January 2022

In early January, China hosted the foreign ministers of six Middle Eastern countries – Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, Iran, and Turkey – and the secretary general of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Unsurprisingly, this series of diplomatic visits was at the center of Chinese commentaries in January. Other important issues that were covered by Chinese media include the 30th anniversary of the establishment of relations between China and Israel, as well as Somaliland’s contacts with Taiwan.

“China's diplomacy in East Africa, the Middle East and the Indian Ocean has started the New Year with a bang!” wrote Zhou Rong, a senior scholar at Renmin University’s Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies. [1] Unsurprisingly, Chinese commentators showed great enthusiasm for what Shanghai International Studies University’s (SISU) Niu Song called the “Middle East week.” [2] Writing for the Xinmin Evening News, Niu makes a number of interesting comments. To begin, China’s goal for these meetings is twofold. In the short term, the visits are part of the efforts to build diplomatic support for the Beijing Winter Olympics. In the long run, China wants to preserve and strengthen the momentum created by Minister Wang Yi’s trip to Africa in early January to show the priority that it attaches to those two regions. In doing so, it is building relations with those “pivot countries” that that are seen as playing a crucial role in protecting and expanding Chinese interests. In other words, the countries that sent their ministers to Beijing are those that China perceives as being the most powerful and useful in the Middle East. Secondly, Niu argues that these visits are a demonstration of the increasing level of maturity of China’s Middle East diplomacy, as well as an indicator of the broader trends in the region as economic development, rather than security competition, is becoming the main priority for its countries. Liu Zhongmin made the same point. [3] Such an assessment is not new among Chinese experts, as we have reported in the past. Naturally, this also reflects the success of China’s own political and economic model, as the Global Times promptly celebrated in two articles made of select quotes from a number of foreign experts. [4] It is particularly interesting to read the assessment made by Niu Xinchun, a senior scholar at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, who is usually very pragmatic and cautious in his comments. According to him, what is happening does not reflect only China’s growing importance as an energy market and economic partner for the region, but, also more broadly, a transition of power. [5] According to him, “China's Middle East policy faces unprecedented opportunities.”

However, both Liu and Ding Long, another scholar based at SISU, argue that the smooth development of Sino-Middle Eastern ties faces challenges. According to Liu, the most important one is growing American pressure on countries in the region to limit their cooperation with China, though he argues that China has neither an interest in nor an intention to fill the power vacuum created by the American disengagement from the region. [6] Ding, instead, points to the low level of institutionalization of the cooperation between China and the region, as well exemplified by the continuous delays in the negotiations over a China-GCC free trade agreement. [7] Ding, however, did not make any prediction about if and when the agreement will finally be concluded.

To a large extent, the comments on the status of Sino-Israeli relations on the 30th anniversary of their establishment reflect a similar understanding of the situation. Chinese commentators, such as the Shanghai Institute of International Studies’ Li Weijian, do not expect Israel to give up its special relationship with the United States but, at the same time, they appear sure about Israel’s willingness to preserve and expand cooperation with China. [8] Israel, thus, is in a similar position to other countries in the region: it has to manage the concerns of the United States while pursing its real interests, which lie in stronger relations with China. Once again, this narrative was strengthened by the Global Times publishing excerpts from Israeli media complaining about the United States. [9]

That said, sometimes things go wrong. This is the case with respect to contacts between the authorities in Somaliland and those in Taiwan. According to He Wenping, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences who was interviewed by the Global Times on this issue, Somaliland is trying to use the competition between China and the United States to increase its chance of receiving international recognition. [10] In this context it is important to mention that Robert C. O’Brien, Donald Trump’s Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, wrote an article in The National Interest calling for American support for Somaliland against the expansion of Chinese influence in Africa. In any case, He does not believe that much will happen between Somaliland and the United States.

Against this background, Liu Zhongming published three very long pieces in The Paper on democratization in the Middle East and North Africa since the Arab Spring. [11] While these three pieces are largely descriptive and summarize the role of the military, identity politics, and religion in the development of political institutions in the region, Liu concludes that democracy is the future of the region. However, he also points out, it will not be Western-style democracy but a local variant, influenced by religion and local history. Other Chinese experts made similar comments, for example, while discussing the situation in Sudan, and arguing that the era of military dictatorships is over. However, none of them has so far clarified what democratic institutions in the region should look like, and how they should influence regional politics.

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