Jiāshā chōngtú jiějué zhī dào“ 巴人治巴”才是加沙冲突解决之道 [“Palestinians governing Palestinians” is the true solution to the Gaza conflict], October 16, 2025 https://www.shobserver.com/staticsg/res/html/journal/detail.html?code=whb&date=2025-10-16&id=468283&page=4
[11] CCTV Chinese,”《Huánqiú Shìxiàn》 20251013 Bā Yǐ Hù Shì Bèi Kòu Rényuán Měi Zài Zhōngdōng Shàngyǎn ‘Hépíng Xiù’” 《环球视线》20251013巴以互释被扣人员 美在中东上演“和平秀” [Global View 20251013: Palestine and Israel Mutually Release Detained Persons; US Stages “Peace Show” in the Middle East], October 13, 2025, https://tv.cctv.com/2025/10/13/VIDEGU7zUqSmBEQ2MSpTYj93251013.shtml.
[12] Nanfang+, “Jiāshā tínghuǒ tánpàn yíng zhòngdà jìnzhǎn, Yǐ méi chēng ‘zhànzhēng yǐjīng jiéshù’? Yī wén dúdǒng →” 加沙停火谈判迎重大进展，以媒称“战争已经结束”？一文读懂→ [Gaza ceasefire negotiations see major progress, Israeli media claims “the war is already over”? Understand it in one article →], October 9, 2025, https://static.nfnews.com/content/202510/09/c11798578.html.
[13] Nie Shuyi, “Jiědú｜Yǐ Hā Dáchéng Běn Lún Chōngtū Yǐlái ‘Dì Sān Fèn’ Tínghuǒ Xiéyì, Zhànzhēng Néng Yínglái Zhōngjú Ma?” 解读｜以哈达成本轮冲突以来“第三份”停火协议，战争能迎来终局吗？ [Analysis | Israel and Hamas Reach ‘Third’ Ceasefire Agreement Since Start of Conflict - Can This War Finally End?], The Paper, October 9, https://m.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_31746319
[14] CCTV Chinese “《Shēndù Guójì》20251011 Jiāshā: Hépíng shǔguāng chū xiàn?” 《深度国际》20251011加沙： 和平曙光初现？ [In-Depth Word, 20251011: Gaza: a Dawn of Peace?], October 11, 2025, https://tv.cctv.com/2025/10/11/VIDEAU5mAt1qgUO5IIcWZSNb251011.shtml
[15] Liu Zhongmin, “Liú Zhōngmín: Ràng Jiāshā tuōlí Bālèsītǎn, yóu Měi Yǐ Yīng gòngguǎn, zhè huò shì Tèlǎngpǔ de zhēnshí mùdì” 刘中民：让加沙脱离巴勒斯坦、由美以英共管，这或是特朗普的真实目的, [Liu Zhongmin: Having Gaza separate from Palestine and placed under joint US-Israel-UK administration—this might be Trump’s true objective], Guancha, October 11, 2025, https://www.guancha.cn/LiuZhongMin/2025_10_11_792810_s.shtml.
[16] Nandu, Jiāshā kùnjú yuánzhuō duìhuà: Xiéyì shuāngfāng sùqiú gè yì xià de hù xìn nántí yǔ fùzá zǒushì加沙困局圆桌对话：协议双方诉求各异下的互信难题与复杂走势 [Roundtable on the Gaza Dilemma: Challenges of Mutual Trust and Complex Trends Amid Differing Demands from Both Sides of the Agreement], October 23, 2025, https://m.mp.oeeee.com/a/BAAFRD0000202510221134085.html.
[17] See note 14, CCTV Chinese, October 11, 2025, https://tv.cctv.com/2025/10/11/VIDEAU5mAt1qgUO5IIcWZSNb251011.shtml.
[18] Ibid.
[19] See note 13, Nie Shuyi, The Paper, October 9, 2025, https://m.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_31746319.
[20] See note 15, Liu Zhongmin, Guancha, October 11, 2025, https://www.guancha.cn/LiuZhongMin/2025_10_11_792810_s.shtml.
[21] Fan Anqi, “Israel and Hamas agree to first phase of Gaza peace plan but questions remain,” Global Times, October 9, 2025, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202510/1345189.shtml
[22] Ibid.
[23] See note 14, CCTV Chinese, October 11, 2025, https://tv.cctv.com/2025/10/11/VIDEAU5mAt1qgUO5IIcWZSNb251011.shtml.
[24] See note 11, CCTV Chinese, October 13, 2025, https://tv.cctv.com/2025/10/13/VIDEGU7zUqSmBEQ2MSpTYj93251013.shtml.
[25] Ibid.
[26] CCTV Chinese, ”《Jīnrì Guānzhù》20251023 Měi gāoguān mìjí fǎng Yǐ bǎo tínghuǒ? Yǐsèliè yào tūnbìng Yuēdànhé Xī’àn?” 《今日关注》20251023 美高官密集访以保停火 以色列要吞并约旦河西岸？[Today’s Focus: U.S. Senior Officials Visit Israel in succession to Safeguard Cease-fire Settlement; Does Israel Intend to Annex the West Bank?] October 23, 2025, https://tv.cctv.com/2025/10/23/VIDE0z6uvh7aaLQQKnCgPmXz251023.shtml.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid.
[29] CCTV Chinese, “《Jīnrì Guānzhù》20251026 Měi: “Guójì bùduì” bùjiǔ jìn Jiāshā Yǐ: Jiāshā dìdào 60% shàngwèi cuīhuǐ?”《今日关注》20251026 美：“国际部队”不久进加沙 以：加沙地道60%尚未摧毁？[US: “International forces are to enter Gaza soon, Israel: 60% of Gaza tunnels not yet destroyed?] October 26, 2025, https://tv.cctv.com/2025/10/26/VIDEutM0WtzWSCn6MmNEWOp9251026.shtml.
[30] See note 16, Nandu, October 23, 2025, https://m.mp.oeeee.com/a/BAAFRD0000202510221134085.html.
[31] See note 11, CCTV Chinese, October 13, 2025, https://tv.cctv.com/2025/10/13/VIDEGU7zUqSmBEQ2MSpTYj93251013.shtml.
[32] See note 16, Nandu, October 23, 2025, https://m.mp.oeeee.com/a/BAAFRD0000202510221134085.html.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Jiefang Daily, “Tínghuǒ xiéyì lái le, yìng gǔ tou zài hòu miàn? Hāmǎsī jiě chú wǔ zhuāng, Yǐsèliè quán miàn chè jūn, Jiāshā zhàn hòu zhì lǐ děng nántí dài jiě” 停火协议来了，硬骨头在后面？哈马斯解除武装、以色列全面撤军、加沙战后治理等难题待解 [The ceasefire agreement has arrived, but the tough part is yet to come? Issues such as Hamas disarming, Israel’s complete withdrawal of troops, and post-war governance in Gaza remain to be resolved], October 10, https://www.jfdaily.com/staticsg/res/html/journal/detail.html?code=jfrb&date=2025-10-10&id=466989&page=07.
[35] CCTV Chinese, “20251016 Yǐfāng fǒurèn dì èr jiēduàn tánpàn kāishǐ. Hāmǎsī chēng yǐjūn wéifǎn tínghuǒ xiéyì” 20251015以方否认第二阶段谈判开始 哈马斯称以军违反停火协议 [U.S. Israel denies that the second-phase negotiations have begun; Hamas claims the Israeli military violated the ceasefire agreement], October 16, 2025, https://tv.cctv.com/2025/10/16/VIDECulLAQCGEUGwQbxh2xfg251016.shtml.
[36] See note 16, Nandu, October 23, 2025, https://m.mp.oeeee.com/a/BAAFRD0000202510221134085.html.
[37] CCTV Chinese, “《Shēndù Guójì》20251025 Jiāshā tínghuǒ kùnjú yǔ chūlù”《|深度国际》20251025 加沙停火 困局与出路 [In-Depth World, 20251025. Gaza Ceasefire: Dilemmas and Solutions], October 25, 2025, https://tv.cctv.cn/2025/10/25/VIDEWkXLxtQO0xMwkoBH20Ph251025.shtml.
[38] Ibid.
[39] See note 16, Nandu, October 23, 2025, https://m.mp.oeeee.com/a/BAAFRD0000202510221134085.html.
[40] See note 10, Wenhui News, October 16, 2025, https://www.shobserver.com/staticsg/res/html/journal/detail.html?code=whb&date=2025-10-16&id=468283&page=4.
[41] See note 14, CCTV Chinese, October 11, 2025, https://tv.cctv.com/2025/10/11/VIDEAU5mAt1qgUO5IIcWZSNb251011.shtml.
[42] Ibid.
[43] See note 16, Nandu, October 23, 2025, https://m.mp.oeeee.com/a/BAAFRD0000202510221134085.html.
[44] Xinhua, “Explainer: 2 years into conflict, is peace in Gaza on the horizon?,” October 8, 2025, https://english.news.cn/20251008/ed4766c104dd427baef5f84f3b6196ab/c.html.
[45] See note 35, CCTV Chinese, October 16, 2025, https://tv.cctv.com/2025/10/16/VIDECulLAQCGEUGwQbxh2xfg251016.shtml.
[46] See note 9, CCTV Chinese, October 14, 2025, https://tv.cctv.com/2025/10/14/VIDEIvf9vOaLpigyBZ6VWFhx251014.shtml.
[47] CCTV Chinese, “《Jīnrì Yàzhōu》20251013 Yǐ fāng bèi kòuyā rényuán yǐ shìfàng, yǐ zǒnglǐ: zhànzhēng réng wèi jiéshù; fèixū zhī shàng, Jiāshā chóngjiàn huò xū shí nián,” 《今日亚洲》以方被扣押人员已释放，以总理：战争仍未结束；废墟之上，加沙重建或需10年 [Asia Today: Detainees held by Israel have been released; Israeli Prime Minister: The war is not over yet; Amid the ruins, Gaza’s reconstruction may take a decade],October 13, 2025, https://tv.cctv.com/2025/10/13/VIDEPQGZPQqwozwd2cynzK5y251013.shtml.
[48] Jiefang Daily, “Chōngtū liǎng zhōunián zài tán tínghuǒ, Hāmǎsī tí liǎng dà yāoqiú, Hā Yǐ jiāohuàn dài shì rényuán míngdān; Xīn yī lún tánpàn néng fǒu xīmiè Jiāshā zhànhuǒ?” 冲突两周年再谈停火，哈马斯提两大要求，哈以交换待释人员名单：新一轮谈判能否熄灭加沙战火 [Ceasefire Talks Resume on Second Anniversary of Conflict: Hamas Puts Forward Two Major Demands, Parties Exchange Lists of Detainees to Be Released. Can the New Round of Negotiations Extinguish the Flames of War in Gaza?], October 9, 2025, https://www.jfdaily.com/staticsg/res/html/journal/detail.html?code=jfrb&date=2025-10-09&id=464861&page=08
[49] Ibid.
[50] See note 14, CCTV Chinese, October 11, 2025, https://tv.cctv.com/2025/10/11/VIDEAU5mAt1qgUO5IIcWZSNb251011.shtml.
[51] Ibid.
[52] See note 35, CCTV Chinese, October 16, 2025, https://tv.cctv.com/2025/10/16/VIDECulLAQCGEUGwQbxh2xfg251016.shtml.
[53] Ibid.
[54] Ibid.
[55] See note 37, CCTV Chinese, October 25, 2025, https://tv.cctv.cn/2025/10/25/VIDEWkXLxtQO0xMwkoBH20Ph251025.shtml.
[56] See note 12, Nanfang+, October 9, 2025, https://static.nfnews.com/content/202510/09/c11798578.html.
[57] See note 15, Liu Zhongmin, Guancha, October 11, 2025, https://www.guancha.cn/LiuZhongMin/2025_10_11_792810_s.shtml.
[58] See note 37, CCTV Chinese, October 25, 2025, https://tv.cctv.cn/2025/10/25/VIDEWkXLxtQO0xMwkoBH20Ph251025.shtml.
[59] See note 29, CCTV Chinese, October 26, 2025, https://tv.cctv.com/2025/10/26/VIDEutM0WtzWSCn6MmNEWOp9251026.shtml.
[60] See note 11, CCTV Chinese, October 13, 2025, https://tv.cctv.com/2025/10/13/VIDEGU7zUqSmBEQ2MSpTYj93251013.shtml.
[61] Yanting Liu, “Zhè liǎng gè guānjiàn wèntí dōu méi líqīng, āijí qiāntóu ‘zhōngdōng běiyuē’ shì xiǎng duōle” 这两个关键问题都没厘清，埃及牵头“中东北约”是想多了 [Without clarifying these two key issues, Egypt’s idea of leading a “Middle East NATO” is wishful thinking], Guancha, September 28, 2025, https://www.guancha.cn/LiuYanTing/2025_09_28_791658.shtml.
[62] Guancha.cn is a Chinese-language online political news platform developed by the Shanghai Chunqiu Development Strategy Research Institute.
[63] Yanting Liu, “Zhǒngzú mièjué jiūchán jiànguó huànmèng, liùfāng bóyì juédìng jiāshā jiéjú” 刘燕婷：种族灭绝纠缠建国幻梦，六方博弈决定加沙结局 [Genocide Intertwined with the Dream of Nation-Building, Six-Party Game Determines the Outcome of Gaza], Guancha, August 25, 2025, https://www.guancha.cn/LiuYanTing/2025_08_25_787661.shtml
[64] Ibid.
